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
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HISTORY OF PRUSSIA

BY

HERBERT TUTTLE



VOLUME IV. — (1756-1757)



Herbert Fuller

HISTORY OF PRUSSIA
UNDER FREDERIC THE GREAT

1756—1757

BY
HERBERT TUTTLE
ASSISTANT PROFESSOR IN CORNELL UNIVERSITY

AN ANECDOTAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

BY
HERBERT E. ADAMS



BOSTON AND NEW YORK:
J. B. LIPPINCOTT AND COMPANY
The Riverside Press, Cambridge



Herbert Fuller

HISTORY OF PRUSSIA
UNDER FREDERIC THE GREAT

1756—1757

BY

HERBERT TUTTLE

LATE PROFESSOR IN CORNELL UNIVERSITY

WITH A BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

BY

HERBERT B. ADAMS



BOSTON AND NEW YORK
HOUGHTON, MIFFLIN AND COMPANY
The Riverside Press, Cambridge



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PUBLISHERS' NOTE.

As Mr. Adams intimates in his biographical sketch of Mr. Tuttle, the present volume in continuation of his *History of Prussia* was left by the author in MS., ready for the printer. It was considered more expedient to publish this portion, even though it does not complete the plan he laid out for himself, since his plan called for publication by sections. To attempt to complete the series from Mr. Tuttle's notes would be to make the remainder of the work, after all, a history by another hand. The only editorial work required, therefore, to supplement the author's very careful preparation of his MS., was the scrutiny of the proofs as the pages passed through the press, to bring the book in all particulars into line with the previous volumes, and the provision of an index.

Boston, 26 February, 1896.

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF HERBERT TUTTLE.¹

BY HERBERT B. ADAMS.

HERBERT TUTTLE was born November 29, 1846, in Bennington, Vermont. Upon historic ground, near one of the battlefields of the American Revolution, the coming historian of the wars of Frederic the Great received his earliest training. His parents removed to Hoosick Falls, Rensselaer County, New York, in 1853, when their son was seven years old. Boy-like, he continued to love the scenery and associations of his birthplace, and improved every opportunity to visit his grandparents at Bennington. Probably his taste for history was early

¹ The basis of this sketch was a paper on "The Historical Work of Professor Herbert Tuttle," contributed by the present writer to the Proceedings of the American Historical Association, 1894, and published in the Annual Report for that year. That paper has been revised and somewhat extended by the aid of materials supplied by Mrs. Herbert Tuttle. Thanks are due to Charles J. Tuttle, Esq., father of the historian, and to Frederick B. Tuttle, his brother, for their helpful coöperation. Mr. Frederick B. Tuttle, the only living brother of the historian (two other brothers having died in their youth), was American vice-consul at Chemnitz, Saxony, from the summer of 1889 to the spring of 1893, or through the administration of President Harrison. Two married sisters of Herbert Tuttle, Mrs. Agnes Prentiss and Mrs. Ernest Jones, are living at Hoosick Falls, N. Y.

philosophy, I had Herbert Tuttle for a pupil. It was a stimulus to the class to have such a peculiar mind engaged with them upon the same difficult subject."

Professor Buckham, now president of the University of Vermont, recently said of his former pupil, Herbert Tuttle: "I have the most vivid recollection of his brilliancy as a writer on literary and historical themes, a branch of the college work then in my charge. We shall cherish his memory as one of the treasures of the institution." It was no accident which had led a son of Bennington to the University of Vermont. The beautiful environment of Burlington, on Lake Champlain, the strength of the hills, the keenness of the air, the good sense, the humor and shrewdness of the people among whom he lived and worked, had their quickening influence upon him. Among the permanent characteristics resulting from his Vermont training were a passionate love of nature, a remarkably quick wit, a good judgment in literary and historical matters, and a mature style of expression.

At Burlington, Herbert Tuttle came under the personal influence of Dr. James B. Angell, then president of the University of Vermont, who was one of the great teachers who did most to mould the young man's character and shape his scholarly ambitions. President Angell, now of the University of Michigan, wrote the following interesting reminiscences of the subject of this sketch: —

"I made the acquaintance of Mr. Tuttle when I entered upon the duties of the presidency of the University of Vermont, in 1866. He was just beginning his Sophomore year. He had already learned the art of concentration in

his work, and speedily accomplished any task he undertook. Therefore, when the hour of recreation came, he was as ready for the sports of college boys as any of his comrades. He impressed me at the outset as possessed of an intellectual maturity in advance of his years. He had the power of easy mastery of various branches of study, but I think he was most deeply interested in the study of history and political institutions.

“It was my good fortune to teach him history, and, I think, to be his first teacher in history. I recall with the greatest distinctness the eagerness with which he read, under my guidance, that most suggestive book, Guizot’s ‘History of Civilization,’ and other historical works in connection with it. While his quick and retentive memory easily held in orderly array the records of events, his mind sought with the keenest zest for the principles which determine the course of events, for the forces which build or destroy nations. He displayed a remarkable insight into the philosophy of history. The same characteristics which were so apparent in his ripe historical work were easily to be discerned in his college days. I used to say that some of his historical essays, written on themes assigned him in college, were worthy of a place in any quarterly magazine.

“For his style of writing when a student was as remarkable as his grasp of the principles which govern the growth of political institutions. It had substantially the qualities of his later style. The plan of his essay was always sharply drawn. His points were distinctly made. His sentences were short, sharp, terse. There was no attempt in his papers at what young students are apt to

regard as 'fine writing.' There were no superfluous words or high-sounding phrases. So mature a style I have seen in very few college students. Among the thousands of graduates whom I have seen passing out of college halls, I recall scarcely half a dozen of whose brilliant success in life I cherished so high hopes as of his at the time of their graduation.

"His purpose was to give his life to editorial writing for newspapers. It so happened that soon after his graduation I was able to be of assistance to him in securing a position on the 'Boston Daily Advertiser.' His ability secured him rapid promotion: within a year he was writing leading articles on questions of international law. He was soon after made Washington correspondent. His desire for wider observation and larger attainments led him unwisely, as I then thought, but wisely as the result showed, to resign his place and go to Europe.

"Though his achievements as professor and historian perhaps exceed in value even the brilliant promise of his college days, yet the essential mental characteristics of the professor and the historian were easily traced in the work of the young student. It has been one of the great pleasures of my life that, by correspondence with him concerning his plans and ambitions, I have been able to keep in close touch with him almost to the time of his death. His aspirations were high and noble. He would not sacrifice his ideals of historical work for any rewards of temporary popularity. The strenuousness with which, in his college work, he sought for the exact truth, clung to him to the end. The death of such a scholar, in the very prime of his strength, is indeed a serious loss for

the nation and for the cause of letters. As for myself, who formed so close a relation with him in his student days, I may be pardoned for saying that I heard of his decease with a grief kindred to that of a father."

Herbert Tuttle, like all true Americans, was deeply interested in politics. The subject of his commencement oration was "Political Faith," and to his college ideal he always remained true. To the end of his active life he was laboring with voice and pen for the cause of civic reform. Indeed, his whole career, as journalist, historian, and teacher, is the direct result of his interest in politics, the life of society.

From Burlington, where he was graduated in 1869,¹ he went to Boston, where for nearly two years he was on the editorial staff of the "Boston Advertiser," and intimately associated with Mr. Goddard. His acuteness as an observer and as a critic was here further developed. He widened his personal acquaintance and his social experience. He became interested in art, literature, and the drama. Among the personal friends who at this period most influenced the young man's intellectual and social development, and whom he most valued in after life, were Mr. and Mrs. Goddard, Dr. and Mrs. Henry C. Angell, their sister-in-law, Mrs. Farwell, and John Boyle O'Reilly, editor of the "Boston Pilot." As long as he lived, this poet-editor continued to be one of the warmest friends of Mr. Tuttle. They sent one another their writings and kept up a pleasant correspondence. Among the subjects treated editorially by Mr. Tuttle the following

¹ Twenty years later, in 1889, Mr. Tuttle, by invitation, gave the Phi Beta Kappa oration at the University of Vermont, his *Alma Mater*.

are noteworthy: The Chinese Question; British Free Trade; Transcendentalism; the Jury System on Trial; Mrs. Stowe and her Critics; Anniversary of Emancipation; Philosophy and Crime; The Ocean Cable; Spiritualism and Art.

In October, 1871, Mr. Tuttle sailed from Boston to England with a personal friend, Mr. Roberts, of Burlington. After a brief visit to London they went to Paris, where for about a year Mr. Tuttle served as foreign correspondent for the "Boston Advertiser." He attended lectures at the Sorbonne and the Collège de France. He heard Renan and made the acquaintance of Guizot, who recommended for him a course of historical reading. Mr. Roberts says the lucidity, finish, and graceful delivery of these French lecturers and historians left a profound impression upon Mr. Tuttle's mind. His ambitions were definite and were followed with a singular unity of purpose. The two friends passed in Paris a delightful and busy winter.

Mr. Tuttle spent the summer of 1872 at Geneva, where the Court of Alabama Claims was in session. He was employed by the "New York Tribune" to report the official proceedings. For the "Journal des Débats" Mr. Tuttle wrote an article on the American side of the Alabama question, and it is worthy of remembrance that the French press took the American side in the controversy. Among the magazine articles growing out of Mr. Tuttle's sojourn in Paris was a paper on French Democracy, published in the "Atlantic Monthly" in 1872. He also wrote an article for "Harper's Monthly Magazine" on the Mont de Piété. Mr. Tuttle's journalistic work was

so good that, in the autumn of 1872, he obtained the position of Berlin correspondent of the "London Daily News." Probably this appointment came through the advice and recommendation of Mr. G. W. Smalley, the London correspondent of the "New York Tribune," to Mr. Robinson, the editor of the great English daily. These journalistic associations proved most important for Mr. Tuttle in determining the Prussian tendency of his life-work.

Early in 1873 Mr. Tuttle entered upon his new and important work. For six years he held the honorable and salaried office of Berlin correspondent of one of the greatest London newspapers. During this time he enjoyed the best opportunities for observation in the Prussian capital, for travel and study in Germany, Belgium, Austria, Russia, and the Danube provinces. It was a position requiring great courage and energy. He had to master the German language and to obtain an inside view of the most important political and social affairs of Germany. He had to be accurate as well as clever, and to take the greatest pains to avoid entanglements with foreign officials. During this period he lived in a pleasant suite of rooms and entertained his friends in a style becoming his responsible position. He seems to have realized the virtue of one of his ancestral mottoes: "He lives twice who lives well." His constant observation of the course of German politics and his growing acquaintance with German society enabled him to prepare newspaper and magazine articles with conscious authority. He was drawing his knowledge from life, the best of all historical sources. He knew the men of whom he wrote, not

only the political leaders but the literary men, the scholars, and artists of Berlin. At the official receptions given by the American ministers, Hon. George Bancroft, Hon. Bancroft Davis, and Hon. Andrew D. White, were gathered in those days many of the choicest spirits in the Prussian capital. There the well-known Herbert Tuttle and many of his young countrymen, students at the Berlin University, saw and admired the Prussian Professors, Hermann Grimm, Helmholtz, and Du Bois-Reymond; Von Moltke and other Prussian officers; and famous diplomatists from different nations. The court dress, the brilliant uniforms, the confusion of tongues, — French, German, and English, — made those scenes memorable to many an American student observer whom Mr. Tuttle, or the secretaries of the American legation, Mr. Nicholas Fish or Mr. Coleman, had befriended. The correspondent of the "London Daily News" and of the "New York Tribune" went everywhere in those times, and he made some friends at court. He knew Count Herbert Bismarck, the old Chancellor's son, and was in social touch with statesmen who were then making Prussian history. He became editor of the "International Gazette" (1874-1876), and thus strengthened his interest in the life and literature of his times. It was a bright, well-conducted paper, containing literary notices and editorials on current events, with columns devoted to art, music, and the drama.

While thus living and writing in Berlin, Mr. Tuttle met a young American lady, a student of art, Miss Mary McArthur Thompson, who occasionally contributed art criticisms to the "International Gazette," at the

editor's request. This lady, since well known and highly esteemed in her own country for her suggestive papers on Art and Color, Mr. Tuttle married at the house of her father, Judge Thompson, in Hillsboro, Highland County, Ohio, July 6, 1875. The bride and groom, after visiting President Angell in Ann Arbor, and also Mr. Tuttle's relatives and friends in Hoosick Falls, Bennington, and Boston, returned to Berlin. Mrs. Tuttle's deep sympathy with her husband's literary pursuits, her appreciation of his tastes, her constant companionship, and her artistic temperament, afforded the inspiration and encouragement which he needed in his arduous journalistic work and historical investigations. He told his wife of his dawning ambition to write the history of Prussia. Together they made a trip to the Spreewald, that old home of the Wends, where Wendic speech and manners still survive. Together they prepared that charming article upon "The Prussian Wends and their Home" which was published in "Harper's Magazine" for March, 1877. Mr. Tuttle wrote it and his wife illustrated it. It was one of the germs of his History of Prussia. One or two extracts may fittingly be introduced in this connection, for they illustrate Mr. Tuttle's preliminary study for a great work, begun on a wedding journey and continued under the happiest auspices for many years: —

"This title ['The Prussian Wends and their Home'] describes the remnant of a people once numerous, warlike, and powerful, and the region where they sought a refuge centuries ago from the conquering arms of the Germans. It is, indeed, the only colony which retains anything of the ancient speech and habits. . . . The Northern Wends

cease to have a history of their own after one or two centuries. Those of the Elbe and Spree alone survive in the little colony of the Lausitz swamps, and in the memory of a brave but useless struggle for altar and home. . . . The great body of the Wends fought the invaders step by step, year after year, even century after century. At last the time came when they could no longer resist in the open field; finally the vast swamps of the Spreewald ceased to shelter them, and they have since been losing, day by day, all the elements which made them a distinct people. A Wendish writer says of his kinsmen that 'their nationality, habits, and language are like the rock of Heligoland, from which the beating waves yearly tear away a piece, until finally, the unlucky island shall disappear.' . . . We went directly to Panke's, the best inn in the forest, and making this place our headquarters, we took thence a series of excursions to various points. By this plan one does not in the same time see so much of the forest, but one has better opportunities for studying the queer and interesting people."

The young historian and his artist-wife settled down in a pleasant apartment at No. 22 Hohenzollernstrasse, a fitting home wherein a young American scholar could study the rising fortunes of a great dynasty from its feudal beginnings in a Swabian castle to its ever-growing wealth and power in Nürnberg and Berlin. Mr. Tuttle did not forget his old friends, nor did he cease to exercise the hospitality of which he was ever fond. While constantly gathering materials for his "History of Prussia," he continued his regular work as correspondent of the "London Daily News" and of the "New York Tribune."

The American journalist who thus supplied two great journals and two great countries with political information from Berlin, still continued to be a natural and an acknowledged leader among his countrymen in the German capital. On the Fourth of July, 1876, the Americans in Berlin gave a banquet attended by ladies and gentlemen, with the Hon. Bancroft Davis, the American minister, presiding. Mr. Tuttle was called upon to respond to the comprehensive toast, "Americans in Europe." Among other striking remarks on that patriotic occasion Mr. Tuttle said, speaking of American students abroad : —

"We are content to learn without teaching, to observe without reforming ; and in this sense I shall ask leave to address for a moment that class of students, old and young, who earnestly seek to profit by the study of the social and political institutions of Europe. Holding myself the most needy of them all, what I have to say will be only in the form of suggestion. The first valuable lesson which the thoughtful American learns here in Berlin, for instance, is, in my opinion, to take off his hat when the Emperor drives along the street. I say this with all earnestness, for beneath the practice lies one of the profoundest moral truths in the economy of social life. To say that it is a mere act of servility to a reigning prince, or a recognition of the monarchical principle, is as unjust as it would be to accuse me of reading this company a paltry lesson in etiquette. No, in this act of respect to the head of the State we simply recognize the majesty of the State itself. We do homage to that long series of brave monarchs, to that combination of valor, sagacity,

and patience which expanded the little mark of Brandenburg, almost hiding in the swamps from the savage Wends, into the fair proportions of the Prussian State and the mighty system of the German Empire. We are really in the presence of the immortal heroes of Fehrbellin, of Rosbach, of Sadowa, of Gravelotte, and of a hundred other victorious battlefields. We are uncovered before the Protestant Reformation, to which Prussia and Germany owe so much. And, sir, when we cross the ocean and confront a different form of government, this eternal truth still asserts itself, or ought to assert itself, through all the violence and passion of party conflicts. It is not simply the spirit of this day, it is not the publicity of this occasion, but obedience to an earnest conviction of political duty, which leads me not only to echo your own eulogies upon the first magistrate of the Republic, but to endow him in fancy with all the virtues of Washington, and Jefferson, and Adams, and Lincoln. By this means we exalt our conception of the office, we exalt the office itself. But the base partisan spirit of detraction, the impudent and obtrusive familiarity, the utter want of courtesy to the man for the sake of the high office, from which not even the American President is spared, is more than bad taste, more than a display of ill-breeding, — it is demoralizing and dangerous. And the man who, in the press, or on the platform, or anywhere, fails in that delicate and noble consideration, seems to me to want one of the first qualities of the perfect citizen. He is false to his own better nature, and disrespectful to the long series of names which have rendered illustrious the annals of that great office. Presidents come and go,

— some of them come too soon and go too late, — but they are all links in that glorious succession which for a century makes up the historical harmony of the State. Therefore I plead, Mr. Chairman, for all those trifling courtesies, for all those delicate social observances, which lend dignity to any political system, and exalt the conditions of all public life.

“ If time permitted, I might call attention of American students to other objects worthy their careful notice in Europe. I might mention that recognition of the omnipotence of law which, even among so orderly a people as ours, is not invariably felt in a broad, general, abstract sense. I might set over against the energy and restlessness of American life the element of æsthetic repose, which is an important condition of all great achievements in science, or art, or literature. But these can only be suggested, and others must be wholly omitted.

“ In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, you will permit me, almost a veteran as it were of our little colony here, to pay a slight tribute to the young men whom during a term of four years I have seen come and go. I have known them and watched them carefully. I have observed their lofty scholastic zeal ; I have learned to know their high conscientious purposes ; and as their countryman I can say from the bottom of my heart that I am proud of them. They are not indifferent students ; they are not superficial observers ; and I am convinced that in their chosen professions, whether medicine, law, theology, or political science, they will carry back the best results of foreign study, and a broader equipment for the duties of the American citizen.

"Finally, gentlemen, at the risk of usurping a privilege that might have been claimed by another, and returning to the sentiment with which I began, I take the liberty of proposing the health of our chairman, the American minister, Mr. Bancroft Davis."

In 1876 the Putnams, of New York, published Mr. Tuttle's first book. It was a revision and a collection of various articles on "German Political Leaders," originally published in the "Gentleman's Magazine" from 1875 to 1876. The book is now out of print, but it served a good purpose in the centennial year of the American Republic. In order to give his countrymen a still better understanding of this subject, Mr. Tuttle published another article on "German Political Leaders" in the "Atlantic Monthly" for June, 1883.

From 1876 to 1879 Mr. Tuttle contributed valuable articles to various magazines and journals. Mr. John Morley, in 1877, gladly accepted for the "Fortnightly Review" Mr. Tuttle's paper on "Parties and Politics in Germany." The "Nation," of New York, printed that same year his article on "The Naturalization Treaty with Germany." He supplied "Die Gegenwart," October, 1878, with a leader upon "Die Amerikanischen Wahlen." In 1878 he travelled in Servia and Bosnia with Mr. Arthur J. Evans, son-in-law of the late Edward A. Freeman, the historian. This trip supplied many valuable materials for the "London Daily News," and suggested a long letter to the "Nation," September 12, 1878, on "The Occupation of Bosnia." In August, 1879, another article on German Politics from Mr. Tuttle's pen appeared in the "Fortnightly Review."

That same month he made a trip to Warsaw to witness the Russian military manoeuvres. A letter to Mr. Tuttle from Lord Dufferin, British ambassador at St. Petersburg, is preserved, and it indicates the diplomatic way in which the privilege was secured. "My dear Mr. Tuttle: The emperor has been graciously pleased to direct that you should be given every facility for witnessing the manoeuvres at Warsaw. The minister for foreign affairs has written to the minister of war to that effect." Mr. Tuttle was well known, and cordially received by Lord Odo Russell at the British embassy in Berlin. One result of this trip to Russia was a long letter to the "London Daily News," September 4, 1879, on the state of Russia.

When Mr. Bayard Taylor came to Berlin as American minister, Mr. Tuttle gave him a dinner-party, at which Berthold Auerbach, Paul Lindau, and other literary lights were present. Following Mr. Taylor came the Hon. Andrew D. White as minister to Berlin. He proved, like President Angell, another determining influence in Mr. Tuttle's career. Deeply interested in historical pursuits, Mr. White encouraged the young American in his ambitious project of writing a History of Prussia, and first suggested to him the possibility of an academic career in his own country. More than one promising young American was thus discovered in Berlin by Mr. White. At least three were invited by him to Cornell University to lecture on their chosen specialties: Herbert Tuttle, on History and International Law; Henry C. Adams, on Economics; and Richard T. Ely on the same subject. All three subsequently became university professors.

Mr. White has written the following reminiscences of

Mr. Tuttle: "My acquaintance with Professor Tuttle began in the year 1879, when, on arriving at Berlin as minister of the United States, I found him holding a very responsible position as editorial representative of one of the great London journals. From the first he made a strong impression upon me by his broad knowledge of German politics and by his clear judgment regarding events then taking place. It was a most interesting time; the first Emperor William, the crown prince, afterward the Emperor Frederic, Bismarck, Moltke, and their associates were still active, and the struggle between various parties was at its height.

"Professor Tuttle seemed to have the confidence of leading men of every sort, not merely in politics but in the scientific and literary fields, and as long as he remained in Berlin I found him a most valuable source of accurate information. But his knowledge was not confined to German affairs: he had a clear view of European politics in general, and especially of men and tendencies then dominant in Russia.

"As the representative of his London journal he had visited St. Petersburg, and my knowledge of Russian affairs, gathered as an *attaché* of the American legation before his visit, and as American minister to Russia since, warrants me in saying that his sagacity in looking beneath the surface and grasping the realities of Russian life was truly extraordinary.

"I had not known him long before it was evident to me that he would make a strong professor in one of our American universities. I sounded him on the subject, and it did not surprise me when he accepted an invita-

tion to take up the professorial work of President Angell at the University of Michigan during his absence as minister to China. Hearing on President Angell's return that my expectations regarding Professor Tuttle had been fully justified, I nominated him to the trustees of Cornell University as professor of International Law and Political Science, and he was elected."

Before returning to America, Mr. Tuttle in the fall of 1879 enjoyed a pleasant trip through Italy. He visited Munich, Verona, Venice, Florence, and Rome, where at that time Eugene Schuyler was consul-general. He did everything to make the visit of Mr. Tuttle pleasant and profitable. Together the two friends visited picture galleries and the old Roman ruins. Mr. Tuttle gave an interesting account of his impressions of Rome to his wife, who had already returned to America in June, 1879.

President White had suggested a possibility of lecture engagements for Mr. Tuttle at two or three different American universities, but before this arrangement was consummated he received an invitation from President Angell, of the University of Michigan, to lecture there on International Law during the absence of Dr. Angell as American minister to China. Thus the personal influence first felt at the University of Vermont was renewed after an interval of ten years, and the department of President Angell was temporarily handed over to his former pupil. Mr. and Mrs. Tuttle went to Ann Arbor in September, 1880, and remained there until March, 1881, when they returned to her old home at Hillsboro, Ohio. Here Mr. Tuttle and his wife spent their summer vacations for several years. Mr. Tuttle took great pleasure

in superintending a farm acquired largely by inheritance and partly by purchase in the vicinity of Hillsboro. He enjoyed the outdoor life which kept him in good health and good spirits for work on his History of Prussia.

In the fall of 1881 he was appointed lecturer on International Law at Cornell University. In 1883 he was made associate professor of History and Theory of Politics and International Law at Ithaca. In 1887, by vote of the Cornell trustees, he was elected to a full professorship. I have a letter from him, written March 10, the very day of his appointment, saying : —

“ You will congratulate me on my election, which took place to-day, as full professor. The telegraphic announcements which you may see in the newspapers putting me into the law faculty may be misleading unless I explain that my title is, I believe, Professor of the History of Political and Municipal Institutions in the regular faculty. But on account of my English Constitutional History and International Law, I am also put in the law faculty, as is Tyler for American Constitutional History and Law.”

Professor Tuttle was a member of the Société d'Histoire Diplomatique, and also one of the original members of the American Historical Association, organized at Saratoga, New York, September 9–10, 1884. His name appears in the first annual report (Papers of the American Historical Association, vol. i. p. 43). At the second annual meeting of the association, held in Saratoga, September 10, 1885, Professor Tuttle made some interesting remarks upon “ New Materials for the History of Frederic the Great of Prussia.” By new materials he meant such as had come to light since Carlyle wrote his Life of

Frederic. After mentioning the more recent German works, like Arneth's "*Geschichte Maria Theresias*," Droysen's "*Geschichte der preussischen Politik*," the new edition of Ranke, the Duc de Broglie's "*Studies in the French Archives*," and the Publications of the Russian Historical Society, Mr. Tuttle called attention to the admirable historical work lately done in Prussia in publishing the political correspondence of Frederic the Great, including every important letter written by Frederic himself, or by secretaries under his direction, bearing upon diplomacy or public policy.

At the same meeting of the association, Hon. Eugene Schuyler gave some account of the historical work that had been done in Russia. The author of "*The Life of Peter the Great*," which first appeared in the "*Century Magazine*," and the author of "*The History of Prussia under Frederic the Great*" were almost inseparable companions at that last Saratoga meeting of this association in 1885. I joined them on one or two pleasant excursions, and well remember their good-fellowship and conversation. Both men were somewhat critical with regard to our early policy, but Mr. Tuttle in subsequent letters to me indicated a growing sympathy with the object of the association, which, by the constitution, is declared to be "the promotion of historical studies." In the letter above referred to, he said : —

"You will receive a letter from Mr. Winsor about a paper which I suggested for the Historical Association. It is by our fellow in history, Mr. Mills, and is an account of the diplomatic negotiations, etc., which preceded the Seven Years' War, from sources which have never been

used in English. As you know, I am as a rule opposed to presenting in the association papers which have been prepared in seminaries, but as there will probably be little on European history I waive the principle."

After the appearance of the report of our fourth annual meeting, held in Boston and Cambridge, May 21-24, 1887, Mr. Tuttle wrote, October 18, 1888, expressing his gratification with the published proceedings, and adding, "I think the change from Columbus to Washington a wise one." There had been some talk of holding the annual meeting of the association in the state capital of Ohio, in order to aid in the commemoration of the settlement of the old Northwest Territory.

From the time of his return to America until the year 1888, Mr. Tuttle continued to make valuable contributions to periodical literature, as will be seen in the Bibliography appended to this sketch.

The great work of Professor Tuttle was his History of Prussia, upon which he labored for more than ten years after his return from Germany. From November, 1879, until October, 1883, Mr. Tuttle was engaged upon the preparation of his first volume, which covers the history of Prussia from 1134 to 1740, or to the accession of Frederic the Great. He said in his preface that he purposed to describe the political development of Prussia, and had made somewhat minute researches into the early institutions of Brandenburg. Throughout the work he paid special attention to the development of the constitution.

Mr. Tuttle had brought home from Germany many good materials which he had himself collected, and he

was substantially aided by the coöperation of President White. Regarding this practical service, Professor Tuttle, in the preface to his *Frederic the Great*, said: "When, on the completion of my first volume of Prussian history, he [President White] learned that the continuation of the work might be made difficult, or at least delayed, by the scarcity of material in America, he generously offered me what was in effect an unlimited authority to order in his name any books that might be necessary; so that I was enabled to obtain a large and indispensable addition to the historical work already present in Mr. White's own noble library and in that of the university."

Five years after the appearance of the first volume was published Tuttle's "*History of Prussia under Frederic the Great*." One volume covered the subject from 1740 to 1745; another from 1745 to 1756. At the time of his death Mr. Tuttle left ready for the printer three chapters of the third volume of his "*Frederic*" or the fourth volume of the "*History of Prussia*." He told his wife that the wars of Frederic would kill him. We know how Carlyle toiled and worried over that terribly complex period of European history represented by the wars and diplomacy of Frederic. In the preface to his second volume, Mr. Tuttle said that he discovered during a residence of several years in Berlin how inadequate was Carlyle's account, and probably also his knowledge, of the working system of the Prussian government in the eighteenth century. Again the American writer declared the distinctive purpose of his own work to be a presentation of "the life of Prussia as a state, the development of polity, the growth of institutions, the progress of soci-

ety." He said he had been aided in his work "by a vast literature which has grown up since the time of Carlyle." The description of that literature in Tuttle's preface is substantially his account of that subject as presented to the American Historical Association at Saratoga in 1885.

Professor Herbert Tuttle of Cornell University was perhaps the only original American scholar in the domain of Prussian history. Professors in our universities have lectured upon Prussia, but Tuttle was an authority upon the subject. Professor Rudolf Gneist of the University of Berlin said to Chapman Coleman, United States secretary of legation in Berlin, that Tuttle's "History of Frederic the Great" was the best written. The "Pall Mall Gazette," July 11, 1888, in reviewing the same work, said: "This is a sound and solid piece of learning, and shows what good service America is doing in the field of history." One of Professor Tuttle's Cornell students, Mr. U. G. Weatherly, wrote to him from Heidelberg, October, 1893: "You will probably be interested to know that I have called on Erdmannsdörffer, who, on learning that I was from Cornell, mentioned you and spoke most flatteringly of your 'History of Prussia,' which he said had a peculiar interest to him as showing an American's views of Frederic the Great. Erdmannsdörffer is a pleasant man in every way, and an attractive lecturer." The Heidelberg professor is himself an authority upon Prussian history. He has edited the "Urkunden und Aktenstücke zur Geschichte des Kurfürsten Friedrich Wilhelm von Brandenburg," a long series of volumes devoted to the documentary history of the period of the Great Elector.

In his *Life of Frederic*, Mr. Tuttle took occasion to clear away many historical delusions which Carlyle and Macaulay had perpetuated. Regarding this wholesome service the "*Pall Mall Gazette*," July 11, 1888, said: "It is quite refreshing to read a simple account of Maria Theresa's appeal to the Hungarians at Presburg without the '*moriatur pro rege nostro*' or the picturesque myths that have gathered around it. Most people, too, will surely be glad to learn from Mr. Tuttle that there is no foundation for the story of that model wife and mother addressing Mme. de Pompadour as 'dear cousin' in a note, as Macaulay puts it, 'full of expressions of esteem and friendship.' 'The text of such a pretended letter had never been given,' and Maria Theresa herself denied that she had ever written to the Pompadour."

In the year 1891, at his own request, Professor Tuttle was transferred to the chair of Modern European History, which he held as long as he lived. The courses which were most highly appreciated were his lectures on Politics, International Law, English History, and the Eighteenth Century. His lecture room was filled with appreciative students, and the evidences of their interest will be given in another connection. Possibly some of his academic lectures and his miscellaneous writings may yet be brought together in a memorial volume.

Professor Tuttle had a charming home at Ithaca, and there the writer once enjoyed his hospitality. As formerly in Berlin, so now he continued to seek the society of friends, and always took great pains to entertain them and to show the Cornell sights. He was a good neighbor, and was greatly liked by those who knew him intimately.

He was something of a sportsman, and liked nothing better than to spend a holiday in trout fishing. He would always send the largest fish which he had caught to a friend or neighbor. One who knew him best said it was inspiring to watch him at his tasks, — he was so ardent in the pursuit of truth, so passionate in his devotion to work, of which he always kept the details in perfect order, both in his own mind and on his desk. He was neat and orderly in all that he did. He noticed the details of household management and looked after his premises, the house and garden, as carefully as after his library. Sometimes when he was tempted to devote himself to writing magazine articles, which would bring him quick returns, he would say, after reflection: "After all, my 'History of Prussia' brings me all I have, — my professorship in the university and my home."

When his health began to fail Professor Tuttle became at times greatly worried. He would say, "I take exercise; I observe the laws of health; I try to keep cheerful; I laugh with my colleagues; we take our vacations in the mountains or by the sea; but somehow I do not seem to throw off these bad feelings." As he grew more feeble in body, he became purified in spirit. He said, "My work seems to fade from me like a dream. Even my professorship is too burdensome. When the chimes ring for the opening of the university I shall not be able to go." He was early placed under the care of eminent specialists, but they could only recommend Southern air for his weary lungs. He went South, as he said, to please the doctors and his friends, but not expecting much benefit from the trip. He loved the blue waters of Cayuga Lake, his own

library, and his own home more than all the world. He was, however, somewhat improved by his first trip to the south; not so much by the second. Although in failing health, Professor Tuttle continued to work upon his "History of Prussia" until 1892, and to lecture to his students until the year before he died. Only one week before that sad event, he took a volume of "*Documents sur la Négociation du Concordat et sur les autres Rapports de la France avec le Saint-Siège en 1800 et 1801*" and wrote upon the title-page the following record: "Herbert Tuttle, as member of the Société d'Histoire Diplomatique, which occasionally publishes for the members as free gifts such works as this, in addition to its regular periodicals. So far three numbers have appeared." This was Mr. Tuttle's last bit of writing.

Some time before his death he looked over the manuscript chapters which he had prepared for his fourth volume of the "History of Prussia," and said he would now devote himself to their completion; but the next morning he arose and exclaimed, "The end! the end! the end!" He died June 21, 1894, from a general breakdown. His death occurred on Commencement Day, when he had hoped to thank the board of trustees for their generous continuation of his full salary throughout the year of his disability. One of his friends, writing to the "New York Tribune," July 18, 1894, said: "It was a significant fact that he died on this day, and that his many and devoted friends, his colleagues, and grateful students should still be present to attend the burial service and carry his body on the following day to its resting-place. A proper site for his grave is to be chosen from amid the glorious scen-

ery of this time-honored cemetery, where the chimes of Cornell University will still ring over his head, and the student body in passing will recall the man of brilliant attainment and solid worth, the scholar of untiring industry, and the truthful, able historian, and will more and more estimate the loss to American scholarship and university life."

One of Professor Tuttle's favorite students, Herbert E. Mills, now professor of Economics at Vassar College, wrote as follows to the "New York Evening Post," July 27, 1894: "In the death of Professor Tuttle the writing and teaching of history has suffered a great loss. The value of his work, both as an investigator and as a university teacher, is not fully appreciated except by those who have read his books carefully or have had the great pleasure and benefit of study under his direction. Among the many able historical lecturers that have been connected with Cornell University, no one stood higher in the estimation of the students than Professor Tuttle."

Another of Professor Tuttle's most brilliant students, Mr. Ernest W. Huffcut, of Cornell University, says of him: "He went by instinct to the heart of every question, and had a power and grace of expression which enabled him to lay bare the precise point in issue. As an academic lecturer he had few equals here or elsewhere in those qualities of clearness, accuracy, and force which go farthest toward equipping the successful teacher. He was respected and admired by his colleagues for his brilliant qualities and his absolute integrity, and by those admitted to the closer relationship of personal friends he was loved for his fidelity and sympathy of spirit, which

expanded and responded only under the influence of mutual confidence and affection."

President Schurman of Cornell University thus speaks of Professor Tuttle's intellectual characteristics: "He was a man of great independence of spirit, of invincible courage, and of a high sense of honor; he had a keen and preëminently critical intellect and a ready gift of lucid and forceful utterance; his scholarship was generous and accurate, and he had the scholar's faith in the dignity of letters."

The first president of the Historical Association, and of Cornell University, Andrew D. White, in a personal letter said: "I have always prized my acquaintance with Mr. Tuttle. The first things from his pen I ever saw revealed to me abilities of no common order, and his later writings and lectures greatly impressed me. I recall with special pleasure the first chapters I read in his Prussian history, which so interested me that, although it was late in the evening, I could not resist the impulse to go to him at once to give him my hearty congratulations. I recall, too, with pleasure our exertions together in the effort to promote reform in the civil service. In this, as in all things, he was a loyal son of his country."

In another letter regarding Mr. Tuttle, President White said: "From the first he took a very high position both among the students and in the community at large, but before long it was evident that his tastes were greatly in the direction of historical research and instruction. His book on 'The Political Leaders of Germany' had been very successful, and his Prussian History was seen at once to have great merits. His power of taking

masses of the driest historical material, rapidly going through them, bringing together in his mind the things which were essential to the understanding of a period, and throwing them into effective form, was admirable. The same qualities which gave success to his books made his lectures very useful and attractive. He had the faculty of lucid narration in a very high degree, while his insight into personal character gave an additional interest to his work.

“The same qualities which drew him to the history of the past gave him a deep concern in the history which was passing in his own time ; he took a strong interest in current political questions, and was vigorous on the side of everything which in his opinion made for a better future in American politics. He advocated strenuously a reform of the civil service, and gave to it effective aid both as a writer and speaker. While, in addressing public assemblages, a certain severity of statement prevented the highest degree of popularity, his conversation was of the utmost value in suggesting fruitful trains of thought to his associates.

“To the social life of Cornell University he was a great addition. His criticisms, which had a not unpleasant sub-acid character, were widely relished. I recall a visit made to the university by a very distinguished German professor and statesman, who had been treated with some severity by Professor Tuttle in his book on German Leaders. It was with many misgivings that I brought the two men together, but my confidence that the two old enemies would soon be reconciled was justified, and our guest left us evidently delighted with his critic.

“The loss to Cornell by Professor Tuttle’s death, all who know the institution must feel deeply ; but it is fortunate, indeed, that his main work is virtually completed, and that the world at large can now enjoy some of the results of his scholarly thought.”

At the funeral of Professor Tuttle, held June 23 in Sage Chapel, at Cornell University, Professor Charles M. Tyler said : “Professor Tuttle was a brilliant scholar, a scrupulous historian, and what lustre he had gained in the realm of letters you all know well. He possessed an absolute truthfulness of soul. He was impatient of exaggeration of statement, for he thought exaggeration was proof of either lack of conviction or weakness of judgment. His mind glanced with swift penetration over materials of knowledge, and with great facility he reduced order to system, possessing an intuitive power to divine the philosophy of events. Forest and mountain scenery appealed to his fine apprehensions, and his afflicted consort assures me that his love of nature, of the woods, the streams, the flowers and birds, constituted almost a religion. It was through nature that his spirit rose to exaltation of belief. He would say, ‘The Almighty gives the seeds of my flowers, — God gives us sunshine to-day,’ and would frequently repeat the words of Goethe, ‘The sun shines after its old manner, and all God’s works are as splendid as on the first day.’” (“New York Tribune,” July 15, 1894.)

Bishop Huntington, who knew Mr. Tuttle well, said of him in the “Gospel Messenger,” published at Syracuse, New York : “He seemed to be always afraid of overdoing or oversaying. With uncommon abilities and accomplishments, as a student and writer, in tastes and

sympathies, he may be said to have been fastidious. Such men win more respect than popularity, and are most valued after they die."

In the beautiful chapel of Cornell University the trustees have placed the following inscription, which is at once a fitting recognition of the man and a summary of his life-work: "To the memory of Herbert Tuttle, journalist, teacher, historian; born at Bennington, Vermont, 1846; an alumnus of the University of Vermont (A. B., 1869; A. M., 1880; L. H. D., 1889); Professor of Politics (1881-91) and of History (1891-94) in Cornell University; died, Professor of Modern European History, 1894. *Justus et tenax propositi vir.*"

The Faculty of Cornell University, at a meeting held Friday, November 30, 1894, adopted the following memorial statement regarding their late colleague:—

"On the morning of Commencement Day, June the 21st, 1894, there passed from earth our colleague, Professor Herbert Tuttle. In resuming without him the duties in which he was so long our associate, it is fitting that we put upon record our deep sense of his worth and of our loss.

"From his entrance into this faculty in the autumn of 1881, Professor Tuttle took an active and efficient part in the conduct of the university. The keenness of his mind, the vigor and courage of his convictions, his invincible independence, his experience of affairs, his power of exact and cogent statement, gave at all times weight to his counsels. To the work of his class-room he brought the same wealth of research, the same maturity of judgment, the same precision of diction, the same grace of literary

expression, which give just eminence to his published writings. In all his university relations, the uncompromising honesty of his nature, impatient of pretence and equivocation, his humor, keen and often caustic, his sensitive and aggressive temper, his outrightness and downrightness, stamped with the force of a positive individuality whatever he said or did. By all who knew him well, and not least by his colleagues in this Faculty, he must ever be sorely missed and sincerely mourned.

"The committee recommends that this expression of our grief be made a part of the records of the Faculty and communicated to the relatives of our late colleague.

"GEO. L. BURR,
M. COIT TYLER,
T. F. CRANE,

Committee."¹

¹ The friendship of Mr. Tuttle's colleagues for him was remarkable. Besides the gentlemen above named, who represented the faculty, Professors Fuertes, Hewett, Charles M. Tyler, Wheeler, Hutchins, Collin, Thurston, Morris, Prentiss gave untiring devotion and assistance to Mr. Tuttle during the year of his ill health. Professor Fuertes, now at the head of the department of Civil Engineering at Cornell University, was the next-door neighbor of Professor Tuttle, and was like a brother to him in his illness. In a hopeful and encouraging letter Mr. Fuertes called Mr. Tuttle "Dear Old Prussian." One of his pupils, Victor Coffin, now professor at the University of Wisconsin, conducted the class-work of Mr. Tuttle during his absence in the South. Among other students who did honor to their teacher in word and deed were Professors Stancliff, Huffcut, Mills, and Weatherly. President Charles Kendall Adams was at the head of Cornell University (1885-1892) during several years of Professor Tuttle's active connection with it. The writer well remembers meeting them both at dinner in the president's house, which at one time was occupied by Mr. Tuttle himself.



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FREDERIC THE GREAT.

CHAPTER I.

THE SEIZURE OF SAXONY.

THE march of the Prussian army across the frontier of Saxony was effected in faultless order and without incident. At the word of command seventy thousand men took up their prescribed routes in silent execution of Frederic's plan, and raised the standard of Prussia in scores of peaceful hamlets where nobody had even dreamed that the greatest war of the century was about to begin. The soldiers of Brandenburg were indeed no strangers to the trembling peasants, who came to see them march along the highways. Only eleven years before the old prince of Anhalt-Dessau had travelled much of the same ground on his way to the field of Kesselsdorf; and when little knots of people gathered in the evening shades to discuss the new invasion, doubtless many a village leader was eloquent with stories of that ancient warrior, as, with grizzled hair and broken frame and feeble limbs, he marched in his last campaign. But Leopold had since been taken to his fathers, and the wisdom of the local sages ended with reminiscence. It was not for them to unlock the secrets of diplomacy, to penetrate the dark schemes of Kaunitz, and to see in the invasion of their land by the king of Prussia only a measure of self-defence. Yet Frederic at least honestly believed that the question of Silesia was again opened by

The march
into Sax-
ony.

the act of his enemies; and in tracing the progress of the new conflict we shall see him in grander proportions, and with nobler qualities than he has as yet revealed. For the Seven Years' War was preëminently a war of fighting, with few intervals for rest, and small play for diplomacy. But if diplomacy lent Frederic little aid, it also led him into few temptations. In the long and weary conflict that is to follow, through the vicissitudes of difficult campaigns and amid the slaughter of desperate battles, history can admire his patience, fortitude, and constancy, his valor on the field of action and his firmness in the hour of defeat, without turning aside, as in his earlier wars, to point out the results of successful treachery.

The force which entered Saxony was divided into three principal columns. Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick had the right, and his first object was the occupation of the rich and flourishing city of Leipsic, after which his route led to the town of Cotta, twenty or twenty-five miles southeast of Dresden. The left corps, under the duke of Brunswick-Bevern, marched by the northeast bank of the Elbe, with the neighborhood of Lohmen as its first destination. Frederic himself, with field-marshal Keith as second, led the central column, which, after crossing the Elbe at Torgau, headed for Wilsdruf, in the suburbs of the Saxon capital. The three commands thus pursued the precise lines of march fixed upon some time before at Berlin.

The commanders, it will be observed, were not men who had leading parts in the earlier wars; but two of them, Ferdinand and Bevern, had always done their duty in town positions, and were known as faithful soldiers, while Keith had brought a great reputation from Russia, and confirmed Frederic's original good opinion of him by several years of intelligent service. Though prince Leopold had succeeded to the government of Anhalt-Dessau on his father's death, and retired from

Routes and rendez-vous.

Lieutenants of Frederic.

military life, Maurice, his brother, was a lieutenant-general in the army of 1756. In addition to these was another officer, who stood even nearer to the king, and had a more confidential place in his councils, the fierce and mysterious Winterfeldt. Common rumor, to which attention has already been called, and the explicit statements of contemporaries, made Winterfeldt the real author of Frederic's policy in July and August; he is described as the evil genius, whose influence overcame Frederic's own more pacific tendencies, and led him into the reckless course of which the invasion of Saxony was the first step. This theory has indeed been contested, and in such an extreme form will hardly stand. But it is not denied that in military affairs at least the general had an unrivalled influence, that he was always for aggressive action, and that the plan of the campaign in Saxony had its origin with him.¹ Finally, three Prussian princes of the blood, brothers of Frederic, held high commands in the army of invasion. August William, prince of Prussia, the heir presumptive, was a general of infantry by rank, while Henry, the second brother, and Ferdinand, the third, were generals of brigade. Of Ferdinand, who was still young, little is said at this time, or indeed at any time. But the heir presumptive and prince Henry were earnest, though perhaps not avowed enemies of the policy adopted, and have left written evidence of their opposition. In the case of the former, his attitude may have been due to a sensitive, shrinking, and timid nature, which led him to hesitate before bold adventures, and to prefer the ways of peace. Henry was made of sterner stuff. He had no dread of war in itself; but he abhorred this particular war, because he thought it unnecessary, because, as an admirer of France and a

¹ Tuttle's *History of Prussia*, iii. 292; A. Naudé in the *Forachungen zur Brandenburgischen und Preussischen Geschichte*, I. i. 225 et seq. Dr. Naudé's text and notes give the bibliography of the controversy.

warm friend of Valori, he deprecated the rupture with the court of Versailles, and perhaps because he was wisely or unwisely suspicious of the influence of Winterfeldt. Be the explanation what it may, the fact remains. He was an unwilling officer throughout the campaign, and had little respect for the policy which guided it.¹

In the preliminary movements of the Prussians no obstacles were met. The few remaining Saxon First conquests. battalions promptly retired before the advance of the invaders, and it was found easy to occupy all the leading towns on the several lines of march. In some of them small garrisons were left, rather for purposes of police than for real military service; in others the works were destroyed lest they prove an embarrassment in the future, and supplies of every description, carelessly left by the retreating Saxons, were found at many points. From Torgau a force under prince Maurice of Anhalt-Dessau captured Wittenberg, the historic town of Luther, with all that it contained. At Leipsic Ferdinand seized a considerable sum of public money, as well as a few cannon and a stock of powder, all of which were promptly converted to Prussian use.² Torgau yielded its contingent, as did Chemnitz, Naumburg, Eisleben, and many others. The booty thus captured, though not inconsiderable in amount, formed, however, but a small part of the revenue which Frederic hoped to draw from Saxony, and which he intended should pay the cost of the occupation and something more. As fast as the occupation proceeded, the taxes were placed under the charge of Prussian officials. The privy-councillor Borceke set up a central office at Torgau, and the military police saw that every thaler was collected. From the total receipts the costs of administration, reduced to the strictest limits,

¹ Dr. Naudé, *ubi supra*.

² Frederic to Ferdinand of Brunswick, 31 August, 1756, in acknowledgment of the spoils.

were first defrayed, after which the balance passed to the army service. Thus, in effect, the revenues of Saxony were, for the time being, added to those of Prussia.

The lawfulness of these measures will, of course, be affirmed or denied according to the standpoint of the critic; but it is only just to Frederic to ^{Frederician logic.} say that he acted in strict obedience to his theory of the situation. The theory was that a designing and unscrupulous minister had so far involved the government of Saxony in the schemes of the two imperial courts that it became for the king of Prussia a measure of right as well as of prudence to meet secret intrigue by open force, and make the country serve him rather than his enemies; but he held the subjects of August guiltless, and intended to treat them as gently as the law of necessity would permit. The various proclamations issued by the Prussian generals declared that the king entered Saxony as a friend, not as an enemy. Full protection was promised to private property and peaceful industry, so long as the people kept to their usual vocations, and abstained from acts of hostility.¹ The electorate was to be treated as a temporary province of Prussia.

This change of authority was not an unmixed evil for the Saxon people. Great as were the hardships of military occupation, and irksome as was the rule of a foreign invader, the expulsion of Brühl and the over-^{Brühl.}throw of his system were compensating benefits, to which the natives could not have been insensible. Brühl had plundered the country under the forms of law. It was endowed by nature with rare sources of wealth, and the people were industrious and thrifty; but his rapacious administration had left no channel of income undrained, and no root of prosperity unsapped. The sums which he wrung from helpless industry he spent in every kind of reckless and showy extravagance. He gave him-

¹ *Heldengeschichte*, iii. 574 et seq.

self palaces in the city and estates in the country, titles which led to new forms of splendor, and offices which brought him ever nearer to the treasury; he encouraged at fatal cost the nobler tastes of August himself for painting, statuary, and precious stones; and his own wardrobe, with its three hundred suits of clothes, was one of the wonders of the capital. Meantime the current expenses of state were left unpaid. The salaries of the officials, civil and military, were long in arrears; and while Brühl's tailors merrily plied their needles, the army was sacrificed in the name of economy. Successive reductions had left it only some twenty thousand men, of excellent material and of fair spirit, but sadly neglected in respect to pay, clothing, and quarters.

This army was now gathered about Pirna on the Elbe, awaiting the course of events. The position was
Camp of Pirna. extremely strong by nature, and art had added to its capacity for defence. It was covered by two great fortresses, the Sonnenstein on the north and the Königstein on the south; and the approaches to the plateau which the troops occupied were narrow and difficult. It could not be bombarded, or easily carried by assault. But it could be blockaded, and unless the force was well supplied with food a short time would suffice to reduce it to terms, in spite of all the guns of the fortresses. But food had not been supplied. From want of time, or from a misconception of the crisis, or perhaps merely from habitual improvidence, Brühl had neglected to take precautions against the most fatal of all enemies; and if no relief should come, the duration of the camp must be short.

This state of affairs suggested, or perhaps arose from, a theory of Saxony's attitude, which Brühl
Saxon overtures. sought to establish by diplomacy, the theory that the electorate could remain neutral in the conflict about to ensue. But it was necessary to have it accepted and

observed by Frederic, and to this end negotiations were at once begun. The first agent was a certain general O'Meagher, the commander of an Irish regiment in the Saxon service called the Swiss guard, who, after some suspicious misadventures, found his way to Frederic's headquarters at Pretzsch on the first of September, and delivered an autograph letter from August in the nature of a reply to the declaration made at Dresden by Maltzahn, the Prussian envoy. This curious production studiously ignored the real state of affairs. It affected to concede the request for the free passage of Prussian troops through Saxon territory, — though Frederic had simply announced a purpose, not made a request, — and after expressing the hope that good order would be maintained, added that O'Meagher was authorized to arrange the details of the march.¹ By later instructions he was ordered to demand the immediate evacuation of all towns occupied by the Prussians. Such a demand was, of course, politely dismissed, as were the other oral representations made by O'Meagher; and after two audiences with Frederic he received a written reply for his master, and departed with it for Dresden.²

The nature of the king's reply was dictated by the circumstances themselves. It announced his desire for peace, and his willingness to withdraw his ^{Frederic's} troops at once, restoring everything to the old footing, if the empress would give him the assurances for which he had offered her a third but last opportunity. He would be governed by the response which he received. In the mean time he had thought it necessary to take measures for anticipating the designs of his enemies. The obvious

¹ August III. to Frederic, 29 August, 1756. *Polit. Corresp.*, xiii. 320.

² Some extracts from O'Meagher's report of these interviews are given by Vitzthum, *Geheimnisse des sächsischen Cabinets*, i. 405, 406.

comment on this is that, however complete as a defence against Austria, it scarcely touched the invasion of Saxony, by way either of excuse for the past or of explanation for the future. Nor was the concluding paragraph any more explicit or reassuring. Saxony, it was simply said, would be treated with as much forbearance as the situation permitted. Every consideration would be shown to the elector and his family; and it was only to be regretted that so great a prince had allowed himself to follow the counsels of a man whose evil intentions were but too well known, and at the proper time would be shown in black and white.¹

It is certain that Frederic did not take these negotiations seriously, and confined himself for that reason to generalities. But he showed more anxiety about the effect of his movement in other capitals.

Explanations for Europe.

His own letters to his envoys abroad announced the facts they were to reveal, and the arguments they were to use, in vindicating the justice, or rather the necessity, of the step which had been taken. By the king's orders, too, count Finckenstein, one of the secretaries for foreign affairs, drew up a formal presentation of the Prussian case.² Podewils read it at Berlin to the entire body of foreign diplomatists, except the Austrian, on the last day of August; but was only able to report that they received it without any other than the most general comments, and the promise to transmit it at once to their respective courts. Frederic characteristically observed that they would probably find their

¹ Frederic to August III., 1 September, 1756. *Polit. Corresp.*, xiii. 320-322, or *Œuvres de Frédéric*, iv. 236, 237. The former has the original French version; that of the latter is retranslated from the German, and differs somewhat in phraseology.

² "Déclaration du roi sur les motifs qui obligent sa majesté d'entrer avec son armée dans les états héréditaires du roi de Pologne, électeur de Saxe." Faber's *Europ. Staats-Canzley*, cx. 691-694.

tongues as soon as he had beaten the enemy in battle.¹ Nearly at the same time appeared a similar address against the court of Vienna.²

At Torgau, which he reached with the central column on the second of September, Frederic met another envoy of August in the person of lord Stormont, the English resident at Dresden.³ Flight of August from Dresden. But the Saxons acted promptly, without awaiting Stormont's report, on the return of O'Meagher. The privy council was summoned to hear the letter which he brought, and the members reached a unanimous conclusion, after little debate, on the next step to take; it was decided that August should leave the capital, and join the army at Pirna. But then another question arose. Was it advisable for the army to remain in its position, negotiate as long as possible, and fight if necessary? or should it seek safety by a timely retreat? The council finally decided in favor of the latter course, and from several plans which were proposed for carrying it into effect resolved to adopt that of marching the whole force by way of Bohemia and Moravia into Poland, where it could be kept intact until the storm was over. The imperial ambassador was notified of the decision, and a request to Maria Theresa for the passage of the troops through her territories was actually prepared.⁴ But a night's sleep brought more wisdom to the bewildered Saxon officials. The obstacles to the plan, and the endless complications to which it was sure to lead, became clearer; and the next morning the ministers advised that for the present only the first of their resolutions should be carried into

¹ Podewils, 31 August, and Frederic's marginal comment. *Polit. Corresp.*, xiii. 322, 323.

² "Exposé des motifs qui ont obligé S. M. le roi de Prusse à prévenir les desseins de la cour de Vienne."

³ See Eichel to Podewils, 2 September.

⁴ Vitzthum, *Geheimnisse*, i. 413 et seq.

effect. The electress and the younger children remained in Dresden. But August and his two oldest sons, together, of course, with Brühl, left on the third of September for the Saxon camp. It was a short and simple autumn journey, and the shores of the Elbe are full of charm; but on that eventful day the unhappy prince entered upon a long exile, during which the storms of war were to rage up and down his native land and about the very gates of his capital.

Before leaving Dresden, August addressed to Frederic a second letter, which, though drawn with some A parting protest. art, still ignored the iron reality of the situation. It affected to regard the quarrel between the king and the empress-queen as one which concerned them alone, and from which accordingly an innocent third state, like Saxony, ought not to suffer. Yet the right of passage for the Prussian troops, freely granted in obedience to the constitution of the Empire, had been expanded, it said, into a right of occupation; fortifications had been razed, requisitions levied, treasure seized, and other acts committed, which belonged only to a state of war. All alike were contrary to Frederic's own assurances, and violations of the neutrality which Saxony had proclaimed. The king was therefore requested to conduct the march through in compliance with the usual conditions, and to complete it as soon as possible. In view of the menacing state of affairs the elector had betaken himself to his army, but he was still ready to receive Frederic's explanations, and give ample securities for the strict observance of neutrality.¹

Such was the outward language of August's second letter to Frederic. If it had expressed real sentiments, and if international law had been understood a cen-

¹ Vitzthum, i. 419, 420. Most of the documents bearing on this controversy appear in a multitude of publications, and it will perhaps be unnecessary to give references except in special cases.

ture and a half ago as it is understood to-day, the court of Vienna would have been the offended party, and its challenge would have converted ^{The case examined.} the elector into an ally of Prussia. But in those days, at least under the loose public law of the Empire, a German state did not forfeit its neutrality by allowing a belligerent army to pass through its territory; nor did Frederic regard the elector's note as affording any security for him. Quite the contrary. Read between the lines, as he read it, and with the reasons which he had for suspecting treachery, it was simply an invitation for him to hasten through Saxony into Bohemia, finding there a hostile army in his front, while another army, which only waited its opportunity to become hostile, remained in his rear. In Saxon neutrality he had no confidence. The chief apologist for August insists, indeed, that this distrust was feigned in order that there might be a pretext for occupying the electorate and seizing its revenues; and he blames the Saxon officials for their failure to penetrate Frederic's real intentions at the beginning. They took the king, he says, at his word; they believed that he desired only what in technical language was called an innocent passage for his troops; and thus they remained the victims of his duplicity until it was too late to effect a military junction with the Austrians.¹ But some doubt is thrown upon this view by documents which the same author prints. These show that immediately after the dispatch of O'Meagher to the Prussian headquarters, before Frederic's answer had been received, and therefore while they were still in the supposed delusion that Saxony was to be only traversed, not occupied, the ministers sent urgent appeals to Paris and St. Petersburg for protection against an impending occupation of the land, that is, against actual hostilities, which alone gave them a right to invoke exist-

¹ Vitzthum, i. 403, 415 et seq.

ing treaties.¹ This was probably unknown to Frederic, but without it he had evidence enough. This again was no secret to the Saxon ministers. Notwithstanding their repudiation of all evil designs, and their emphatic denial that any proof could be furnished of such designs, they knew that Frederic had come into possession of some of their secret papers; and that these, while not convicting them of a formal adhesion to the conspiracy against Prussia, were still grave enough to excuse severe measures of precaution. Their information was derived from no other than Kaunitz himself. Two years before this time he had notified count Flemming, the Saxon envoy at Vienna, and Flemming had notified Brühl, that Frederic had found a channel through which the secrets of the grand project were regularly conveyed to him; so that, although particulars were wanting, the existence of treachery was made known in so positive a manner that it required no little audacity for the Saxons to assert their absolute innocence, or to challenge Frederic's proof of their guilt.²

While Brühl and August were thus striving through negotiation to gain time, or military position, or diplomatic advantage, the Austrians prepared earnestly for war. The news of the Prussian invasion found the empress at the summer castle of Halitsch, on the frontier of Hungary; but a few hours

Measures
of the Aus-
trians.

¹ The Prussian manifestoes made clear, it was said in the communication to St. Petersburg, that the intention of the king of Prussia was "anstatt eines in der dabei zu observiren gewesenen Ordnung erlaubten und unversagten Durchmarsches das hiesige Churfürstenthum und übrige Land zu occupiren, und nach Gutdünken an sich zu behalten." Vitzthum, i. 409.

² See Flemming to Brühl, 21 December, Brühl to Flemming, 30 December, 1754, and Flemming to Brühl, 4 and 8 January, 1755, printed in the pamphlet, *Einige neue Actenstücke über die Veranlassung des siebenjährigen Krieges*, Leipsic, 1841, pp. 10-13. The author or compiler was count Albert von Schulenburg.

brought her to Vienna, where hurried councils with the leading political and military advisers were at once held. These concerned, however, not so much new plans as the execution of plans already formed. Either for attack or for defence the Austrian authorities had long since made their principal military dispositions; and it now remained only to fill in the details, by pushing the reserves to the front, providing for the treasury, and completing the system of alliances. If the last of these measures required time, the others were made easier by the reforms of the past decade. Even the Hungarian rangers now emulated the looks and bearing of troops of the line.¹

For commander of the principal army in the field choice had already been made of field-marshal Marshal Browne. count Maximilian Browne. This was a tardy recognition of military merit. Browne was the officer who held command in Silesia in 1740, and whose advice, if followed in season, might have saved the province to the Hapsburgs. In the war which ensued, he rendered good though not conspicuous service. He was Irish by descent, the son of a Jacobite refugee, and had worked his way slowly up through the successive grades in the Austrian service, overcoming prejudice and jealousy by mere force of talent, zeal, and application. His energy was proverbial in the army; his intelligence was quiet and penetrating, his decisions were prompt without being reckless; though an exacting, he was a just commander, and enjoyed the love of the soldiers beyond almost any other officer in the service. When the Prussians entered Saxony he was at Kollin, with an army not much over thirty thousand in number, including nine thousand horse. It was perhaps a compliment to him that his first orders after this event, though leaving him general freedom of action, contained the warning, rarely needed by the Austrian commanders in the earlier wars, to use the

¹ Arneth, *Geschichte Maria Theresias*, v. 3.

greatest caution, and to fight only under the most favorable conditions.¹

This prudence was doubtless inspired in part by the knowledge that the threatened appearance of the Prussians had caused a general panic in Bohemia.

Final reply from Vienna.

Indeed it extended even to two of the immediate advisers of the empress at Vienna. When Klinggraeffen presented the third Prussian note, which was simply a renewed demand for the promise to make no attack that year or the next, the lord chamberlain, count Khevenhüller, and the vice-chancellor, Colloredo, favored a mild answer, and a fair compliance with Frederic's terms. But Maria Theresa was more courageous. On the advice of Kaunitz and a majority of the ministers, she ordered a reply which simply referred to the answer already given to the second inquiry, and contemptuously refused any further explanation.² The plan to convert a peace secured by the most solemn treaties into a simple truce was not susceptible, the note concluded, of any declaration. In transmitting this final reply to Frederic, the envoy reported that he had at once taken steps to secure the archives, close the legation, and depart from Vienna.³

If the alarm of the Bohemians and the timidity of two ministers made a disagreeable impression at Vienna, much greater embarrassment was caused by the course of the unlucky Saxons. The first expectation had been,

¹ Arneth, v. 10.

² Critics of Frederic's French, which indeed was bad enough orthographically, will be interested in a specimen of Maria Theresa's German. Her autograph approval of Kaunitz's recommendation reads: "Bin völlig der ersten Meinung das diese antwort Klingraf zu geben wäre als eine folge all unserer resolutionen." Arneth, v. 13.

³ Klinggraeffen, 7 September, 1756, with enclosures. *Polit. Corresp.*, xiii. 374-376. Five days elapsed between the presentation of Klinggraeffen's note, and the receipt of the reply. Part of the delay was due to the absence of the empress-queen; but is Arneth right in assuming that this absence is proof of her peaceful intentions?

naturally enough, that if the Prussian army crossed the frontier they would hasten to join Browne in Bohemia; and the caution urged upon the field-marshal may have had in view chiefly the postponement of actual hostilities until such a union could be made. Even with this reënforcement Browne would have had fewer men than Frederic led into Saxony. But he would probably have been able to concentrate a larger force at any point south of the frontier, and hence the Austrians were extremely anxious to welcome the army of August on Bohemian soil. Pending the conclusion of a subsidy treaty money was sent to defray the cost of the expected movement.¹ But the movement never took place. Undoubtedly the wisest plan for the Saxons would have been to march into Bohemia while that was still possible. Lest such a step should compromise their neutrality, says a solemn official protocol, it was decided not to take it. Yet the ink was scarcely dry on this record when Brühl began negotiations for a different plan of escape, through a different system of coöperation with the Austrians. Letters, couriers, and agents were sent in every direction. Colonel von Riedesel appeared at the headquarters of Browne with an explanation of the decision of his court. Means of transportation were wanting, he said; the defiles through which the army would have to make its way were difficult and dangerous; a random shot might end the precious life of August himself. But if the Austrian commander would reach out a helping hand the problem could be solved. It was suggested, therefore, that Browne detach a force of twenty-four companies of grenadiers toward Pirna, with a rendezvous at the village of Peterswalde, where they would be able to aid the Saxons in case of attack, or to cover their retreat, if a retreat should be attempted.² To

Austria
and Sax-
ony.

¹ Arneth, v. 10, 11.

² Riedesel's report, in Vitzthum, i. 445, 446.

Vienna colonel von Trützschler took even more extravagant demands. He was the bearer of the resolution of the council at Dresden to hold the army at Pirna; and after explaining the reasons for the act, he was to urge the Austrians to throw ten thousand of their own men into the same camp, or even to transfer the whole army of Browne to Saxon territory.¹ But both delegates were instructed to declare that unless aided by an Austrian diversion the elector would not be able, and would not even try, to lead his army out upon the road to Bohemia. Such was the Saxon obstinacy, fortified daily by the growing difficulty of escape. Even if no help should come, and they should be forced to an eventual capitulation, August and his advisers reasoned that they would still detain Frederic long enough to thwart his plan for a decisive campaign that year.² But the Prussian lines they could not undertake to force.

It is a question for military critics whether the Saxons judged correctly the strength of Frederic's position, but there is no doubt about the celerity of his movements, or the general wisdom by which they were guided. On the ninth of September he entered Dresden, remaining, however, only twenty-four hours. The next day he moved his headquarters to Sedlitz. In the mean time the various detachments of the army had taken up their several positions, the duke of Bevern on the right bank of the Elbe forming a line which reached from Pillnitz to Schandau, and commanded the eastern end of the bridge at Pirna, while a similar half-circle on the left shore completed the blockade. Ferdinand of Brunswick had the most advanced position, at Peterswalde. A pontoon bridge was laid above Pillnitz for convenience of communication between the two sections

¹ Arneth, v. 14 ; Vitzthum, ii. 45.

² See in Vitzthum, i. 452, Brühl to Sternberg, the Austrian envoy, 6 September, 1756.

of the army; and while the command of the stream from Pirna downwards made it easy for Frederic to obtain supplies, the occupation of Schandau shut off its use by the Saxons in the other direction. Unless they could forcibly open navigation above Pirna there was no way by which they could replenish their meagre stock of provisions. The last chance of escape for their army was through Hennersdorf and Peterswalde, and, though this was at the extreme end of the Prussian line, was guarded only by a small force, and was nearest to Bohemia, the nature of Frederic's formation was such that in case of need he could easily detach enough troops to close the outlet completely. By the tenth of September this preliminary work was regarded as done.¹

On the same day Riedesel and Trützschler returned to Pirna with long reports of their missions, and important letters from Austrian authorities. Browne, it appears, gave a sympathetic hearing to Riedesel. He promised to send the grenadiers as requested, and later to make a diversion in force, but he deplored the decision to hold the camp at Pirna, and even hinted some doubts about the sincerity of the Saxon court, which he thought might be on the point of making terms with Frederic.² The budget which colonel Trützschler brought from Vienna was even less reassuring than Riedesel's. He was the bearer, indeed, of a copy of an order to Browne by which he was authorized to do everything compatible with military rules for the rescue of the Saxons. But the alternative plans of action which Riedesel had submitted to the Austrian ministers were both rejected, while Kaunitz sent a note to Brühl sharply expressing his surprise at a policy which left the Saxon army shut up between the

¹ Frederic's letters in *Polit. Corresp.*, xiii. 360 et seq.; Brühl to Flemming, 9 September, 1756, apud Vitzthum, ii. 30, 31; Prussian General Staff history, i. 83, 84.

² Vitzthum, ii. 41-43.

rocky banks of the Elbe, while the enemy was leisurely closing every path of escape.¹

On the receipt of these communications from Austria the Saxons resolved that they amounted to a refusal of help. A council of war decided, therefore, to reopen negotiations with the invader, and approved the draft of a letter which August sent to Frederic on that same tenth of September.² Thus began another exchange of communications which extended over about a week, but led to no result whatever. The apparent object of August was to obtain neutrality and the restoration of his lands by granting everything except the surrender of his army. At one stage of the negotiations Frederic sent Winterfeldt on a personal visit to August.³ Of the nature of his mission and the representations which he made, little transpired at the time, but it is now known that he was charged to offer an alliance instead of neutrality, or as an alternative the capitulation of the Saxon army. Both alike were rejected by the elector. In later letters August treated Frederic's terms as unchangeable, and asked only permission for himself and suite to retire into Poland. Even this was refused until a settlement about the army should be reached.⁴ But though the elector personally may have been inclined to yield, a settlement was made impossible by the duplicity of Brühl, who continued to send appeals for help as well to Browne as to Browne's superiors at Vienna.⁵

¹ Vitzthum, ii. 44-46.

² Vitzthum, ii. 53-55, 427-431.

³ See Frederic to August III., 14 September, 1756.

⁴ August III. to Frederic, 15, 18, Frederic to August III., 16, 18 September, 1756. In a letter from Frederic to Benoit, Prussian resident at Warsaw, 24 September, 1756, there is a résumé of the whole correspondence.

⁵ See Brühl to Browne, 10 and 12, and to Flemming, 10 September, 1756. Vitzthum, ii. 63 et seq. Schaefer, i. 209, seems to be in error

To such a man in such a situation the visit of Winterfeldt must have been the reverse of pleasant. It appears that, among other things, the Prussian general took occasion to lay before the elector certain documentary proofs of Brühl's connection with the Austro-Russian schemes against Prussia, and of the extent to which he had thereby abused the confidence of his master. The immediate object of the disclosure was doubtless the dismissal of the accused minister, after which it was hoped the course of negotiation would move more smoothly. But the device was a failure, and the hopes, if any, which were built upon it do little credit to Frederic's discernment. It was unreasonable to suppose that a prince who had clung to Brühl throughout his long career of waste, corruption, and general misgovernment at home would now discharge him on the advice, however well supported, of a foreign power. Moreover the revelations made by Winterfeldt were only a part of the proof which Frederic had offered to produce. Brühl had met the offer with defiance; and the elector may have been impressed by an audacity which is even yet somewhat difficult to understand. An apologist for Saxony, who is indeed no champion of Brühl, assumes that its only ground was the consciousness of innocence, and the certain knowledge that no evidence of guilt could be found.¹ Frederic himself suggests a different explanation. He had long been in possession, he writes, of treaties and other incriminating papers; but if he had published them, the Saxons would at once have denounced them as forgeries. It was thus necessary to obtain the originals,

in the statement that the council of war authorized these farther appeals to Austria while the reopened correspondence with Frederic was yet in progress. The text of the protocol, Vitzthum, ii. 429, hardly yields such a sense.

¹ Vitzthum, i. 412, ii. 123-125. Cf. *Einige neue Actenstücke*, etc., p. 22.

FREDERIC THE GREAT.

in the archives at Dresden.¹ Now the same appears in the correspondence of Brühl. No sooner had he reached the headquarters at Struppen, than he sent instructions to Wackerbarth, one of the ministers left in Dresden, to the effect that in case the Prussians should enter the capital he was to endeavor to have the interior of the castle kept in charge of Saxon guards, on account of the green vault and of certain articles which were deposited in it.² On its face this seems to refer to the Saxon archives, and later events place such a reading beyond all doubt.

Now the treacherous help of Menzel had made Frederic, or at least Maltzahn, nearly as well acquainted as Brühl himself with the geography of the Saxon archives, and one of the king's first precautions on entering Dresden was to seize them for his own use. This proceeding gave rise to a number of myths, which were long current in literature. What reader is not familiar with the picture of the electress of Saxony, queen of Poland, sitting on a trunk in which the fatal papers were packed for shipment, and compelled by the rude threats of a Prussian officer to surrender her sacred charge? But the true account belongs to comedy rather than tragedy. On the occupation of Dresden by the Prussians, general Wylich was made military governor, and by him a major Wagenheim was chosen to obtain the desired papers from the archives. The officials refused to give up the keys, and referred Wagenheim to the electress. This lady was indeed somewhat rebellious. She denounced the proceeding as an act of robbery, refused to have the cabinets opened, and, though she finally surrendered some of the keys, had her seals placed on

¹ *Œuvres de Frédéric*, iv. 82, 83. Cf. Eichel to Podewils, 21 September, 1756.

² Vitzthum, i. 422.

the doors. Wagenheim replied by placing his own under those of the electress. Thus doubly secured the doors remained during the night. The next morning Wagenheim reappeared, and demanded the removal of the Saxon seals, threatening in case of refusal to break them. Some of the officials hastily summoned the electress, who was at early mass in an adjoining chapel; whereupon she appeared on the scene, and taking position before the door, inquired whether it was proposed to use violence against her person and her seal. Wagenheim replied that he had his orders. The counsellors of the lady then advised her to yield to force and have her seals removed, which she consented to do. The Prussians at once took possession. The cabinets were unlocked, such papers as were needed were taken out, and the booty was sent to Berlin in triumph.¹

It was not until these precious originals were safely on the road to Berlin that Frederic unmasked Frederic unmaska. his real purpose to the Saxons. "I have the proof of your guilt in your own state papers," he said to them in effect; "join me as an ally, and we will make common cause against the house of Austria; refuse, and I will show your duplicity to the world. But your soldiers I am determined in any event not to leave in my rear, or to disband after their capitulation. I propose to enroll them in my army, and make them fight my battles. It is for you to choose whether you become my

¹ There are at least three accounts of this affair which have claim to official authenticity. Carlyle gives that of count Sternberg, the imperial envoy at Dresden, who of course was not an eye-witness, but was also not friendly to Prussia. The Prussian account is furnished by Eichel to Podewils, 18 September, 1756, though the honest secretary confessed that some of his details rested on rumors which could not be verified. But there is a substantial agreement between these versions and that of the archive officials, which is given by Vitzthum, ii. 33-41.

ally or your troops become my conscripts.”¹ This was certainly a hard alternative to place before the unhappy elector, one of the hardest indeed ever submitted to a reigning prince; and a certain desperate courage may be seen in the refusal of August to lend his hand to any dishonorable bargain. Even Brühl, too, continued defiant. It is only just to quote from a long dispatch to count Flemming, written after the seizure of the archives, — the passage in which he says, “It is true, the king of Prussia will find that we have not been the advocates of his cause, but he will not find proof that we have entered into any combination against him, for such is not the fact.”²

The Saxons were now so closely blockaded that no supplies could be obtained from the outside, and even messengers made their way to and from the Austrian headquarters only with the greatest difficulty. Frederic even felt strong enough to push a force across the Bohemian frontier. Under Ferdinand of Brunswick it easily dislodged the grenadiers sent forward by Browne to Peterswalde, and became the nucleus of a corps of observation, which was strengthened as fast as need appeared and men could be spared. By the twentieth of September it had become a formidable army of twenty thousand men, and Keith then took the chief command with headquarters at Johnsdorf; thus placed the army of observation could easily become an army of action, should the Austrian movements make such a change necessary.

Great as had been the folly of the Saxons, Browne at least had no intention of deserting them. To support the details already sent out toward Peterswalde, he had transferred the bulk of his army and

The Prussians in Bohemia.

Movements of Browne.

¹ Extracts from the diary of prince August William, published by Dr. Naudé in the article above cited, make it clear that this appropriation of the Saxon army was part of Frederic's original plans, and that Winterfeldt was in the secret.

² 20 September, 1756. Vitzthum, ii. 123.

his own headquarters, as early as the twenty-third of September, to Budin, on the river Eger, some distance above its junction with the Elbe. But the advance of the Prussians to Aussig, and the assurances from Pirna that their lines were impregnable on that side, compelled a change of plan. It was determined to try the right bank of the Elbe. The Prussians were there in weaker force; and it was believed that if Browne should advance toward Schandau, the Saxons could cross under the guns of Königstein, and fight their way through the hostile lines while he attacked them from the opposite side. Indeed they themselves had proposed the plan, and Browne had agreed to be at the rendezvous by the eleventh of October. He could even have anticipated this date if his pontoons had arrived in time. But they, like much of his material equipment, were late in coming; and it was not until the last day of September that he succeeded in throwing a bridge over the Eger, and leading his army toward Lobositz. His plan was to have his principal force hold Keith in control, while he himself with a chosen corps crossed the Elbe for the expedition toward Schandau.¹

Frederic was apparently ignorant of this plan. He had himself joined the camp at Johnsдорф two days before, and the latest information which ^{Before the battle.} he had was that the Austrians intended to make their diversion by a wide detour to the west, through Freiberg, and thus around the army of Keith.² But as the situation of his troops was not satisfactory, and it was desirable to get within feeling distance of Browne, he decided to make a cautious advance southward, and take up a position near Lobositz. This movement brought

¹ Cf. Cogniaz, ii. 232; Browne to Brühl, 28 September, 1756, apud Vitzthum, ii. 170 et seq.

² Frederic to Winterfeldt, 28 September, 1756. Cf. *Œuvres de Frédéric*, iv. 86, 87, and Frederic to Keith, 24 September, 1756.

the Prussians, on the thirtieth of September, face to face with the enemy. It was about an hour before sunset, so Frederic relates, that on reaching with the vanguard the little village of Welmina he saw in the distance the whole army of Browne.¹ Its left rested on the Elbe just below Lobositz, and the line extended thence toward the Eger as far as the hamlet of Tschiskowitz. Cavalry were on both wings. About the village of Lobositz earthworks had been thrown up, and batteries placed. Nearly in front of the middle of the line lay another little settlement, Sulowitz, while the ground was varied by a sluggish stream and a series of ponds, which had much defensive value. Frederic saw at once that this was the place, and the morrow the day for the battle. He proceeded hurriedly to occupy the important heights of Lobosch and Radostitz, or Homolka, which commanded the plain below, with such forces as he had; and when in the course of the night reënforcements came up, they were so distributed as to be ready for the prompt completion of the line of battle at break of day.² At daybreak a thick fog lay over the valley, separating the rival armies as by a curtain. Nevertheless Frederic began at once to strengthen the positions which he had hastily seized the night before; strong batteries of cannon were mounted on the several heights; behind them and in the intervening ravine the infantry was massed; and in the rear of the centre, on the only available ground, the horse awaited the signal to charge. The Austrians kept practically the formation of the previous evening. Their left,

¹ Frederic to Schwerin, 2 October, 1756.

² Browne has been much censured for his failure to occupy the Lobosch and Radostitz mountains,— so they are called on the maps,— and unfriendly critics ascribe to this failure the events which followed. But Cogniazo, ii. 236, 237, asserts positively that the marshal gave the proper orders, which the blunder of a subordinate left unexecuted. Arneth is silent on this subject.

protected by the chain of ponds and the marshes which lined the course of the Morellen creek, was comparatively safe, but their right was at the mercy of the Prussian guns on the lofty heights of Lobosch. It was, therefore, of the first importance for Browne to carry this position, while Frederic's problem was far simpler. He had only to keep up a steady fire from his heavy guns, to send forward columns of foot or horse whenever an opening appeared, and to meet with every advantage of ground the attacks of the enemy.

As early as seven o'clock there was some light skirmishing between the outposts, which, owing to the fog, amounted to little or nothing. But Battle of Lobositz, 1 Oct., 1756. about eleven the fight began seriously, though even then prematurely on the part of Frederic, and in consequence of what proved to be a costly error. As the mist cleared for an instant he saw small bodies of the enemy's horse moving in the plain below, and leaped to the conclusion that it was the rear-guard only, while the main army was preparing to cross the Elbe in retreat. It was the work of an instant to send thirty Prussian squadrons forward to disperse this insignificant force. The foot-soldiers opening a way, the gallant horsemen shot down the valley, cleared the intervening plain, and charged impetuously upon the supposed rear-guard of hostile cavalry near the village of Sulowitz. But this rear-guard proved to be a vanguard, and instead of retreating, it showed fight. Its lines were indeed broken by the shock; but the Prussian horse were then met by a sharp fire of infantry and artillery, which not only stopped their progress, but forced them to recoil upon their own supports. Here they recovered themselves, and reënforced by new squadrons prepared for another assault. Meantime the fog had lifted entirely, and Frederic, seeing through the clear light of a tardy day that he had the whole Austrian army in battle array before him, not

a mere detachment of cavalry, hastened to change his tactics, but unfortunately too late. Again the cuirassiers charged down the valley, and hewing right and left with their sabres broke into the ranks of the enemy. It was all in vain; the old scene with aggravated horrors was repeated. The horses plunged into impassable swamps, and struggled wildly for a foothold, while their riders were exposed to a murderous fire from the infantry of the Austrians in their front, and the artillery on their flank. No bravery could overcome such obstacles, and soon the heroic column, extricating itself as best it could from its mistaken adventure, returned sadly reduced in numbers to its own friends. The Prussian guns continued to roar from the Homolka heights, but the battle in this part of the field was practically over. It was now transferred to the left of the Prussian, or the right of the Austrian line.

In front of Lobositz on the lower slopes of the Lobosch hill, where some pretty vineyards gave them shelter, Browne had stationed bands of Croats, which, though often driven out, as often returned, because they were not pursued. They thus held the ground until the Austrians were ready for an offensive movement. About twelve o'clock a column of infantry under colonel Lasey advanced from Lobositz, and aided by a flank attack on the part of pandours or other irregulars from the village of Welhoten, marched steadily up the heights. This was the crisis of the battle. The first line of Prussians on the crest of the hill had shot away its ammunition in the useless fights with the Croats, while the advancing foe was fresh in action, and confident of success. But when the Austrians were halfway up the slope the duke of Bevern, who commanded on the hill, led his regiments against them with the bayonet. A desperate hand-to-hand fight ensued. The Austrians held their ground manfully, and for a time the issue seemed doubtful, but

at this trying moment Lascy fell gravely wounded, and his troops turned back sullenly upon Lobositz.¹ The Prussians gave them no opportunity to recover. Strengthened by fresh battalions from the centre they followed the retreating foes, and engaged the reënforcements which in the mean time Browne had sent forward. But the ground was so narrow that these could not deploy with effect. The shells from the heights set fire to the village, and the Prussian foot slowly worked its way forward. Hard fighting at close quarters still continued for some time, but the Austrian resistance gradually weakened, and by two o'clock ceased entirely. The retreat, if retreat it may be called, was effected in good order. By an extremely skilful manœuvre, Browne swung a portion of his centre, which had not yet been engaged, toward his right, and under the protection thus afforded his shattered battalions safely rejoined their comrades. Because the Austrians retained their line nearly intact, had fewer losses than the enemy, and were not pursued, the action has sometimes been called undecided. But Prussian regiments bivouacked on the most hotly contested part of the field.²

¹ Browne, it appears, held the disabling of Lascy to be the chief cause of the failure to carry the heights. See the extract from his report in Arneth, v. 472, n. 25.

² I offer the above as the best general view which, after comparing, contrasting, and trying to reconcile the various conflicting accounts, I have been able to obtain of the course of the battle. The difficulty of the task will be understood when it is stated that Lascy's movement has been sometimes described as merely an attempt to check a Prussian advance upon Lobositz, and sometimes, I believe more correctly, as an attempt to carry the Loboschberg. Again, some authors speak of only one cavalry charge from the Prussian right, whereas it seems certain that there were two. Finally, how shall a layman treat the confession of the authors of the General Staff history, i. 104, that it is impossible to determine whether the first charge was with fifteen or seventy-one squadrons, the statements of Frederic in the dispatch to Schwerin, which mention in one place

In this opening battle of the war the Prussians were considerably outnumbered by the enemy, and for this reason were unable to press their advantage. Browne's army counted about thirty-three thousand men; that of Frederic some twenty-four thousand, but neither side brought more than half its fighting force into action. In artillery the Prussians were superior, and to this circumstance and the advantage of position, the issue of the battle is in part to be ascribed. But their losses exceeded those of the enemy. They had in round numbers three thousand three hundred killed, wounded, and missing, while the Austrians lost only three thousand, the inequality being mainly due to the unfortunate charges of cavalry at the opening of the battle. Three Prussian generals were killed, and a fourth, Kleist, died soon afterward from his wounds. The Austrians lost one general, Radicati, on the field.¹

Early the next morning Frederic moved his headquarters to Lobositz, and thus proclaimed his intention to hold the field of battle. If the Austrians had renewed the fight he would have been in

thirty and in another sixty squadrons, and the still different figures in the *Œuvres*, iv. 891 ?

¹ The military student may consult with special advantage the treatment of the battle of Lobositz, and this first campaign of the war, by the English general, Lloyd. His work, which covers only the first three years, and was published in 1781, was subsequently translated into German and completed by the Prussian major, G. F. Tempelhof, Berlin, 1783-1801, in six volumes. Lloyd is critical, often pedantic, at times slightly oracular, but always frank and intelligent, while Tempelhof had more knowledge, and is ranked by Prussian historians as the best contemporary authority. In its reconstructed form the work consists of Lloyd's narrative, so far as it reaches, his critical comments, and Tempelhof's own contributions. I shall cite sometimes Lloyd, sometimes Tempelhof, but the references are always to the German edition. On the losses see G. S., i. 108, 109 ; Lloyd, i. 47. Besides Kleist, the Prussians lost generals Lüderitz, Oertzen, and Quadt.

grave danger, for his numerical inferiority was now greater than before; but Browne let the opportunity pass, and the king's strategy soon redressed the balance. A small force under the duke of Bevern was sent around by the right to a position opposite the village of Tschiskowitz. This threatened the Austrian flank; and the movement was scarcely completed when Browne ordered a general retreat, and his whole army fell back upon its old position at Budin. The coincidence here certainly suggests a relation of cause and effect, and as such it is usually described. But there is room for the belief that what appeared to be a retreat to the Eger was really only a change of base, with a view to a second, yet not essentially different movement toward Pirna for the relief of the Saxons. Browne's own language suggests this theory, and events give it a strong support.¹

After only four days of rest and preparation the indefatigable Austrian general resumed the plan which had been temporarily checked at Lobositz. Leaving the bulk of his army at Budin under count Lucchesi as a counterpoise to Frederic, he led a picked corps of some eight thousand men directly to the Elbe, crossed at Raudnitz, and took up the difficult march toward Schandau. His route was by way of Kamnitz, Schluckenau, and Lichtenhayn, through narrow defiles and crooked mountain-passes, laborious even in the best of times. Now, however, though the season was not late, winter had actually set in; the weather was cold and raw, the roads were heavy from continuous rain, while the troops were without tents for shelter against the terrible storms, and suffered from lack of the simplest comforts. But the example of the heroic commander encouraged every man in the ranks of the little army. By sharing their toils and hardships, by showing himself always

His march
to Schan-
dau.

¹ *Heldengeschichte*, iii. 637-639, where Browne's report is given. Cf. Arneth, v. 18.

cheery, resolute, and hopeful, Browne held up the spirits of his troops, worked his way patiently through or over all obstacles, and kept his promise to the Saxons with religious fidelity. On the eleventh of October, the appointed day, he made known his arrival at the rendezvous. His force took position between Lichtenhayn and Altendorf, opposite the strong Prussian command of general Lestwitz, and there awaited the approach of the Saxons.¹

But the Saxons never came. According to the plan finally adopted after the exchange of several letters between Budin and Pirna, some of them subsequent to the battle of Lobositz, the imprisoned army was to cross the Elbe at Thurmsdorf by means of a pontoon bridge in the night of the eleventh, and on the twelfth, all being ready, a gun from Königsstein was to give the signal for a combined attack on the Prussian lines. But though Browne was on time, the Saxons were late. Their best pontoons lay at Pirna, under the fire of the Prussian cannon. They succeeded, indeed, after a sharp artillery duel in loosing them from their moorings, and starting them up the stream; but the fire of the Prussian guns, now thoroughly aroused, was so fierce that they soon had to be tied up at the shore and abandoned. A set of copper pontoons yet remained, and with these, which were hauled by land, better success followed. But they came twenty-four hours later than the appointed time. The road was so rough and dangerous that the drivers and horses could be kept to their work only by the lash and the bayonet. The rain surged like an angry sea up and down the valley. Slowly, painfully, and fearfully the train pursued its weary way; and behind it the army, faint from scanty rations, and worn out by constant vigils, followed in a hopeless march.

¹ Lestwitz had ten battalions and five squadrons, considerably less, therefore, than Browne, but they were posted in strong defensive positions.

The Saxons
cross the
Elbe.

The last morsel of food had been eaten. For days the horses had lived only from the leaves of the forests. At length toward the evening of the twelfth the bridge was laid, and in the course of the night the army passed to the other side of the river.

Here it found itself on a narrow plateau known as the Ebenheit, which has the river as a boundary on one side, while the lofty and precipitous Lilienstein rises as a barrier on the other. On the slopes of the Lilienstein, at Waltersdorf, and on other elevations, commanding every outlet from the plateau, the Prussians had thrown up intrenchments, and surrounded them with formidable abattis. The few troops previously guarding them had been promptly reënforced when the Saxons showed signs of moving. To reach Browne then, who still had his own enemy before him, in other words, to advance, the Saxons had to fight their way through the works on and about the Lilienstein. Retreat was impossible. The infantry was hardly over the river when the bridge went to pieces, and floated idly down with the current, while the abandoned camp fell into the hands of the Prussians, who under Zieten pressed closely on the rear-guard of the fugitives. The thirteenth, the last day on which Browne had promised his aid, was come; the Saxons had made the crossing successfully; and yet they delayed to act. The contracted nature of the ground made it almost impossible to manœuvre their troops, they said, and no reply had been received to the excuses for the delay sent to Browne. All day long the tired, hungry, drenched, and shivering fugitives awaited news from their deliverer.

In the mean time the suffering in Browne's camp was nearly as acute. The storms increased in violence. The temperature fell lower and lower. Floods tore through the defiles and ploughed the roads into furrows. Browne himself had a terrible cold, and

But get no further.

Browne retires.

kept himself up only by the most strenuous efforts, so that the sympathy of the entire army was aroused, and when, worn out by fatigue, pain, and exposure, he threw himself on the naked ground for rest, his comrades fought for the privilege of covering him with their own coats and blankets.¹ But he was determined to keep his word. For three long days he held his post, and listened for the signal gun from the Königstein. The twelfth, the thirteenth passed, and still all was silence. On the fourteenth, as a letter to Brühl the evening before gave notice, the order to retreat was issued, and the Saxons were left to their fate.

This was soon determined. When the evening of the thirteenth approached without any word from Browne, the Saxon commander, Rutowski, was reduced to despair. Like most weak generals in such a crisis, he called a council of war, and obtained an opinion in favor of immediate surrender. But when the result was reported to August on the Königstein, he expressed great surprise that it should be proposed to give up the case without striking a blow, and at his request another council was held early on the fourteenth. It led, however, to no different result. Browne's momentous letter had since arrived, and the corps of officers gave the unanimous opinion that it was hopeless to try to force the Prussian batteries which frowned across their path; that the long defence of the camp met every requirement of military honor; and that the time had now come to yield. The answer of August was a short letter to Rutowski, giving him full discretion to surrender, to die fighting, or to starve.² Without awaiting this reply, Rutowski had already requested Winterfeldt, who was in command at Waltersdorf, to send an officer with power

Capitulation of the Saxons.

¹ Cogniazo, ii. 253.

² The documentary matter concerning these events will be found in the appendix to the second volume of Vitzthum's *Geheimnisse*.

to arrange a suspension of arms. But Winterfeldt thought it better to go in person, and soon afterwards Frederic, too, appeared on the scene. At Lobositz he had been late in getting news of Browne's movements; and it was not until the thirteenth that he learned through letters from prince Maurice and Winterfeldt that the critical moment had come.¹ The latter indeed painted the situation darker than it really was. He overrated the danger from Browne, feared even a diversion toward Dresden,² and excited Frederic not only to hasten in person, but also to bring substantial reinforcements with him. About one o'clock of the fourteenth the king arrived at Struppen, the late headquarters of August. He found Zieten in possession of the camp so long held by the Saxons, and Winterfeldt still engaged in his negotiations with Rutowski, though for a surrender, not a truce. These Frederic cut short by an abrupt threat to reopen fire unless a general agreement was reached within an hour.³ Such an argument prevailed. The preliminaries were soon adopted, and early on the fifteenth the full articles of capitulation were signed.

The articles provided that the Saxon army should surrender as prisoners of war; that the officers should be paroled on an engagement not to Terms of the surrender. serve against the king of Prussia; that the fortress of Königstein should retain a Saxon garrison, but be neutralized for the duration of the war;⁴ and that all general officers should continue to receive their pay from the revenues of the electorate. Such was the substance of the capitulation as it finally went into effect. In

¹ Frederic to Maurice and Winterfeldt, 13 October, 1756.

² *Polit. Corresp.*, xiii. 530. (This fear is recorded also in the journal of Henckel von Donnersmarck, *Militärischer Nachlass*, I. i. 52, 53.)

³ *Ibid.*, p. 533.

⁴ The Sonnenstein, the other Elbe fortress, had already been captured by the Prussians, and remained in their hands.

respect to form it consists of articles submitted by Rutowski, and changes made by Frederic as marginal decisions on the articles; and it was subsequently argued that by accepting the rations at once supplied in accordance with one of the articles, the Saxons acquiesced in the interpretation which Frederic put upon the others.¹ August himself pleaded earnestly for some mitigation of the sentence, and especially asked that certain household troops might accompany him to Warsaw. But Frederic was inexorable. He urged with reason that since several Saxon regiments stationed in Poland had just been transferred to the empress-queen, he could not be expected to offer facilities for others to repeat the process; and on the twentieth of October, the elector, with Brühl and a numerous suite, set out for his other capital. Thus ended the famous camp of Pirna. Its melancholy issue gave rise to many recriminations between the parties concerned, between Frederic and the Saxons, between the Saxons and the Austrians, and between different officials among the Saxons themselves. Rutowski published his defence with oblique thrusts at Brühl. The minister replied, and August himself even entered the lists, at least by proxy. Into this controversy it is here impossible and unnecessary to enter, but one question, which concerns the fate of the rank and file of the Saxon army, is still of interest.

Rutowski's draft of the terms of capitulation as agreed on by himself and Winterfeldt contained an article which, called forth doubtless by dark hints of Frederic's purpose, was designed to secure the prisoners against forced enrolment in the army of the victor.² But as it extended to officers of every grade and privates, Frederic refused to

¹ The original articles and Frederic's marginals are in Vitzthum, ii. 239 et seq., *Polit. Corresp.*, xiii. 534 et seq., and elsewhere. Some further points were also adjusted subsequently by special agreements.

² Art. viii.

accept it in that form. His marginal note said bluntly that no general officer would be compelled to serve; beyond that the affair concerned only himself. Other comments in the series make his intention even clearer. The next morning, accordingly, a Prussian officer appeared at Rutowski's headquarters to enrol the Saxon troops under Frederic's flag, and administer the usual military oath of obedience. Rutowski protested in vain. Some of the regiments complied in a perfunctory way, but the guards, all of the artillery, and one or two other organizations absolutely refused the oath. These were at once broken up, and the members distributed among Prussian regiments. A few, but very few, of the officers voluntarily accepted the uniform of the conqueror. On the eighteenth the Saxon army as an organization ceased to exist.¹

Comment on this transaction is almost unnecessary. It has been shown indeed that Frederic can hardly be accused of breach of faith, and that Reflections. the Saxon general had no reason to feel surprise, or to complain of treachery.² But this is all that can be said for the king by way of extenuation. The old law of Rome was harsh which condemned captives to slavery, after they had perhaps graced a triumph in the streets of the Eternal City; but there was a more unnatural vio-

¹ The number of prisoners is given as low as twelve thousand and as high as seventeen thousand, so that it is hopeless to strive for accuracy. Vitzthum, ii. 249 et seq., collates various accounts of what took place at the so-called swearing in of the Saxon regiments, and all agree in respect to the mixture of fraud and violence by which it was accomplished. There may be some exaggeration, but in most cases the oath was probably a farce.

² This appears, I think, from the declaration which Rutowski added to the articles of capitulation before appending his signature. It said: "Ich bin autorisiret der Armee das Gewehr strecken zu lassen: ich kann aber weder von dem Eide, den sie geschworen, dieselbe lossprechen, noch ihr einen andern Eid schwören lassen. Alles andere ist Sr. Königl. Maj. in Preussen Allerhöchsten Willens Meinung gemäss überlassen." Vitzthum, ii. 246.

lence, a more exquisite cruelty, in compelling men who had surrendered as prisoners of war to take their places in the ranks of the enemy, to fight against the allies of their own prince, and even to aid in the subjugation of their own country. In his account of the affair Frederic attempts no defence or excuse, and few Prussian historians are hardy enough to venture where he refused to lead. The judgment of the impartial world of course condemns the measure without qualification. But it is satisfactory to know that the outrage defeated its own ends after all, and yielded nothing like what was expected of it. The Saxons were no sooner enrolled than they began to desert, singly, in squads, even by companies and battalions. Some of them escaped to Poland, others joined the Austrians, and prince Xaver even formed out of the fugitives a compact corps of nine thousand men, which took part in later campaigns of the war. In an age when armies were composed so largely of mercenaries the unshaken devotion of the Saxon soldiers to their exiled prince is a touching and pleasant spectacle, the more so since little had been done by that prince in the past to encourage their sense of fidelity, and his recent folly was the leading cause of their misfortunes.

After the fall of Pirna operations were suspended for the season, and the armies went into winter quarters, the Austrians in Bohemia and the Prussians in Saxony. Frederic fixed his residence in Dresden. Here he took an unworthy personal vengeance upon Brühl by turning his offending palace and gardens over to plunder and destruction;¹ but otherwise respected the rights of property, sternly repressed all disorder, and treated the electress with decent consideration. The example of the principal armies was at once followed by

¹ See Preuss, ii. 34, 35, for details. Schaefer, i. 218, says the proceeding was generally condemned, but cautiously omits his own opinion.

the secondary commands on either side. Of these, however, and of the fruitless campaign which they conducted, a word must be said before they are finally ushered into their winter camps.

Prince Piccolomini, the commander of the second Austrian army, was an officer of considerable experience, who, on account of his sound judgment, his love of order, and his sense of justice, enjoyed in a high degree the respect of his comrades.¹ When the encampments were formed, he was stationed with an independent command at and about Olmütz. His force numbered about twenty-five thousand, and it was so placed that it could either coöperate aggressively against Prussia, or meet an attempted invasion of Moravia from Upper Silesia. But when it was decided that Browne should push forward to the rescue of the Saxons, Piccolomini moved westward in order to give the necessary support; passed Leutomischl on the thirteenth and Hohenmaut on the fifteenth of September; and on the sixteenth took up a strong position near Königgrätz, which he at once proceeded to fortify. Detachments were also sent out to guard the strategic points in the neighborhood. In the mean time Schwerin had likewise been moving. His force now amounted to about twenty-seven thousand, divided into two corps under generals Fouqué and Hautcharmoy, with fourteen field-guns and six howitzers. As Piccolomini advanced westward he proceeded toward the south, but several marches behind. On the twentieth of September he crossed the frontier at Nachod. The Austrian outposts were driven back, though only after several brisk skirmishes; and it was not until the twenty-second that he took position about August, with his right resting on the Elbe, and his front only four miles from the enemy. Here both armies remained inactive. It has been suggested that Piccolomini might safely have de-

Schwerin
and Piccolomini.

¹ Cogniaz, ii. 208, 213 n.

tached fifteen thousand men to the support of Browne before the battle of Lobositz, and thus have changed the issue of the campaign.¹ But it is by no means certain that this result would have followed, for even without reënforcements Browne outnumbered the enemy. There is perhaps more justice in the criticism of Piccolomini's failure to take the offensive after his own force had been strengthened, as it was, to over thirty thousand. But even here it is easier to be wise after the event than before. Schwerin certainly could not attack an army posted in an impregnable position, and he seems to have performed faithfully the duty entrusted to him. He performed it, too, with a forbearance toward the natives which is justly recorded to his credit. The army was supported indeed from the country; but he forbade unnecessary exactions, and even permitted the peasants to hold open market in his own camp.² Let it be added that the marshal even addressed himself to Piccolomini in the interest of peace, and suggested a personal meeting for an exchange of views. But the authorities at Vienna ordered Piccolomini to reject the overtures, and they led to nothing.³ On the twenty-first of October Schwerin returned to his winter quarters in Silesia. The opposing army found shelter in various frontier towns of Bohemia and Moravia.

¹ G. S., i. 136, 137. Napoleon, on the other hand, condemns Frederic's plan of invading a country in two separate columns, which he thinks accounts for the failure to capture Prague and winter in Bohemia. *Memoirs . . . of Napoleon dictated by the emperor at St. Helena*, London, 1823, iii. 162, 163. As I may often cite these interesting criticisms of one great soldier upon another, it should be explained that they are usually based upon inadequate knowledge of the facts.

² G. S., i. 56; Cogniazio, ii. 230, 231; Varnhagen von Ense, *Ausgewählte Schriften*, xii. 258.

³ Arneth, v. 20. The Austrian suspected a Prussian trick, it appears.

The campaign of 1756, striking as were some of its results, clearly failed to effect the principal object that Frederic had in view; he did not crush ^{Results.} the Austrians by a sudden blow, and force them, as expected, to accept his terms before their plans were matured or their allies could come to their support. In respect to his grand strategy even the battle of Lobositz was a barren victory. True, it showed that the fibre of the Prussian troops had not been impaired by a decade of peace, that they could endure the privations of march or camp, and fight against heavy odds, as well as in the days of Sohr. But that was all. The victory brought him no nearer to Prague, made little impression on the enemy, and contributed little or nothing to the fate of Pirna. Even the capture of the Saxons was not effected until they had rendered the important service of delaying the Prussian movements, and practically thwarting the whole plan of campaign. Frederic was indeed master of the electorate, and supported his army through the winter from its revenues. But as the invasion gave his enemies the pretext which they desired, so his temporary check gave them the leisure which they needed, and the period of rest for the soldiers was full of work for the diplomatists.

CHAPTER II.

WINTER PLOTS AND POLICIES.

IN the war of pamphlets and manifestoes Frederic was as active a belligerent as in the war of arms. Measures of justification. The proclamations which he issued on entering Saxony formed only a sort of preface or introduction, dealt in general statements, and promised rather than furnished the proofs; but the seizure of the archives of Dresden gave him a whole arsenal of weapons, of which early use was made. Podewils and Finckenstein were ordered to prepare, with the aid of the captured originals, a succinct statement of the Prussian case.¹ They in turn called in the service of a young official of the civil service, who, in connection with this work, began, modestly enough, his career in Prussian history.

Ewald Frederic von Hertzberg, whose family belonged to the old Pomeranian nobility, was born in Hertzberg. 1725, at Lottin. After finishing his studies at the gymnasium of Stettin and the university of Halle, where he obtained distinction in history and public law, he received a clerical position, without pay, in the foreign office at Berlin. In 1746 he obtained permission to study in the secret archives, in order, as he himself stated in his petition, that he might perfect himself in the chancery style, — a dreadful object for a young man deliberately to set before himself. The intelligent use which he made of the privilege led the keepers of the archives to propose his appointment as an assistant. Podewils

¹ Frederic to Podewils and Finckenstein, 12 September, 6 October, 1756.

avored the proposal, his reasons being that Hertzberg, as a recluse who had no knowledge of the world, and no desire to acquire any, would be lost in active diplomatic service, and ought to be left in the solitude of musty parchments and antiquated public records, where his industry would be of more value. So the young scholar received his appointment. In 1750 he was made director of the archives of the foreign office, and two years later acquired the title of privy-councillor of legation. Frederic personally seems to have known little of him when, in 1756, Podewils invited him to prepare the formal vindication of Prussia's action.

The first, second, and third drafts which he offered were freely reëdited by the ministers, and then, because they wanted the directness and simplicity which he justly considered essential, were re-^{The Mémoire raisonné.}jected by the king.¹ A fourth trial proved more satisfactory. Its result was the famous memoir, in which Prussia's cause was set forth with a wealth of documentary support, an adroitness of arrangement, and a cogency of logic that are surpassed in few state papers of ancient or modern times.² The author traced the whole course of diplomatic history from the treaty of Warsaw downwards; followed out the intrigues of Kaunitz with Dresden and St. Petersburg; and verified every allegation by the fatal evidence of the Saxon archives. Certain restraints were indeed imposed on him, and these interfered with the completeness of the defence. The full extent of the

¹ See *Polit. Corresp.*, xiii. 509.

² In the original the full title was "Mémoire raisonné sur la conduite des cours de Vienne et de Saxe, et sur leurs desseins dangereux contre sa majesté le roi de Prusse, avec les pièces originales et justificatives qui en fournissent les preuves." The French text was put in circulation on the sixteenth of October, a German version a few days later; and it was also translated into English. Published in *Recueil des déductions du comte de Hertzberg*, i. 1-64; *Heldengeschichte*, iii. 647 et seq.; etc.

French engagements to Austria was not known. It was considered wise to avoid offence to Russia, since Elizabeth had not yet openly declared herself, and Williams was still laboring to keep her on the right side. But Austria and Saxony were treated without reserve. The first was declared to be the real author of the war, while the conduct of the other, it was argued, fully justified the measures of force that had been taken.¹

If Frederic was still ignorant of the full extent to which France was involved in the Austrian schemes, he had not been left in doubt about her intention to furnish the aid promised in the open articles of the treaty of Versailles. The formation of the auxiliary corps was already in progress; and on the first of October Knyphausen reported that the rendezvous had been fixed at Strasburg for the twentieth of the month. From the choice of this place the envoy inferred that the force would operate toward Bohemia, rather than against Westphalia.² In the same letter too, as well as in earlier and later ones, he gave gloomy accounts of the state of feeling at Paris, of the exasperation caused by the treatment of August, of menacing language held by Rouillé and others; it was even charged that Frederic was acting in the pay of England. At Berlin the attitude of Valori remained unchanged. Personally he affected to feel more grief than anger at the misconduct of a prince who had honored him with

State of
feeling in
France.

¹ The editor of the *Recueil* states that Hertzberg prepared the Mémoire in eight days, and the correspondence between Frederic and the ministers seems to show that this was after the arrival of the original Saxon documents at Berlin. The Austrians and Saxons answered, and then Hertzberg drew up another more elaborate defence of Frederic under the title, "Réfutation de l'ouvrage intitulé : Remarques sur les manifestes de guerre du roi de Prusse, lettres circulaires et d'autres mémoires publiés depuis le commencement de cette guerre jusqu'à présent, 1757." *Recueil*, i. 67 et seq.

² *Polit. Corresp.*, xiii. 524, 525.

his friendship and his raillery; but as the envoy of France his voice had no uncertain tone. Even the sight of the secret dispatches from Dresden failed to move him. Podewils reported on the twenty-eighth of September that the marquis refused to see in them any justification for the invasion of Saxony, and merely renewed the warning given before that his master would make no delay in furnishing the empress-queen the stipulated aid.¹

Louis the Fifteenth and the stout marquis of Valori, his envoy at Berlin, were thus religiously faithful to the treaty of Versailles. But just at this Count de Broglie. time occurred an incident, or a series of incidents, which gave France a pretext for going far beyond the provisions of that treaty, for asserting a grievance of her own, and for exchanging the modest character of an auxiliary for that of an ally, or even a principal. The count de Broglie was still French ambassador at Dresden, accredited also to August as king of Poland. But the course of events had wrought a singular change in the situation of the ingenious young diplomatist. He had not at first favored the change of policy at Versailles.² The secret mission with which he was charged, that of thwarting the designs of the two imperial courts in Poland and securing the election of prince Conti when the throne should become vacant, naturally drew him toward the king of Prussia, who likewise had an interest in at least the first of these ends. But the diplomatic revolution threw all of his plans into confusion. France became the ally of Austria, and began to approach Russia. England and Prussia were united on the other side. And the Prussian invasion completed the disorder by driving Saxony into the arms of the two empires, changing the aspect of Polish affairs, and introducing an entirely new set of factors

¹ *Polit. Corresp.*, xiii. 502.

² *Mémoires de Dubois* (ed. 1763), ii. 263; Louis XV. to Broglie, 24 December, 1756, apud Stühr, *Forschungen*, i. 41 n.

into a problem already complex and difficult enough. But Broglie tried to make the best of the matter. Adopting the policy of his court, he warmly espoused the cause of Saxony, and in the panic caused by the approach of the Prussians found himself to his surprise, as he states, the chief adviser of the elector.¹ Even after the flight to Pirna he kept up an officious correspondence with the beleaguered prince, and as often as he could get a letter through the lines surprised him by some new and ingenious scheme. Such a restless person was sure to cross the path of the king of Prussia.

As early as the seventh of September one of Broglie's couriers had been detained at the Prussian lines because he stated, through mistake or indiscretion, that he was bound for Prague.² His dispatches were taken from him. They were returned indeed to Broglie, but only after a delay which gave a pretext for insinuating that they had been opened and read at the Prussian headquarters. His government espoused his quarrel, and soon afterwards a new question came in to sharpen and embitter the issue. In the language of law Broglie would be called a barrator. He seemed to take pleasure in raising test cases which would enable him, if successful, to hoist the flag of victory, or if unsuccessful, to demand redress as a martyr to brute force. Hence he had no sooner sent off his version of the arrest of his courier than he provoked a new conflict by insisting on his right to wait upon August in the camp at Pirna.³ Frederic refused his consent, and without it the envoy remained, of course, subject to the general orders that no one should pass the lines. This refusal and the arrest of the courier brought matters to a crisis.

Arrest of
the
courier.

¹ Broglie, *Secret du roi*, i. 174.

² Eichel to Podewils, 9 September, 1756.

³ Report of Maltzahn, 11 September, 1756, in *Polit. Corresp.*, xiii. 376.

By order of his court, Valori waited upon Podewils, and, with warm expressions of personal regret, left a written protest against the offences in question; demanded full and complete reparation; and insisted that the French envoy at Dresden should have perfect liberty to visit the prince to whom he was accredited.¹

Broglie received orders in harmony with this action. On the fifth of October he set out from Dresden in his carriage, escorted by a mounted suite, and drove directly toward Pirna. The next morning he reached the Prussian lines, where he was promptly detained. Dragoons rode across the heads of his horses, and as he could show no passport, the officers in charge notified him that he could proceed no farther. Margrave Charles, who under Winterfeldt commanded at Sedlitz, was then summoned.² Toward him Broglie assumed an even more heroic attitude; poured out protests, demands, threats, and, as if to challenge the use of force, made formal efforts to pursue his journey. But the margrave only replied firmly that he had his orders, and the dragoons barred the way. The next morning Broglie, who had passed the night in a house near by, sent a messenger to ask the margrave whether he had sufficiently considered all the consequences of his action, and was now prepared to let the king of France, in the person of his ambassador, freely continue his journey. The sturdy soldier replied that without orders he would not permit the king of France, or all the kings of Christendom, to pass the lines into Pirna.³ Thereupon the solemn farce of the pre-

His own
adven-
tures.

¹ 29 September, 1756. Published, with the report of Podewils and Frederic's evasive reply, in *Polit. Corresp.*, xiii. 503, 504.

² Margrave Charles of Schwedt, so-called, a Prussian prince descended from the Great Elector by his second marriage. See Tuttle's *History of Prussia*, i. 255, 256.

³ Margrave Charles's report, 7 October, 1756. *Polit. Corresp.*, xiii. 514.

vious day was repeated. The horses of his excellency were harnessed, he himself took his place in the carriage, the escort formed in order, and the word was given to start. But the cavalcade never started. Again the soldiers interposed, again Broglie invoked the name of his most Christian majesty, and again he retired to his quarters to await the expected passport from Frederic. But no passport or relief of any kind came, and on the ninth he returned to Dresden. Though baffled in the nominal object of his demonstration, he was not wholly unsuccessful, for he had obtained a grievance, and his report of the affair was not wanting in vivacity.¹

It seems clear that Frederic's neglect to send the passport which Broglie professed to expect was intentional.² In explanation of the affair he suggested an alternative to Podewils. Either, he said, the envoy's demonstration was made by order of his government, in which case it showed that France was only in search of a pretext for a rupture; or it was made on the envoy's own initiative, and then it became a cause for complaint on the part of Prussia.³ But there is no doubt that the piquant personal details of this scandal, and the use made of it by the French court, gave it an interest which otherwise it hardly deserved. Without this, and independently of the treaty of Versailles, the invasion of Saxony had caused an outburst of indignation at Paris. The dauphiness read aloud the letters of her

French
demon-
strations.

¹ The above account is condensed from two opposite sources, Broglie's own report, 11 October, to Valori, *Mémoires de V.*, vol. ii. pp. 353-355, and the report of margrave Charles to Frederic, *Polit. Corresp.*, xiii. 507, 508. Cf. Broglie, *Secret du roi*, i. 194-197; Henckel, I. ii. 49, 50.

² "Der Franzose muss mit Höflichkeit geschont werden, aber nicht hereingelassen." Frederic to Winterfeldt, 8 October, 1756.

³ Eichel to Podewils, 9 October, 1756. Under date 12 October Podewils reports accordingly that he had lodged a complaint with Valori.

mother, the electress, besought Louis on her knees to avenge the injuries of her parents, and moved the virtuous Pompadour to tears. A diplomatic note issued by Rouillé early in September accused England and Prussia of provoking a war of religions, in order that under the pretext of defending Protestantism they might rob their Protestant and Catholic neighbors alike.¹ Simultaneously with this a formal tender of aid was made to Austria. It could take the form, said Bernis to Stahremberg, of men, as the treaty of Versailles provided, or of money, if the empress-queen should prefer; and in case she chose the former, it was also left to her discretion to say whether they should serve in the direction of Bohemia, or should invade Westphalia and Hanover. But it was pointed out that they would be unable to reach Bohemia before winter, too late, therefore, to be of any service until the next spring.² This necessary delay was foreseen and predicted by Frederic; he took it for granted that a winter campaign was out of the question.³ Such, however, was not the view of Maria Theresa. In her angry zeal she urged that the auxiliary corps should enter the field at once, should be added to Piccolomini's force in Moravia, and that after the junction, though it were the dead of winter, an attempt on Silesia should be made, while Browne held Frederic in check on the Elbe.⁴ This was before the battle of Lobositz, but that affair caused no change in the Austrian plans. France, too, seemed to acquiesce at first, then different counsels began to prevail; hesitation appeared; new objections were raised, some of which extended even to the plan of sending the troops to Bohemia, or putting them under Austrian control at all. An independent campaign against Hanover

¹ Stuhr, *Forschungen*, i. 69, 70.

² Arneth, v. 26.

³ Frederic to Michell, 22 September, 12 October, 1756.

⁴ Arneth, v. 26, 27.

or against Prussia was preferred. But while this controversy was in progress the relations of France and Prussia came to a crisis, and changed in a measure the whole face of the situation.

As soon as the news of Broglie's last adventure reached Paris the French court took the long-impending step, and a dispatch of the nineteenth of October ordered Valori to close his mission at Berlin without taking leave of the king.¹ The next day this action was made known to Knyphausen. His report and Valori's instructions seem to have reached their destinations on the thirtieth of October, so that while the old diplomatist was reading, not without emotion, the lines which terminated forever his long and eventful connection with the Prussian court, Frederic at Sedlitz was dispatching a prompt and decisive order to Knyphausen to shut up the legation and return to Berlin.² Thus the climax approached. As soon as Valori could arrange his affairs he left Berlin as directed, and without any official audience of leave; but he sent Frederic privately a message of respect and attachment, to which a civil answer was returned. "As for me," wrote the king in concluding his letter, "I look with calmness upon the strange things which are happening, and you may rest assured that instead of shaking my resolution they only inspire me to greater efforts for the coming year."³ On the sixteenth of November Knyphausen finished his preparations, and took his departure. Prussia and France were at war. The recall of Valori being based mainly on the offence given in the treatment of Broglie and his courier, it follows that Louis the Fifteenth now became a principal in the war, and that Frederic was exposed, not merely to the twenty-four thousand

Rupture of
France and
Prussia.

¹ Valori, *Mémoires*, ii. 359 et seq.

² *Polit. Corresp.*, xiii. 581-583; Schaefer, i. 224.

³ *Polit. Corresp.*, xiv. 6, where also Valori's letter may be read.

men promised to the empress-queen as auxiliaries, but to the whole military power of the French monarchy.

It is an interesting though probably not a very important coincidence that on the day of the dispatch of Valori's letter of recall, final instructions were also issued to a special envoy to Vienna, the count d'Estrées, marshal of France. The chief object of his mission was to settle all outstanding military questions between the two courts. His instructions, which were drawn up by Bernis, directed him to support the French plan of coöperation. If the empress-queen persisted in her demand, France would send the auxiliary corps to Moravia, but under protest; the interests of both parties would be best served, so he was charged to argue, by the formation of one French army to act against Hanover and Magdeburg, and another for operations on the lower Rhine.¹ Many weeks were consumed in this work by the marshal, and many more passed before the parallel negotiations at Paris were closed, so great were the personal and political obstacles to overcome. Not even the acts of Frederic and the arrival of the *casus foederis* had as yet brought about complete harmony in the French councils. Rouillé was doubtful or lukewarm. Machault, the minister of marine, still insisted that the naval war against England should be made most prominent, and Bernis, the devoted slave of madame de Pompadour, supported the demands of her friend. These had in view, in respect to the war on land, a simple compliance with the treaty of Versailles, and the supply of the stipulated troops to Austria. But D'Argenson, the war minister, and Belleisle, who, as a member of the council of war, had finally enrolled himself among the enemies of Prussia, carried through the

¹ *Recueil des instructions données aux ambassadeurs . . . de France*, i. 338 et seq. Stuhr and Arneth follow out these negotiations in great detail.

opposite policy of an independent French campaign, on a large scale, in Germany; and Bernis's instructions to D'Estrées were therefore contrary to his own views of the true policy to pursue.¹

While these supplementary negotiations were in progress between the principals, those with other powers whose accession to the treaty of Versailles had been invited in one of the secret articles were pushed with equal vigor. Russia, of course, was a willing conquest. If Elizabeth's resentment against France had made her for a time reluctant to enter into a treaty with that power, her hatred of Frederic proved still stronger, and the invasion of Saxony swept away every doubt. On the fourth of September she issued a vigorous protest against the attack on her ally, which it was said she could not regard with indifference. A request for mediation, in regard to which Williams sounded the ministers at Frederic's instance, was contemptuously refused.² Further, English subsidies were declined.³ Not even the purchase of Bestuschef for Frederic could now turn the course of events; for although the chancellor accepted the bribe, and promised thenceforth to be the king of Prussia's best friend, he added mournfully that the bargain came too late.⁴ Woronzof and Douglas carried the day. On the eleventh of January, 1757, articles were signed at St. Petersburg by which the empress acceded to the treaty of Versailles, and a defensive alliance was formed. It was expressly stipulated, however, that France should not be required to give assistance against the Porte, or Russia against

Russia accedes to the treaty of Versailles.

¹ *Mémoires de Bernis*, 296, 297, 303 et seq.

² Mitchell to Holdernessee, Frederic to Michell, 30 August, report of Williams, 14 September, 1756. *Polit. Corresp.*, xiii. 298, 311, 315, 516.

³ Raumer, *Beiträge*, ii. 401.

⁴ Report of Williams, 28 September, 1756, apud Raumer, ii. 399, 400.

England, so that Prussia remained the only common enemy.¹ For signing a secret article, at once repudiated by Louis XV., by which Turkey was included in the French guaranty, Douglas was reprimanded. It was contrary, of course, to the whole Eastern policy of France, to which the Russian treaty already did sufficient violence.²

In the negotiations which led to this result the diplomacy of Austria was even more active than that of France. The feelings of Elizabeth were well understood at Vienna, and there was no anxiety about the present; but she was known to be the victim of hasty impulses, and the frivolous nature of her quarrels with France and Prussia threw grave doubts upon the stability of her friendships. Some disappointment was felt over the failure of the Russians to take the field during the first campaign.³ It appeared, too, very early in the course of the discussions that Elizabeth's fierce desire for vengeance upon Frederic as a personal enemy did not exclude a thrifty purpose to round off her dominions at the cost of Prussia; and to this end the suggestion was made that Courland, with Semigallia, be transferred from Poland to Russia, while the republic should receive Preussen in exchange. Such a plan was highly inconvenient to the Austrians. They set up against it the distinction, with which France was already familiar, between the restoration of Silesia and Glatz to their lawful owner, and the conquest from Frederic of provinces which were his by inheritance; practical rather than

Austro-
Russian
negotia-
tions.

¹ Mortens, suppl. iii. 33 et seq. The secret articles of the Versailles treaty were apparently not made known to Russia.

² See Vandal, *Louis XV. et Elisabeth de Russie*, Paris, 1882, pp. 272-276, and Broglie, *Secret du roi*, i. 224.

³ Arneth, v. 53. But Bestuschef was able to meet this complaint by showing that the Russians had been ready in July, and had retired to winter quarters only because the plans of Kaunitz himself were not ripe. See Raumer, *Beiträge*, ii. 405, 406.

moral considerations were, however, the real cause of the embarrassment. It was the effect of the project, when it should become known, upon France, Turkey, and other powers that was feared.¹ But a flat refusal might have ruined the plans of a diplomacy which now went as far beyond the treaty of St. Petersburg as it did beyond the treaty of Versailles; and the negotiations were brought to an early close by the complete though unwilling acceptance of what was understood to be the condition imperatively laid down by Elizabeth. The empress-queen gave her solemn promise to regard the proposed transfer of territory as part of the settlement to be made at the end of the war. Declarations were also exchanged in behalf of Saxony, which was to receive Magdeburg and the circle of the Saale. No difficulty then remained about the treaty proper, which was signed on the second of February.²

In that instrument the number of troops to be furnished by each power was raised from sixty to eighty thousand; Russia also agreed to supply a fleet of from fifteen to twenty ships of the line, with some smaller craft; and instead of the two million florins which, under the treaty of 1746, Austria was to pay as soon as the lost provinces should be restored, one million roubles annually was promised for the duration of the war. The common rage against Frederic was expressed with a freedom not usual in such documents. The king was practically called an outlaw, who would have to be made powerless before Europe could expect to enjoy a

¹ See Esterhazy's instructions, 13 November, 1756, in Arneth, v. 57 et seq.

² According to Arneth, v. 70, the promise in regard to Courland and Semigallia was also put in the form of a written declaration, signed by the empress-queen, but the paper was subsequently returned at her request, and for greater safety the engagement was left an oral one.

settled repose,¹ and accordingly it was stipulated that neither of the parties would conclude a separate peace with him. Nor was this all. The coöperation of other states was to be invited; and to Sweden especially the prospect of a territorial reward was held out as an inducement, — Pomerania being understood, though not expressly named. Saxony received the same general mention. The details of military coöperation make up the rest of the treaty.²

The many titles which were held to give Sweden a right to enter the lists, and the many powers which labored to induce her to exercise that right, afford ^{Sweden and the Empire.} a curious example of the mixture of pedantic with practical, of legal with political considerations, which reigned in Europe as late as the second half of the eighteenth century. Austria and Russia agreed to solicit her aid against Frederic. France and Austria had the same understanding, although it was not openly expressed in the treaty of Versailles. In the interests of European peace the three greatest states of the Continent thought it necessary, or at least wise, to take into their alliance this little kingdom of the north, which had long since outlived its military renown, and was the prey of civil dissensions. More than this, Sweden, which Frederic had not attacked, and had no intention of attacking, was to be put forward as the defender of law. What was this law? The law of the Empire. Where was this law to be sought? In capitularies, in enactments of the diet, above all in the treaty of Westphalia, concluded a century

¹ Art. vi. "Le repos de l'Europe ne pouvant jamais être solidement établi à moins qu'on ne parvienne à ôter au roi de Prusse les moyens de le troubler," etc.

² The full text is printed by Schaefer, vol. i., appendix, pp. 591-595. The treaty consisted of eight general articles, four separate, and one secret. Saxony and Sweden had each one of the second group, while the secret article concerned the annual payments by Austria.

before, and now invoked against Prussia. The king of Sweden, by virtue of the possession of West Pomerania, was a prince of the Empire, and accordingly had an interest, like any other member, in preventing violations of its peace and its laws. But the king of Sweden as such was also one of the guarantors of the treaty of Westphalia, and was bound whenever occasion arose to defend the settlements made in 1648. In this capacity France had a similar duty, or rather right, for the relation was more often used to supply a pretext, than to ascertain a rule, for interference in Germany. History is full of illustrations of this. But since France was also allied independently with Austria and Russia, and since the three allied courts were also appealing to Sweden as a European power, it is time to inquire what the Empire was doing, or had already done, in its own corporate capacity. With Maria Theresa's husband as its head, and all its organs completely subject to Hapsburg influence, the direction of its measures was easy to foresee. But their nature or method belonged strictly to the system itself, that greatest of all the anachronisms in Europe. The reader who reflects that Frederic the Second was practically a sovereign prince, that he was a man of deeds, who hated shams and never allowed himself to be checked by words, that he had not invaded Saxony without first counting the cost, that he was really making only what he felt to be a desperate choice between evils, and that all these things were no secret to the imperial pedants of Vienna and Regensburg, — the reader who carries these facts in his mind will find in the solemn decrees, edicts, and proclamations, the monitoria, excitatoria, dehortatoria, and inhibitoria, with which the unlucky culprit was assailed, the most delicious humor of that dark and cruel time.

The play began as early as the thirteenth of September, when the emperor with the approval of the aulic council

issued a furious admonitory edict against Frederic. Out of its barbarous terminology and labyrinthine involutions can be read, after effort, the official declaration of Francis and his advisers that the king of Prussia was a disturber of the peace and an offender against the laws of the Empire; that he had wantonly injured one of its members in the person of the elector of Saxony; and that he must at once give up his unlawful and wicked enterprise. Stripped of all its verbiage the paper sounds like the hue and cry proclaimed by a sheriff against a notorious felon. This was absurd, of course, but it was not novel. The usage of the Empire still tolerated, or rather sacredly guarded, the fiction that its authority over the princes and other members was that of the officers of law over individuals, so that the violent tone of its fulminations neither deceived nor surprised. But there was grave doubt among the publicists of the time whether even the theory of the imperial power extended to the length of absolving soldiers from their oath of obedience. Such was, however, one of the features of the decree. It solemnly called on all who were enrolled under Frederic's flag to leave the service of the malefactor, and, under penalty of the laws of the Empire, to give him no aid or support in his nefarious schemes.¹

Edict of
the em-
peror
against
Frederic.

A few murmurs were excited by this summary edict. Several of the free cities, including even Regens- burg, the seat of the diet, refused to placard it, and the archbishop of Mayence was not without scruples.² Any act of the emperor which looked like an encroachment on the rights of the states was, of course, viewed with suspicion. But in this case Austrian influence was so strong, and Prussian antipathies were so keen, that little open dissent appeared, and the edict went on record as the edict of the German suzerain against an

Frederic's
defiance.

¹ Huschberg-Wuttke, pp. 58-60.

² Ibid., p. 61.

unruly and rebellious vassal. Of course, too, it had to be answered. It was indeed hardly necessary for Frederic to state that he had no intention of obeying the haughty summons; but as a person formally arraigned before his federal associates, and before public opinion, he could not afford to let the case go by default. On the fourth of October appeared the Prussian reply. It rehearsed once more the familiar reasons for drawing the sword against the empress-queen, and for seizing Saxony as a measure of precaution. But it sounded no tone of apology. Though scrupulously respectful toward the members of the imperial body, it had a firm note of defiance toward the Austrians, and returned epithet for epithet, with interest.¹ In work of this kind Frederic personally took little part; it was the one branch of literature which he shunned. He gladly left it to subordinates more expert in the deep constitutional lore of the Empire, and more practised in its laborious forms of expression. One of these was his envoy at the diet, baron von Plotho, who signed and presented the composition in question.

Four days later the Saxon envoy at Regensburg replied in a "counter-pro-memoria," and on the ninth of October the aulic council, referring to the seizure of the archives of Dresden and the indignities offered to the electress, thundered forth new maledictions against the royal offender.² Thus began a war of decrees and protests, less bloody indeed, but scarcely less bitter than the war of armies. The fisc of the empire—a committee specially charged to detect and punish infractions of the law—was called into activity, and responded with zeal. Frederic distinguishes in respect to style between its manifestoes and those of the emperor.

¹ "Pro-Memoria der Chur-Brandenburgischen Comitial-Gesandtschaft." Faber's *Staats-Canzley*, cxi. 386 et seq.

² Both in Faber, vol. cxi.

Both were mendacious and unjust; but the rancor of the fisc was expressed with a coarse brutality which in the productions of the emperor became a more polished and supercilious insolence. He adds that he caused a hint to be conveyed to the empress-queen that a correspondence of diatribes did little honor to wearers of the purple. Though they were enemies, they need not scold each other in the style of the fish-markets.¹

It may now seem paradoxical to suggest that the imperial party gained little if anything from the technical strength of its position. Probably as a matter of strict construction Frederic was wrong. I speak with diffidence on such an obscure point; but as I understand the law of the Empire, the occupation of Saxony was an act which gave the federal authorities a just right to interfere, or at least to inquire. The first edict of the emperor was in the nature of an injunction, which, pending an appeal to the diet, should have been obeyed. It was not obeyed, however, and the refusal to obey, supported as it was by the continued use of force, might be regarded as making war upon the emperor, a thing expressly forbidden by the treaty of Westphalia. But in a larger sense the proceedings against Frederic were wholly devoid of any judicial character. The Austrians simply used the imperial machinery in support of their own national and dynastic interests. The emperor, the aulic council, the fiscal committee, and even, as will later appear, the diet itself, were not so many tribunals, which on account of the justice of her cause Maria Theresa was able to gain, but mere agents who lent their official characters and powers to her support. Plotho drew a just distinction in one of the briefs which he submitted to the diet. There was either war between Austria and Prussia as belligerents, he said in substance, or there was merely a case under the laws of

Technical-
ities and
realities.

¹ *Œuvres de Frédéric*, iv. 104.

the Empire. The issue must be either international or constitutional; it could not be both. If it was German, it should be settled by Germany, and by Germany alone. But the empress-queen had already by treaty secured the support of outside powers for her side of the dispute; and having thus in effect proclaimed its international character, she was precluded from demanding the aid of the Empire, or from using in her own behalf such of the imperial organs as she happened to control. The Prussian treaty with England was of a different character. Its object was to keep war out of, not to introduce it into Germany, and was therefore both humane and patriotic.¹

The force of these arguments, and of others put forward from time to time by Prussia, may have Action of the diet. made, as is often stated, some impression at a few German courts, though I believe the extent of this has been exaggerated. But they were lost upon the emperor. Though the high office of Francis prescribed to him the part of a judicial arbitrator between contending parties, and though he was personally of a mild and peaceful temper, he was borne away by the stronger nature of his consort, and the swift procession of measures to which he gave his sanction marched with complete docility toward the goal set before itself by Austrian statecraft. In the division of labor at Vienna it merely fell to Francis to see that the Empire, of which he was titular head, was enrolled on the right side. The decrees and edicts had done perhaps all that was ever expected of them; they had prepared the ground. It now remained to get the formal sanction of the diet, the only body having at all a representative character, to a declaration of war against Frederic in the name of the Empire. Prussia and Hanover tried to avert this by suggesting, first, the neutrality, then the mediation of

¹ "Pro-Memoria," 3 November, 1756. Faber's *Staats-Canzley*, cxii. 555 et seq.

the Empire. But their efforts were in vain. Subsidy treaties gained some needy or wavering princes; others were driven to submit by various forms of coercion; the Catholic members were influenced, as was natural, by religious sympathy; and a few Protestant states fell for one reason or another into the Austrian line. By the seventeenth of January a clear majority was assured. On that day, accordingly, the declaration against Prussia was passed by the concurrent vote of all three orders or colleges in the diet, the electors, the princes, and the free cities. The emperor was authorized to insist on the restoration to August of all his dominions, with an indemnity for the losses and injuries already sustained; to require also a due satisfaction for the empress as queen of Bohemia; and to these ends to call on the circles of the Empire for their proper quotas of troops.¹ Thus in point of form the act gave the emperor the power of a sheriff to raise a posse comitatus. But in fact it was a declaration of war against Prussia by the confederate body, of which Prussia was a member.

The indefatigable Plottho was promptly on hand with his protest. He complained with some justice ^{Plottho's} that his master had been condemned without ^{reply.} such a hearing as the constitution of the Empire gave him a right to expect; and then heaping up adjectives proceeded to call the decree of the diet unprecedented, illegal, prejudiced, unconstitutional, wicked, unjust, violent, arbitrary, cruel, null, and void.² But this docu-

¹ "Reichs-Gutachten an Ihre Röm. Kaiserl. Majestät," adopted 17 and recorded 18 January, 1757. Faber's *Staats-Canzley*, cxiii. 669 et seq. The proceedings in the college of princes are also given in full, *ibid.*, pp. 540-659. The act received the imperial confirmation on the 29th of January.

² "Chur-Brandenburgisches Pro-Memoria," 24 January, 1757. *Staats-Canzley*, cxiii. 672-677. Returning defiance for defiance, Frederick threatened, or Plottho made him threaten, vengeance upon those states which had taken part in the act.

ment was simply read, placed on record, and forgotten. The decree remained as the judgment of the Empire.

This measure added one more to the list of Frederic's enemies. The Empire, apart from Austria, was not indeed formidable in a military sense, and dissenting members, like Hesse and Brunswick, were likely to choose their own sides, in spite of all the decrees of the diet; but the complication was awkward and embarrassing if only because it shut the Prussian recruiting officers out of a useful field of operations at a time when every vagabond had his value. It also gave the Austrian cause a certain prestige, which would be serviceable in other directions. This soon appeared. Under the act of the diet, Sweden would have been liable only for the quota of troops due from West Pomerania as a part of the Lower Saxon circle. But Sweden was already taking measures to enter as an independent ally into the larger plans of the Austrian party, and a treaty with France, signed on the twenty-first of March, 1757, marked the beginning of the change. By its terms the two powers agreed to act together in executing the guaranties of the treaty of Westphalia. This was in the usual language of such stipulations, and reads fair; but the next articles contain, though in vague and guarded phraseology, the promise of France to secure for Sweden some further morsels of Pomerania.¹ The adhesion of the empress-queen to the treaty was invited in the fifth article. Ten days later, on the thirty-first of March, the two courts gave public notice of their intervention. It is well understood that the treaty was extorted from the king, Adolph Frederic, by the senatorial oligarchy, whose hatred of Frederic and Prussia is described as boundless.²

¹ Articles ii. and iii. Schoell, iii. 33-36. Sweden had already refused to undertake a special guaranty of Magdeburg and Halberstadt, which Frederic had suggested. See Huschberg-Wuttke, pp. 103, 104.

² Raumer, *Beiträge*, ii. 401. Both Austria and Russia subsequently acceded to the treaty.

Thus the hunt of the allied courts went merrily on. Not satisfied to pursue Sweden alike as a German and as a non-German power, and knowing well the inborn procrastination of the imperial military system, they had also adopted the plan of engaging the separate princes by special treaties, under which money was to be furnished by one side and soldiers by the other, and had divided their labors to this end. Austria secured the elector of Mayence and the bishop of Würzburg, the latter alone agreeing to contribute six thousand troops. France was already entitled to six thousand from the archbishop of Cologne, and to a small contingent from the Palatinate, and toward the end of March she obtained from Bavaria and Würtemberg, in return for subsidies, the promise of ten thousand more.¹ The duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin was secured by France for a nominal neutrality, which was, however, distinctly hostile to Prussia.² But neither the persuasions nor the threats of French diplomacy moved the landgrave of Hesse-Cassel, who firmly adhered to the other party.

In this courageous attitude the landgrave had little support from the more powerful neighbor for whose defence he had pledged his military resources. D'Estrées left Vienna early in March, having reached a provisional agreement with Kaunitz on the method of French coöperation, which had for its basis the promise of his most Christian majesty to assemble an army of 105,000 men, in May, on the lower Rhine. The rest depended on the issue of negotiations for the neutrality of Hanover. If favorable, half the French army was to join an Austrian force in a direct attack upon Magdeburg, while the rest blockaded Wesel; if unfavorable, the entire army was to operate against

The German courts.

Proposed neutrality of Hanover.

¹ Arneth, v. 156.

² 1 April, 1757, the text in Schaefer, i. 595-597. See especially the separate article.

Hanover and her allies.¹ The negotiations, begun at the instance of Austria, had been in progress for some time. The Hanoverian ministers desired, of course, an arrangement by which the electorate could escape the costs and dangers of war, and it is only fair to say that this was a case in which England was dragging her, not she England, into an unwilling conflict. Austria's interest in a plan for narrowing the scope of the war, sparing the German states of the north, and for turning the bulk of the French forces directly against Frederic, is obvious. But France refused to agree to the arrangement unless there was coupled with it the right of passage for her armies through Hanover, and on this rock the project was shipwrecked. If it had succeeded, the effect on Frederic's fortunes would have been serious. The treaty of Westminster had in view the defence of Prussia as well as Hanover; and it was an open question whether England, her own German possessions thus secured, would still give the promised support to Frederic, or would idly allow the armies of France, Austria, and Russia to break into his dominions on every side, and with overwhelming force. The king of England at least seems at one time to have been equal to such treachery. So long as Hanover was left undisturbed, it was his purpose, he intimated to Austria, to hold aloof from the war in Germany, since Frederic, whom he had repeatedly tried to dissuade from beginning hostilities, had as the aggressor no claims whatever upon him.²

It is, however, not so much to the treachery as to the weakness of the cabinet that England's dilatory and

¹ Arneth, v. 87; Stühr, i. 93, 94.

² Report of Colloredo, Austrian ambassador at London, 19 November, 1756. Arneth, v. 78, 79. The English guaranty was, of course, technically only against an invasion of Prussia by a foreign power, and could not be invoked by Frederic so long as his war was with Austria alone.

vacillating conduct at this time must be charged. The duke of Newcastle, crushed by his responsibilities, ^{Fall of Newcastle.} allowed affairs to drift whithersoever the winds of fortune might take them. Disaster followed disaster until the cup of national shame was full. In America the French, though a mere handful compared with the English, captured Oswego, gained control of the great lakes, and convinced the Red Man that they were the ruling race. From India came the ghastly news of the Black Hole of Calcutta. The spiteful persecution of Byng was still in progress when another English admiral, Hawke, suffered the French to establish themselves in Corsica, and the heroic Paoli to struggle unaided for the independence of his country. All confidence seemed lost. The continued French armaments filled England with dismay, and the wildest rumor of their designs upon the island itself was sufficient to cause a general panic. The cabinet was still at war with itself. The unhappy alliance between Newcastle and Fox, which Pitt, in a famous speech, had compared to the union of the Rhone and the Saone at Lyons, proved of short duration. In October Fox resigned, alleging ill treatment from his chief; and soon afterwards Murray, to whom every path of political preferment stood open, but whose ambition looked only toward a judicial career, claimed and obtained a place on that bench of which he was to become such an illustrious ornament. In these troublous times the plan of neutralizing Hanover may have seemed to George the Second only a desperate effort to save something from the general wreck that was impending. Though he had taken an accurate measure of Newcastle's capacity, he looked forward to his fall as the beginning of chaos. But with all the duke's love of office, and in spite of overtures to possible supporters on every side, he was compelled to bow before the storm, and in November handed in his resignation.

Frederic watched these quarrels in the domestic household of his only ally with anxiety and disgust. He was not too familiar with the English system at its best; but he acknowledged his failure to understand how a patriotic nation could allow questions of men and parties to paralyze its energies at such a crisis. Ministerial changes. This was a time, he vehemently urged, for composing, or at least suspending differences, for sinking personal rivalries, for erasing party lines, and for uniting all the resources of the country in defence of Protestantism and liberty. There is no reason for believing that Frederic's exhortations reached the ears of the English politicians, or that if they had, any great effect would have been caused. Even Pitt had not yet thrown off the shackles of party or of personal prejudice. He declined to come to the relief of Newcastle after Fox's retirement, and he declined to join a new ministry under Fox as leader.¹ But when after much negotiation a cabinet was proposed in which Fox was to have no place and the Newcastle interest no representation, he entered into the plan, and became one of the secretaries of state, Holderness, who held over, being the other. The duke of Devonshire was first lord of the treasury and premier. Legge, Pitt's friend, became again chancellor of the exchequer, and earl Temple, his brother-in-law, took the navy, while the great seal was put in commission. In the country at large the cabinet was highly popular, but not at the royal palace. George the Second had not forgotten Pitt's hearty denunciations of the Hanoverian policy of his predecessors, his attacks on the subsidy system, his description of the electorate as a place which could not be found on the maps; he was a good hater, and treated the unwelcome minister with rudeness from the first. Michell was only able to report that it was believed the Prussian alliance would not be repudiated, and that there would

¹ H. Walpole to Sir H. Mann, 4 November, 1756.

be no complete change of policy. As for Frederic, he bluntly confessed that, except Holdernessee, every member of the new government was perfectly unknown to him.¹ He might have added that Holdernessee was a mere cipher in any government.

The speech from the throne, with which Parliament was opened on the second of December, announced, as Michell had predicted, no essential ^{William Pitt.} change of policy, and no radical doctrines of any kind. But its tone was considerably more emphatic than any which Europe had lately heard from that side of the channel. The passage which declared that "the unnatural union of councils abroad, the calamities which, in consequence of this unhappy conjunction, may, by irruptions of foreign armies into the Empire, shake its constitutions, overturn its system, and threaten oppression to the Protestant interest there, are events which must sensibly affect the minds of this nation, and have fixed the eyes of Europe on this new and dangerous crisis," was full of significance. The speech announced, too, that the German troops lately brought over to England would be at once returned to the Continent. As the absence of these troops had been cited only the month before as evidence of the peaceful intentions of Hanover, and in support of her claim for neutral treatment, their reappearance in the electorate was, of course, an instructive event. It was so regarded by Frederic on the one hand, and by his enemies on the other.

Soon after the opening of the session the long-pending bill for the reorganization of the militia was passed, though not until the Lords had cut down by one half the proposed strength of the forces, and not without protests from the dissenting clergy, who feared that the Lord's Day might be desecrated by drill.² In February, 1757,

¹ Frederic to Michell, 28 November, 1756.

² *Parl. Hist.*, xv. 782.

Pitt brought in a royal message, asking for authority and means to support an army of observation in Germany, and submitted at the same time a bill appropriating two hundred thousand pounds sterling for the current year. This passed the House of Commons five days later, on the twenty-second. In the course of the debate Pitt made a long speech, of which, unhappily, no report exists in English, but which Michell described as full of fire and eloquence, as outspoken in favor of Prussia, and as showing a highly statesmanlike grasp of the situation.¹ This speech, or the envoy's report of it, filled Frederic with delight. He felt that a new force had entered English politics, and through both Michell and Mitchell sent his warmest acknowledgments to Pitt.²

Notwithstanding the resolute language of England, and the apparent futility of their negotiations at Vienna, the ministers of Hanover still hesitated, doubted, intrigued, and delayed the adjustment of many important details. The subsidy treaties were not all concluded; no commander for the proposed army was yet chosen; and there was a radical disagreement as to where it should form. In December Frederic sent his general Schmettau to Hanover as an agent of energy and decision. But it needed a second visit, on which he was accompanied by Mitchell, before much impression was made. Toward the end of March the subsidy treaty with Brunswick was concluded. That with Hesse-Cassel was still in force, and a similar one had lately been negotiated with the duke of Saxe-Gotha.³ The hirelings thus obtained, the troops of Hanover herself, and such auxil-

Difficulties
at Han-
over.

¹ Michell, 22 January, 1757. *Polit. Corresp.*, xiv. 344.

² Frederic to Michell, 7 March, 1757. Mitchell to Pitt, five days later, and Pitt's reply, *Chatham's Correspondence*, i. 224-227. Arneth, v. 84, 143, describes the angry effect which the message caused at Vienna.

³ See Tuttle's *History of Prussia*, iii. 237, 305.

iaries as might be added by England and Prussia, were to make up the allied army of Westphalia. Next, what should be done with the army after it was formed? Frederic's plan was to place it near the river Lippe for operations on the Rhine, and in support of Wesel. But as the Hanoverians insisted that it should form behind the Weser, and act purely on the defensive, Schmettau was ordered to give notice that the garrison of Wesel would be withdrawn, and the fortress blown into the air.¹

The choice of a general-in-chief had also been the subject of many communications. As early as the eighth of August, 1756, the government of Hanover sounded Frederic about Ferdinand of Brunswick for the place, and the project was often renewed.² But Frederic discouraged it. He told Mitchell that the prince, though a brave and good officer, lacked decision. He would recommend prince August William of Prussia if he were not his brother; he still thought, however, that prince Louis of Brunswick was the proper man.³ But prince Louis declined the offer, when made to him; and George finally gave the command, as he had probably always desired, to his son, the duke of Cumberland. The duke's departure from England was fixed for the nineteenth of April. In addition to his military

The duke
of Cum-
berland.

¹ Frederic to Schmettau, 17 February, 1757. Cf. Frederic to general La Motte, commandant in Wesel, 6 February, and the lively account in *Œuvres de Frédéric*, iv. 106, 107. Rumors of the intended abandonment of Wesel reached Paris, but were not credited. See Luynes, xv. 456. It is curious that while Bernis condemns Frederic for deserting a powerful fortress, which would have been a serious obstacle to the French, D'Estrées at Vienna was arguing that it would not long delay their march toward the Elbe. *Mémoires de Bernis*, i. 377, 378, and Stühr, *Forschungen*, i. 96. But Bernis admits that his was not the prevailing opinion in France.

² *Polit. Corresp.*, xiii. 219, 352, etc.

³ Mitchell's report, Dresden, 13 December, 1756. *Polit. Corresp.*, xiv. 133.

office, he received from his father the full powers of regent in Hanover, and thus emboldened, he made the further demand, as an absolute condition, that Pitt and the Grenvilles should leave the government. George had no difficulty in accepting terms which suited so well his own feelings. Lord Temple fell on the fifth of April, and the next day Pitt himself, who refused to resign, had the seals of office taken from him by order of the king.

About this time the supplementary negotiations of France and Austria came to a happy close. France
and
Austria. Prolonged through the whole winter and spring, in progress simultaneously at two capitals, and vexed by the confused mixture of political with military aims, they seem to be marked in their later stages by the steady leaning of France toward the view of Austria, which made Prussia the principal enemy. This appears in the willingness to grant Hanover a conditional neutrality. It appears, also, in the offer of a separate peace to England, which Pitt at once rejected because the king of Prussia was not included.¹ In explanation of Louis's growing aversion toward his old ally several minor incidents may have their place, such as the miscarriage of the dauphiness, due, it was supposed, to grief over the fate of Saxony, and Frederic's failure to congratulate his brother prince on his escape from the dagger of Damiens, which gave rise to the most malicious insinuations.² This attempt at assassination caused a momentary panic, during which the position of madame de Pompadour seemed in danger. The king's system was considerably shaken, and, as the cynics of the clubs said, being unable to see his mistress, he sent for his confessor.³ Personal exas-

¹ This offer, if such it may be called, was made through the French envoy at the Hague. Cf. Schaefer, i. 245, and *Polit. Corresp.*, xiv. 211.

² See Schaefer, i. 280; Wilhelmina to Frederic, December, 1757, *Polit. Corresp.*, xvi. 151.

³ Bernis was very much disgusted with the public prudishness on

peration against Frederic in connection with these incidents may thus have had its influence. But it is probable that Louis was more affected by reading an alleged treaty of the eleventh of January, 1757, between Prussia and England, which made Frederic agree to conclude peace as soon as possible with the empress-queen, in order to unite with England for a decisive campaign against France.¹ Such an adroit falsification, which long passed as genuine, could not fail to make it easier for the French to come to terms with Austria. Still they drove a hard bargain and sold their alliance dear. It was not until the first of May, the anniversary of the original treaty of Versailles, that the new treaty of the name was signed by the representatives of the contracting powers, Bernis and Rouillé for France, and Stahremberg for Austria. Bernis had been admitted to the council as minister on the second of January, and thenceforth had more official dignity, though perhaps not more power. Some obstacles had been removed, too, by the simultaneous dismissal of the two rivals, Machault and D'Argenson, both victims of madame de Pompadour.²

That the French court had no longer any scruples about dismembering Prussia is shown by the preamble, which declared the reduction of that unruly kingdom to harmless dimensions to be the

Second
treaty of
Versailles.

the subject of the Pompadour. "Why will hypocrites and prudes complain of a relation which is now platonic and innocent, because it was not always so?" writes he. "Why wish to constrain consciences," etc. To Stainville, 20 January, 1757. *Mémoires de Bernis*, ii. 111, 112.

¹ Schoell, iii. 30 et seq., gives the pretended text.

² According to Bernis, *Mémoires*, i. 366 et seq., Machault, the former ally of the marchioness, lost her favor by his conduct after the attempt of Damiens, while D'Argenson, who at the last moment might have saved himself by accepting her alliance, haughtily refused all overtures. Bernis, who disliked him personally, gives him credit for great talent, and thinks his loss was a great blow to the army.

object of the treaty. Hence the plan of division went far beyond anything yet adopted. Besides Silesia and Glatz, the empress-queen was permitted to add the principality of Crossen, and to round off her frontier with portions of the Lausitz; for so much of the Lausitz as belonged to Saxony the latter was to be indemnified out of Prussian territory, receiving in all the duchy of Magdeburg, the principality of Halberstadt, and the circle of the Saale; and there was furthermore to be taken from Frederic so much of Pomerania as was acquired in 1720, all that he possessed of the former duchy of Cleves, and the district of Guelders. Both powers agreed not to lay down their arms until he should be forced to these or equivalent cessions. If now the promises already made to Russia be added, it will be seen that Prussia was to be reduced to limits narrower than those of 1648. For dividing the spoils, beyond the shares assigned to Austria and Saxony in the plan, negotiations were to be opened with Sweden, the elector-palatine, and the United Provinces, while to Sweden and Poland subsidies were also to be offered. France agreed to place an army of 105,000 men in the field, and to maintain 10,000 German auxiliaries at the disposition of Austria. She also promised to pay twelve million florins a year for the duration of the war. This sum was really destined for Russia, the empress-queen having no funds from which to pay the promised subsidy. So far the concessions were all on the side of France, and seemed to justify the exultant boast of Stahremberg that he had carried every point for which his government had contended.¹ But France got in return the promise of the Austrian Netherlands, in part for herself, in part for Don Philip, the son-in-law of Louis. They were to be ceded as soon as Silesia and Glatz returned securely under the sceptre of Austria. The Netherlands were, however, a precarious

¹ 3 May, 1757. See Arneth, v. 144, 145.

possession of doubtful value; for his portion Don Philip was to cede in exchange the Italian territories which he acquired by the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle; and it was to revert to Austria on the extinction of his line, — facts which modify considerably the first aspect of the transaction. In effect, then, the skilful diplomacy of Kaunitz obtained a bargain under which Austria was to give little, to receive much, and to enjoy the spectacle of Prussia's ruin.¹

This elaborate plan for the destruction of Prussia was undoubtedly cruel, unjust, and wicked. But it was no more cruel or wicked than the treaties of 1741 and 1744, by which Frederic entered into plots for the robbery of Maria Theresa; if anything it was less so, for while he was a wanton aggressor on those earlier occasions, the empress-queen was now in search of redress and revenge, and even France was not without cause for resentment against her former inconstant ally. The real difference in Frederic's favor was the heroism with which he faced the enormous odds that were gathered against him, — a heroism for which no parallel is found in the war of the pragmatic sanction. The numbers alone of the opposing forces are impressive. The several treaties which bound the three chief enemies together called for 115,000 men from France, 80,000 from Russia, and 80,000 from Austria, which would give a positive total for field service of 275,000. In addition Sweden was expected to furnish 20,000 men, it was hoped that at least 10,000 might be saved from the wreck of the Saxon army, and the Empire had decreed a triple armament, the result of which was yet unknown. But

Military
strength
of the
coalition.

¹ The text of the treaty is given by Schoell, iii. 129 et seq. Schoell says, indeed, that the treaty was never ratified, which is incorrect. It was ratified at Vienna on the 14th of June, just within the limit of time set by the instrument itself. Cf. *Einige neue Actenstücke*, pp. 42, 43; Arneth, v. 152.

it was not probable that the activity of the principal belligerents would be limited, in a war like this, by treaty stipulations. Austria had 128,000 men in Bohemia and Moravia at the opening of the campaign, though not all on a war footing;¹ France early exceeded her quota, and so too did Russia. The military resources of the combined powers, that is to say, the number of men which they were able or willing to put in the field, give the true basis for comparison. This yields a total of nearly or quite 400,000 men.

To this immense force the other side could oppose not more than half as many; the Anglo-Hanoverian army was liberally fixed at 45,000 or 50,000.

Of Eng-
land and
Prussia.

Frederic himself planned to open the campaign with 152,000, leaving 58,000 for service in the garrisons. This involved an addition of 47,000 to the establishment of the previous year, 19,000 through enlargement of existing companies, and 28,000 through new formations.² The increase included, of course, the Saxons. Few indeed of the captives of Pirna now remained under the Prussian standard; but to replace those who had deserted recourse was had to a general conscription in the electorate, which was enforced with merciless rigor. Plans were likewise considered for resuscitating the old national militia, which had fallen into decay, in order that it might relieve the regular troops in the provinces least exposed to invasion. Pomerania was one of these, for the Swedes had as yet made no demonstration; and it was accordingly in Pomerania, though somewhat later, that the experiment was first tried.³

¹ G. S., i. 155. Other accounts place the figures even higher.

² Ibid., p. 147.

³ It is the subject of an elaborate monograph, *Organisation und Verpflegung der Pr. Landmilizen im Siebenjährigen Kriege*, by F. Schwartz, Leipsic, 1888, which forms one of Schmoller's *Staats- und Socialwissenschaftliche Forschungen*.

In respect to money the inequality was not as yet so great. Saxony yielded Frederic, of course, a new supply in the regular taxes, and in funds seized in the various public offices, and the contributions levied on Leipsic and other cities; while at home provincial loans brought in a considerable addition to the regular revenues, the nobility of Preussen alone contributing upwards of five hundred thousand thalers.¹ In the western provinces, where a French occupation was foreseen, the taxes for the year had been anticipated. The war-fund thus replenished during the winter was thought to be sufficient for another campaign. But no new tributes were imposed, either now or at any time during the war, nor were the rates of the old imposts raised. The theory of the Prussian system was that the contributions due from the people, fixed as they were by nearly a century of usage, rested on a species of unwritten contract, which ought not arbitrarily to be changed even in the gravest crisis; besides, they were already as high as the land could bear. Even subsidies from abroad Frederic was not yet ready to accept. He assured Knyphausen for the information of the French court, and gave Mitchell to understand, that he could foresee no situation in which he would be willing to ask his allies for pecuniary aid.² This was a point of honor, about which Mitchell describes the king as extremely sensitive. But it does not appear that his conscience was troubled about the debasement of the currency, which, from small beginnings, took on larger and larger dimensions as the needs of the treasury increased, until the whole coinage became rotten with corruption. The plan was to issue debased coins for use by the army in the enemy's land, which, after the peace, were to be redeemed only at their intrinsic value. The sorriest work

¹ Schaefer, i. 306. On the method of these loans, see vol. iii. of this work, pp. 86, 87.

² Frederic to Knyphausen, 12 October, 1756; *Polit. Corresp.*, xiii. 98.

was done at the Saxon mint. This was practically turned over to a firm of Hebrew jewellers, Ephraim and Sons of Berlin, who paid liberally for the privilege of flooding Germany with debased coins of both gold and silver, and of every denomination.¹

Frederic spent the winter at Dresden, where his rigorous system made life nearly as severe as in camp. Mitchell, who joined the headquarters soon after the fall of Pirna, wrote that as a guest at the royal table he himself fared tolerably well, but that the members of his suite looked like spectres.² His admiration for the king's courage, fortitude, and cheerfulness was unbounded; he describes him as accomplishing an enormous amount of work without ever seeming busy. It must have taxed the envoy's powers severely even to read and answer the letters and enclosures, the plans and suggestions, which were addressed to him alone; but the same man from whose pen or brain all these proceeded found time besides to write almost daily letters, on the affairs of the allies alone, to George the Second, the duke of Brunswick, the landgrave of Hesse-Cassel, as well as to the Prussian agents at London, Hanover, and the Hague. Military correspondence was little reduced even during the nominal rest of the winter months, for a commanding general hardly dared to send out a foraging party without first taking the king's pleasure. In civil affairs the same rule prevailed. All important questions, whether external or internal, whether of principle or of detail, were still decided in the royal closet, so that the seat of the Prussian government was in effect transferred for the time to Dresden, as later it followed Frederic in his campaigns whithersoever he went. Indeed, he visited Berlin but once during the whole course of the war, and that was a mere excursion from these

Frederic's
winter at
Dresden.

¹ See Riedel, *Staatshaushalt*, pp. 82 et seq.

² 4 November. Raumer, *Beiträge*, ii. 410.

winter headquarters in Saxony. Early in January he spent a week at the capital; greeted kindred and subordinates, some of whom he was never again to see; and made arrangements for the case of any personal misfortune to himself during his absence in the field. These arrangements were made known to Finckenstein in an order which has become deservedly famous.

The opening paragraph gave directions that in case of a serious disaster in the field, involving danger Heroic injunctions. to the capital, the garrison, the funds, the plate, and the royal family should be removed to Stettin, Cüstrin, or Magdeburg, as might be most expedient. The rest was more characteristic. "If I should happen to be killed," continued Frederic, "let affairs pursue their course without the least alteration, and without any indication that they are in other hands; the oaths must at once be taken and homage rendered, above all in Silesia. Should I be taken prisoner by the enemy, I command that no regard be had for my person, and no attention be paid to any communication from me during my captivity. In case of such a misfortune I prefer to sacrifice myself for my state; obedience will be rendered to my brother;¹ and he, the ministers, and the generals will answer with their heads if they offer province or ransom for my release, or if they fail to continue the war, and use every advantage, as if I had never existed."² Two days later the king issued orders to the ministers and other officials to obey literally the count Finckenstein in the conjunctures described in this noteworthy paper.³

The visit of Frederic to Berlin was, however, only an episode in a life which was occupied throughout Problems and plans. the entire winter with problems ludicrously triv-

¹ August William, prince of Prussia, heir presumptive.

² *Instruction secrète pour le comte de Finck, Berlin, 10 January, 1757.*

³ *Polit. Corresp.*, xiv. 199-201.

ial and problems momentarily grave. To the first class belong the interminable disputes with the domestic, political, and military connections of August and Brühl. But the larger problems were, of course, those of the war itself. It has been shown how these increased, alike in number and in gravity, as the time for the next campaign approached; how Kaunitz organized power after power against Prussia; how factional quarrel lamed the energies of England, and treacherous intrigues nearly let a French army through the gates of Hanover. When the accession of Russia to the treaty of Versailles became known, little hope remained of a change of policy at St. Petersburg, except, perhaps, from the death of Elizabeth, who was believed to be in feeble health, and the accession of the grand duke Peter, who was still the friend of Frederic.¹ The tardy and irresolute measures of England during the spring shook the king's confidence even in Pitt, so that when he fell, a letter to Michell classed him contemptuously with the other imbecile ministers of George the Second.² The Anglo-Hanoverian authorities decided to form the allied army behind the Weser instead of on the Rhine, and yet hesitated for a time to accept as reinforcements the six Prussian battalions, which in consequence of that decision were compelled to abandon the fortress of Wesel. Yet in spite of all these disappointments and discouragements Frederic still adhered to the main features of a policy announced months before the actual outbreak of war. This was notably true of the diplomatic programme. Although this was described in an earlier volume, it may prove convenient to remind the reader that the three leading points were to detach Russia from the court of Vienna, to induce the Sultan to make a diversion against Austria, and to bring the United Provinces back into the English alliance. Among the later statements of these aims, perhaps the most concise is that submitted

¹ Report of Mitchell, and Frederic to Mitchell, 25 December, 1756.

² 14 April, 1757.

by Frederic to the British envoy soon after his arrival at headquarters.¹ But they were all alike doomed to failure. Russia took the field against him in strict fulfilment of her pledge to the empress-queen. The Dutch showed no inclination to give up a profitable neutrality for the benefit of the maritime rival who had tried, by a forced construction of the law of capture, to make that neutrality dear and difficult; and it is not probable that they would have thrown themselves into a struggle which had no concern for them even if England had followed Frederic's urgent advice to renounce a questionable and oppressive system.² Even more visionary was the plan to gain the Turk, who in spite of Frederic's finesse, and in contempt of all the ducats of his emissaries, preferred to enjoy the delights of Oriental civilization, while the western powers cut one another's throats in a true spirit of Christian charity.

Thus with enemies accumulating on every side, and no hope of aid except from England and her mercenaries, Frederic saw the time for the next campaign approach. Yet he was not discouraged. He had faith in his army, in himself, perhaps in that good fortune which had never yet deserted him. He tried in many letters to calm the anxiety of Wilhelmina, and in the midst of the most pressing cares dashed off bad verses to his private correspondents.³ The Austrian

Eve of a
new
campaign.

¹ Mémoire remis . . . à Mitchell, 29 October, 1756.

² Cf. vol. iii. of this work, p. 307. Holland could of course have escaped the qualified right of interference with her neutral commerce claimed by England, by becoming the ally of England. But her whole commerce as a belligerent would then have been exposed to the French.

³ Thus a letter to Wilhelmina, 23 December, 1756, closes with some "Lines to be inscribed on a bust of Mazarin in the gallery of count Brühl." A specimen will suffice : —

"Tu m'as donc mis dans ton palais,
Pour faire ton pendant, peut-être,
Tu crois que, pour voler ton maître,
Tu vaux tout ce que je valais ;" etc.

historian reports, on the authority of Brühl, secret overtures which Frederic was said to have made at this time for a pacification with the elector, and which were, of course, rejected with emphasis.¹ The king's own reputation for integrity is perhaps not such as to compel the instant dismissal of the story. But in view of all the circumstances it is open to the doubt which Arneth rather feels than expresses; and no other evidence from any quarter has been adduced in its support. Brühl's interest in circulating such a story is obvious; Frederic's, in making the alleged overtures, is not obvious. He was already in possession of the resources of Saxony; and he was too sagacious to suppose that Saxon influence, even had he gained it, would affect the policy of the empress-queen. He knew that one more campaign against Austria was necessary, but he hoped that one more would be enough. This was the real secret of his confidence. In other words, he intended to renew the plan, which had failed on its first trial, of crushing the Austrians by a decisive blow and forcing them to terms before their allies could come to their relief. Audacity, energy, a sudden victory, and an early peace were the features of a programme which he again prepared to try.

¹ Arneth, v. 160, 161.

CHAPTER III.

THE YEAR OF BATTLES.

IN the campaign of 1757 the French were the first to take the field. About the middle of March ^{The French in West-phalia.} their principal army, which had been gradually formed during the winter, moved leisurely by the Rhine and the Meuse toward the Prussian provinces of Guelders and Cleves. It reached fully the promised strength of one hundred and five thousand men, and was reënforced on the march from the Austrian garrisons in the Netherlands. Its field artillery numbered over one hundred pieces. Marshal d'Estrées was destined for the command in chief; but as he was detained by the affairs of his negotiation in Vienna, the prince of Soubise became his temporary substitute. Soubise was a scion of the great house of Rohan, yet he owed his preferment neither to his birth nor to his merits. He was a special friend of madame de Pompadour; unlike Machault, he had not deserted her in the panic which followed the attempt of Damiens; in her will he was named as executor; and she steadily pushed his claims with all her arts and influence. She could not indeed secure him the permanent command of the chief army, but he was promised an independent corps as soon as relieved by D'Estrées. Count Maillebois, brother-in-law of Paulmy, the new war minister, was chief of staff. The duke of Orleans held high command, and the list of officers contained the usual ratio of titled profligates and fops, the creatures of a corrupt court and the favorites of the

reigning mistress.¹ In the higher ranks *esprit de corps* was shut out by jealousy, intrigue, and scandal. The general discipline was bad; the equipment was showy rather than solid or complete. But in spite of a weak general, worthless officers, and loose morals the grand army moved with the confidence of superior numbers, left garrisons in all important towns, detached a small force to blockade Guelders, and early in April entered the ruined fortress of Wesel. It was now an easy matter to push forward to the line of the Lippe, and thus menace the most vulnerable possessions alike of Frederic and of George the Second. Only the army of the duke of Cumberland, half as strong in numbers, barred the way to East Friesland, Hanover, Brunswick, and Magdeburg. The virtuous wife of monsieur d'Etioles rubbed her hands with delight at the achievements of her friend of the house of Rohan.

The French were in the full tide of triumph on the Rhine when Frederic first showed signs of action. Frederic's plans. His troops lay in winter quarters along a line of nearly three hundred miles, but grouped in four principal commands. Schwerin had forty thousand men in Silesia and Glatz; the duke of Bevern, eighteen thousand in the Upper Lausitz; the king himself, forty thousand about Dresden; and prince Maurice of Anhalt-Dessau, half as many at Zwickau.² With the exception of skirmishes between the outposts the winter passed in quiet. Frederic was busy, of course, with plans, yet during all these anxious months, while France, Austria, Russia, even the Empire were collecting their forces for the next campaign, he failed to adopt any fixed scheme of policy. To remain on the defensive was contrary to his methods, and not suited to his genius. But in what

¹ Schlosser, ii. 333, counts forty-one major and fifty-two brigadier generals, all of them dukes, marquises, or counts.

² G. S., i. 156, 157.

direction should he take the offensive? Much depended on the movements of the French. If they should choose the line of the Main, and thence push their principal force into the heart of Germany, it might become necessary to act first against them, holding the defensive against Browne; yet to await the development of the French plans involved a loss of time, and might be full of danger. It was not until the end of March that Frederic's mind became clear on the proper course of strategy. He resolved to give the Austrians the first blow, but to make it the more effective by having it unexpected. His measures continued to appear purely defensive. The frontier towns were ostentatiously fortified; trees were felled across the roads leading from Bohemia; and it was given out that orders had been issued for concentrating the Prussian troops either at Görlitz or at Dresden, according to the direction from which an Austrian attack should come. By these devices the enemy were easily lulled into a false security.

The Austrian line had about the same length as the Prussian, its extremes being Eger and Olmütz. Between Eger and Pilsen the duke of Ahremberg had twenty-four thousand men, Browne forty thousand in and about Prague, count Königsegg twenty-three thousand near Gabel, general Serbelloni twenty-seven thousand at Königgrätz, and Nadasdy fifteen thousand in Moravia. The totals on either side were thus not greatly different. But the Austrians, unlike Frederic, had reserves, both of men actually enrolled and of men available as recruits, and ought therefore, if only on account of superior numbers, to have taken the offensive. According to Arneth they had such an intention, which, however, was not carried out because they failed to agree on a plan.¹ Toward the end of March the chief command was conferred on prince Charles of

Prince
Charles of
Lorraine.

¹ *Gesch. Maria Theresias*, v. 89 et seq.

Lorraine. Notwithstanding his failures in previous wars, and in spite of warning protests from various quarters, the empress-queen still had confidence in the military genius of her brother-in-law, and insisted that he should have another trial. She was willing, indeed, to associate Browne with him as military adviser, a part like that of Traun in 1744, the most fortunate year of the prince's military activity. But Browne pointed out the evils of a divided command, and nobly consented to serve as subordinate.¹ The favored kinsman thus became general-in-chief, and nepotism once more exacted its terrible bill of costs from the house of Austria.²

While the Austrians were thus substituting a prince for a general and leisurely discussing plans, the enemy suddenly appeared at the gates of Bohemia. Frederic's own strategy was favored by the success of his ruse, the dispersion of the enemy, and the greater mobility of his own troops, so that he felt confident of gaining the race for concentration. Early in the march the four columns were to be compressed into two through the junction of Maurice with the king, and of Bevern with Schwerin. By the fifteenth of April all alike were to be in complete order for the field. The general plan which now went into execution is usually ascribed to Winterfeldt, and has all the marks of his hardy genius.³ The army of Silesia under Schwerin,

Advances
of the
Prussians.

¹ Arneth, v. 167.

² Frederic indeed held Charles to be a better general than Browne, and said so to Mitchell. Raumer, *Beiträge*, ii. 425.

³ *Polit. Corresp.*, xiv. 399, 400, 414, etc. After some hesitation Frederic accepted it in the main, and sent his adjutant, Goltz, to Silesia to arrange details with Schwerin and Winterfeldt. The three had a consultation at Frankenstein, 30 March, and the result is given in their joint report of that date. *Ibid.*, pp. 438 et seq. A considerable literature has grown up on this famous plan for the campaign of 1757. The monographs of A. Zimmermann and E. Caemmerer discuss its authorship, the former giving it wholly to

with Winterfeldt as second, crossed the frontier of Bohemia on the eighteenth, and brushing the enemy away wherever they appeared, effected a junction with the duke of Bevern at Kosmanos on the twenty-sixth. The old marshal had pushed his troops diligently, and his arrival was opportune. As Bevern marched southward from Zittau in execution of his part of the programme, he found the enemy under count Königsegg strongly posted at Reichenberg. He dislodged them, indeed, after a brilliant engagement; but the ground was difficult, Königsegg fell back slowly and sullenly, and it was not until Schwerin appeared on his flank that he yielded before superior numbers.¹ The united Prussians then continued their march. At Jung-Bunzlau an immense store of provisions fell into their hands, and on the fourth of May they crossed the Elbe at Brandeis. In the mean time the army of Frederic and the corps of Maurice, moving on converging lines, the one by way of Aussig, the other by Kommotau, reunited at Linay on the twenty-fourth, and then advanced to the Eger. Browne himself was in force at Budin awaiting the detachments of Ahremberg. An effort was made by crossing the river

Winterfeldt. Perhaps it would be safest to say with W. Wiegand, *Hist. Zeitschrift*, lx. 532, that the plan of an offensive campaign in Bohemia occurred about the same time to both Frederic and Winterfeldt, but that it first took definite shape in the head of the latter. In connection with this the reader will find a characteristic bit of a priori historical writing in Huschberg-Wuttke, pp. 150 et seq., where the latter absolutely denies, and only because of its inherent improbability, the statement of Kaunitz and of H. Walpole that Frederic communicated this plan of campaign in advance to George II. But he did so communicate it in full detail, and his letter is in *Polit. Corresp.*, vol. xiv., under date of 10 April, 1757.

¹ According to Prussian accounts they lost in killed and wounded some 250, the enemy 1,000, including general Porporati. *Polit. Corresp.*, xiv. 526-528. Cf. Cogniazo, ii. 278. But the G. S. history makes the Prussian losses over six hundred, and the above figures are manifestly too small. The engagement took place on the 21st.

above Budin to prevent this junction; but the enemy baffled it, and after uniting their forces at Welwarn, fell back to Tuchomirschitz. Here Browne desired to make a stand. Even at Budin he had been anxious to fight, but had been overruled by his generals; and now again at Tuchomirschitz, where prince Charles took the command in person, a council of war resisted all his appeals. The violence of the dispute frightened the inmates of the old monastery where the chief Austrian officers passed the night.¹ Next day the retreat continued. Leaving all their magazines to the enemy, the Austrians hurried on to Prague, crossed the Moldau, and finally reached the high ground on the eastern side of the river and the city.

Frederic had followed the Austrians sharply. On the second of May, the day after they passed through Prague, he took possession of the suburbs on the west, and from the Weissenberg as a centre drew a complete cordon about so much of the city as lay on the left bank of the Moldau. But the bloodless capture of the Weissenberg was not a victory. Frederic had expected and desired an engagement here,² and the Austrian army, the principal object of his efforts, was yet intact in the field. So a further movement became necessary; and from several plans which offered themselves he chose the one which, though perhaps the most dangerous, also promised in case of success the greatest results. Twenty-five or thirty thousand men under Keith were left to keep up the blockade on the west. With the remainder Frederic set out to meet Schwerin, who was still awaiting orders at Brandeis. After some delay a bridge was thrown across the Moldau a few miles below Prague, and when all was ready three guns gave the concerted signal to Schwerin. On the fifth Frederic crossed the river. He had only twenty thousand men, but the enemy made no attempt

¹ *Heldengeschichte*, iv. 11.

² Frederic to Schwerin, 29 April, 1 May, 1757.

to interfere, and at daybreak of the sixth, after a strenuous night march, the vanguard of Schwerin's army greeted their expectant comrades.

Frederic had now a slight advantage in numbers. The troops which he led across the Moldau and those of Schwerin made together a total of not less than sixty-five thousand. The Austrians counted only sixty thousand, and not all of these were anxious for battle. Prince Charles even proposed to fall back upon the Sazawa, deserting the city in order to save the army, and only yielded to the energetic protests of Browne, who this time was joined by the other generals.¹ It was, however, Browne's fault that the Prussians gained a surprise, and that while they were in full force the Austrian concentration was incomplete.² The division of Königsegg, steadily pushed back by Schwerin, had indeed reached the ground, but Serbelloni was still on the road, and Nadasdy remained in Moravia. But the field was all in favor of the Austrians. They were formed in two lines with a reserve along the crest of a range of high and abrupt hills, of which the Ziscaberg is the most prominent and most famous, with their left resting on the city, and their right reaching nearly to the hamlet of Sterbohol. Nor did the strength of the Austrian position consist alone of these rugged heights covered with soldiers and bristling with artillery. Along the base of the slopes toward the north ran a deep ravine, with treacherous swamps and muddy pools, protecting the front as by a natural ditch. But Frederic had no intention of giving the enemy the benefit of this obstacle. While his troops were forming in line, he surveyed the ground with Schwerin. The outlook was forbidding

Battle of
Prague,
6 May,
1757.

¹ Arneth, v. 175, who finds the statement in the prince's own reports.

² Because he had received early hints of Frederic's plan, but ignored them. See Arneth, v. 168, 169; Stühr, i. 245.

enough, and the old marshal pleaded for his tired men. But Frederic brushed away all objections, decided to give battle that day, and adopted the plan of turning the enemy's right flank, as naturally the weakest part of their position. His own left, where Schwerin had command, reached, however, only to the village of Podschernitz, so that a long movement toward the south became necessary. This was at once begun. Wheeling into columns and marching by the left, the army proceeded in a concentric line, which threatened to enwrap the entire Austrian right in its folds; and prince Charles suffered this hazardous movement to take place in broad daylight before his own eyes.¹ But he changed his own formation to meet it. He threw his right back on a line parallel with Schwerin, before and beyond Sterbohol, so as to avert the danger of a flank attack; and thus in a measure defeated the tactics of Frederic. But the ground between the two armies was now more open, and the Prussians deployed for action. About nine o'clock the order was given to begin.

For the infantry on the left the key to the battle was the village of Sterbohol. It lay in the midst of what seemed to the Prussians a series of green fields, brilliant in the fresh beauty of spring and highly favorable to the movement of troops. Winterfeldt was chosen to lead the first assault. The battalions swept across into Sterbohol in splendid style, but the Austrian guns then opened fire with deadly effect. Winterfeldt was wounded; the Prussians wavered, and Browne charged them with grenadiers. He fought with a personal desperation and even recklessness which seemed to defy, or rather to court

¹ Napoleon says, "Never make a flank march before an army in position, particularly when it occupies the heights at the foot of which you must defile." Montholon, vii. 183. This is precisely what Frederic did, but the Austrian generalship was worse, as Napoleon says, than his own.

death, and in the heat of the onset a shell took away one of his legs. A squad of soldiers carried him from the field. Still the grenadiers pressed forward, infuriated rather than disheartened by the loss of their beloved commander. The advance of the Prussians was checked, their line shattered; Sterbohol was wrested from them, and they broke in disorder. Then Schwerin appeared. Seeing the repulse of his chosen troops, he threw himself into the ranks of the fugitives, leaped from his horse, and snatching a flag from the hands of its bearer, led a new assault upon the enemy. "Let the brave follow me!" he shouted, as he waved the colors above his head; and he fell riddled with bullets. This time the Prussians did not waver, though they now first learned the nature of the ground over which they had to fight. What they had taken to be green meadows proved to be dry ponds, the miry bottom of which was hidden by a rank growth of maize, and into which the soldiers plunged only to find themselves in impassable mud. The Austrian guns ploughed their ranks with shell. Still they extricated themselves laboriously from the mire; some found a better foothold on the dams and dikes; and inch by inch the ground was gained. Prince Charles made every effort to turn the tide of battle, and showed great personal courage. But he fell twice in a swoon from exhaustion, was bled, and finally had to retire from the field. Meantime the Prussian horse under Zieten charged the enemy's cavalry on their extreme right, and after two failures broke it up in great confusion and cut it off from the main army. Unhappily the victors stopped to plunder the hostile camp, and while filling themselves with wine allowed the beaten squadrons to escape. The second line of infantry sent forward by Frederic completed the ruin of the Austrian right. Without a commander, without cavalry supports, and with the Prussians steadily pressing upon its broken ranks, it fled in a panic from the

field, and part of it paused only when safe behind the river Sazawa.¹

The left wing of the Austrians disputed the field until nearly three o'clock. Frederic's plan had been to ignore this part of their line, and to refuse his own right pending the flank movement; but the impetuosity of general Manstein, who without orders attacked the Austrian centre nearly at the angle of the two wings, opened the fight on this side of the field, and it soon spread along the entire line. Manstein's rash step was nearly disastrous, for the ground was against him and the enemy's guns angrily disputed his advance. But prince Henry, Ferdinand, and Bevern came to his support with fresh troops, and a foothold was secured.² Then it became necessary to carry formidable batteries and to charge gallant battalions one after another. As fast as the Austrians lost one position, they fell back to the next, contesting every foot of the way. The slaughter was terrible. But the Prussians fought on from height to height until the enemy's resistance was completely broken, and the great army, which at dawn of day had looked down so confidently from the long ridge of hills, turned in a general retreat, orderly at first, but soon degenerating into a veritable race for shelter. The left wing of the victors, which in the mean time had advanced as far as the Moldau, shut off their escape on the south. When they attempted to retreat by the opposite side of the city, Keith interposed his frowning batteries, and the walls of Prague became their prison walls. Browne still showed the spirit of a true soldier. If reports may be trusted,

¹ According to a Prussian account in *Heldengeschichte*, iv. 20-26, the destruction of the Austrian right wing was completed about eleven o'clock.

² As prince Henry's adjutant, count Henckel was in the very thickest of this part of the battle, and he gives a graphic description of it. *Mil. Nachlass*, I. ii. 198 et seq.

he fiercely denounced the folly of letting so large a force be shut up like a flock of sheep, and, suppressing his pain, called for an attempt to cut a way through the enemy.¹ But demoralization reigned supreme, and the army accepted its fate.

The battle of Prague is still fought by young ladies on the pianoforte, and by its aid skilful hands may perhaps give some faint image of the sharp ^{The} losses. rattle of musketry, the roar of heavy guns, the cheers of a victorious column, the groans of the wounded and dying. But the sober records of history are needed to show that it was one of the most sanguinary battles of modern times. Various statements of the losses are given, of course, but none which is now accepted as credible places the number of killed and wounded much below thirteen thousand, or twenty per cent. of the force engaged, on either side.² Among the Prussians this included, as killed, the heroic Schwerin, of whom Frederic said in the first pressure of grief that he was the foremost soldier of the century, and his loss equal to ten thousand men,³ generals Hautcharmoy, Amstel, and Goltz, the prince of Holstein, and colonel Manstein; as wounded, Winter-

¹ But some accounts make the scene occur the next morning, when Frederic sent to summon the city, and prince Charles asked Browne's advice. The literature of this battle is of course extensive, and I have consulted the most important authorities. For clearness Tempelhof's account, i. 144-166, seems to me to deserve the palm, and he successfully meets many though not all of Lloyd's criticisms. Retzow, i. 97, adopts some of the strictures upon Frederic's policy, especially that one which calls the battle precipitate.

² The exact figures of the Prussian General Staff are : Prussians, 340 officers, 12,169 men ; Austrians, 412 officers, 12,912 men. The victors also captured 33 field-pieces, 71 battle-flags, 40 pontoons, and a large supply of camp equipment.

³ "Relation de l'expédition de Bohême," etc., *Polit. Corresp.*, xv. 19-21, an account of the battle from the king's own hand, and, as Eichel wrote to Podewils, 9 May, 1757, "modeste gefasset." *Œuvres de Frédéric*, iv. 119.

feldt, Fouqué, and others. The Austrian general Peroni was killed, and Browne died from his wounds six weeks later. Four thousand prisoners also fell into Frederic's hands.

Right in the wake of this great victory came a daring exploit which intensified the terror of the Prussian arms. Colonel Mayr was a soldier of fortune who had served in many armies before he joined that of Frederic. The methods of regular warfare being too tame for his restless soul, he had been permitted to raise a free corps, to train it in his own tactics, and to use it in his own way. His first adventure was a raid into the Upper Palatinate and Franconia. With less than two thousand men Mayr set out from the main army on the twenty-ninth of April, destroyed the Austrian magazines at Pilsen, and then struck into the very heart of the Empire. City after city opened its gates, or ransomed itself by money and recruits. Even Nuremberg was summoned by this daring partisan, who announced his motley band as the vanguard of a Prussian army; and he boldly cannonaded a force of imperialists thrice his own number, sent out to arrest him as a common brigand. His movements were as swift as his audacity was keen. When he had done his appointed work, and spread a panic throughout the whole region which he traversed, he leisurely returned to Bohemia laden with booty.

Such was the terror caused by this bold adventure and by the great victory before Prague that protestations of innocence, offers of neutrality, tenders of money, began to pour in upon Frederic from all parts of the Empire.¹ In Vienna widespread dismay followed the news of the battle, which reached the city

Mayr's
raid.

Effects of
the battle
of Prague.

¹ Stuhr, i. 247, 248; Huschberg-Wuttke, p. 267 et seq. But the Huschberg half of this literary firm insists that the panic also hastened the formation of an imperial army, so that the raid injured Frederic's cause in the end. Vide p. 281.

about the same time as the copy of the second treaty of Versailles. Was Frederic's victory his answer to that compact? How should this crushing disaster, at the very opening of the campaign, be excused to France and Russia and the other allies of the empress-queen?¹ At Paris marshal Belleisle, who knew the ground well, loudly denounced the folly of the Austrian generals.² Frederic himself was chagrined that only a large part and not the whole of the Austrian army had been forced into the city. But all who had not escaped from the field he now regarded as a certain and easy prey. To Wilhelmmina, to his mother, to George the Second, and to his other correspondents, he writes in a single strain. Prince Charles must soon capitulate, a short campaign against the French might follow, and then peace would come.³ So he drew his lines closely about the city, and sent to Saxony for his heavy guns. Even when he learned that prince Charles had supplies for two months instead of ten days, he made no essential change in his plans, but after dispatching a small force under the duke of Bevern to watch the corps of Serbelloni, threw shells into Prague from time to time, and confidently awaited the end.

The corps of Serbelloni was now, however, in abler hands. Just before the battle of Prague the command had been transferred to field-marshal ^{Leopold} Daun. Leopold Daun, an officer in whom Frederic soon learned to recognize his most skilful antagonist. Though not hitherto prominent in the wars of Maria Theresa, Daun was a soldier of much experience added to the most complete professional training. Cautious by nature, he also imitated Traun in making caution the basis of his strategy against such an adversary as Frederic. Like Turenne,

¹ Arneth, v. 183, 184; Stühr, i. 245; reports of count Broglie, who on his way to Warsaw reached Vienna in these days, in Broglie, *Secret du roi*, i. 244, 245.

² Arneth, v. 186.

³ *Polit. Corresp.*, xv. 8, 9, etc.

he had enough coolness and self-restraint to prefer the advantages of a bloodless campaign to the more dazzling temptation of hazardous battles, refused all challenges when he was not ready, and made it a rule to face the enemy from commanding positions, for which he had an almost infallible eye. His policy was the Fabian policy, never the most striking, and not always the wisest. But against Frederic, for whom war meant short campaigns and sharp battles, it was precisely the one best fitted to exhaust his resources, wear out his patience, and lead him into costly errors. Daun's principles of strategy had not yet been developed on a large scale. But this brief characterization will make clearer what is to follow.

Through some cause not clearly understood, the plan of Daun to join prince Charles before the battle failed, and on the sixth his vanguard had only reached Podiebrad, still a [day's] march distant.¹

The disastrous issue of that day made his problem a different one. In pursuance of a general scheme of action formed by the authorities at Vienna as soon as they recovered their courage, orders were secretly conveyed through the Prussian lines to prince Charles directing him to hold the city to the last, to try no desperate measures, but to annoy the enemy by frequent sorties, and thus compel him to hold his forces together until a strong army of relief could be organized outside the besieging lines. The work of organizing this second army was the task assigned to Daun. Unwilling to risk an engagement with the small force which had been turned over to him by Serbelloni, he fell back slowly before the duke of Bevern, and gave up town after town without dispute. But this masterly policy gave him time to effect a junction with Nadasdy, to pick up the demoralized fugitives from the battlefield, to restore discipline throughout the ranks, and

¹ Arneth, v. 180, puts the blame on count Puebla, commander of the advance.

to reorganize the entire corps of officers. Prince Charles, on the other hand, did his work poorly enough. After one or two feeble sorties he settled down quietly to his fate, and showed no more energy than was required to direct the extinction of such fires as were caused by the Prussian shells. But this time he was saved by the folly of Frederic. The attempt to blockade an army nearly equal to his own in a strongly fortified city, while another hostile army was gathering in his rear, is ascribed even by Prussian critics to an over-confidence bred by five successful campaigns. Napoleon calls it one of the most extraordinary and audacious ideas of modern times.¹ The warning reports from Bevern that Daun's army was steadily growing; that his own forward movement must soon cease; and that he could not risk an action, passed long unheeded by Frederic, who with his own mind fixed on Prague dismissed them as exaggerated fears.

On the twelfth of June Daun finally abandoned his dilatory tactics, and in pursuance of orders from Maria Theresa set his face toward the enemy. His first object was to give battle to Bevern, or, if battle should be refused, to get between him and Prague. But though the duke fell back as fast as the Austrians advanced, and relinquished first Kuttenberg and then Kollin, he fell back always in the direction of his supports; and on the fourteenth, between Planian and Kaurzim he was met by Frederic with reënforcements. They were few in number, for more could not be spared from the investing army. But Frederic, who had long doubted the strength of Daun's army, still doubted the quality of his generalship, and fully expected to defeat him easily in battle, or to drive him from the neighborhood without a battle,

¹ G. S., i. 218; Montholon, vii. 182. Napoleon says that the true policy for Frederic was to surround the city with earthworks, which would have enabled smaller numbers to hold prince Charles in check, and then to march with an adequate force against Daun.

and then to complete the work at Prague in freedom. The united Prussian forces were not more than thirty-four thousand strong, twenty thousand less than the enemy.¹ But the fate of Prague, if not the issue of the campaign, was at stake; and Frederic turned without hesitation upon the untried Austrian general. Daun at once checked his own advance, and prepared to receive the battle which he knew would be offered. His first position was along the elevated ground of which the hamlet of Krickenau is the centre, the line of battle facing the west. But when Frederic, bringing his old tactics into play, set out by a wide detour to turn the enemy's right flank, Daun promptly shifted his own ground and occupied the very place that the king had chosen for himself. Marching by his right he formed a new line of battle, this time looking northward. His extreme right nearly touched the village of Kollin, from which the battle takes its name.² The ground was made up of a series of rugged hills, difficult to scale and admirable for defence. The artillery was placed to the best advantage. Here, as at Prague and elsewhere throughout the war, the superiority of the empress-queen in this arm was conspicuous. It was mainly due to the labors of prince Wenzel Lichtenstein, one of the noblest of Austrian patriots, who with untiring energy and at great personal sacrifice devoted the years of peace to a complete reform of the system of field ordnance.

When Frederic came up the next morning, and saw

¹ See Frederic to Bevern, 12 June, 1757. Major Gaudi, an officer of Frederic's suite, who left manuscript memoirs of the war, often it should be said unfriendly to the king, describes the reticent Zieten as complaining of Frederic's refusal to believe the reports about Daun's strength and movements. *G. S.*, i. 244, 245. Cf. Schaefer, i. 325. Arneth, v. 195, gives Daun fifty-four thousand men.

² By some early writers, as Lloyd, it was called the battle of Chotzemitz or Chotemitz, from a little settlement near the Austrian centre.

what had taken place, he changed his tactics to suit the new state of things. The proposed flank movement had failed. But the enemy's right still seemed the weakest part of their line, and against it the king decided, therefore, to direct his main attack, refusing his own right while drawing upon it as need arose to support his left. This plan involved a long march before the Austrian front until the points indicated for the various commands were reached, when the whole army was to halt, and facing form an unbroken line of battle. Then general Hülsen was to begin the fight with the extreme Prussian left. But in the course of this movement a grave mistake occurred. General Hülsen did his part successfully. After Zieten had swept the Austrian cavalry out of the way, and cleared the ground for him, he led seven battalions against the strong position of the enemy about the village of Kretschor, captured two large batteries, and pushed on up the heights with splendid gallantry. But the Austrians unmasked new batteries, which poured in a destructive fire; and when Hülsen expected reënforcements they came not. The regiments next behind had halted and formed front too early, leaving a fatal gap in the line. The accounts differ about the author of this blunder. Some ascribe the fault to Frederic himself, who, they say, lost his head in the excitement, and forgot his own dispositions for the battle; others charge it to prince Maurice; and there were reports of violent scenes between the two, in which the king drew his sword upon the prince. To add to the confusion, general Manstein, the same whose rashness nearly caused disaster at Prague, opened an attack, contrary to plan, from the Prussian right, and the engagement soon became general along the whole line.¹ The

Battle of
Kollin,
18 June,
1757.

¹ One eye-witness, a French officer with Daun's army, describes the Austrian left as beginning the fight on this part of the field. Luynes, xvi. 93. Huschberg, pp. 158, 159, accepts this version, which seems, however, to want sufficient confirmation.

order of battle was ruined. Instead of an oblique attack against one Austrian wing, it was now a fight between parallel fronts, with every advantage on the side of the enemy. Regiment after regiment dashed against the rocky slopes, which Frederic had intended to avoid as impregnable, only to reel back under a murderous fire, with dead and wounded marking every foot of their course. Each successive attempt was followed by new slaughter; and though the foot displayed prodigies of valor, no serious break was made in the enemy's line. Most of the cavalry, too, behaved badly. Some regiments fled in disorder under the dreadful storm of grape and canister, others absolutely refused to charge, and the tide of battle set sternly against the Prussians. Meantime the extreme left, where Hülsen held the ground so dearly won, was deprived of its infantry supports at the most critical moment. One regiment of dragoons charged forward, and gave momentary relief to the gallant column. But it was only momentary, for the ground was not suited to cavalry; and while all the infantry were melting away under the fire of the Austrian front, the king sighed in vain for four fresh battalions, with which to support Hülsen, and win the battle. Daun threw forward his own reserves with good judgment, and though the Prussians held out until nightfall, only their honor was saved. The coup de grace was given by three Saxon regiments of light horse, which under their leader Benckendorf charged with revengeful fury against the thin and feeble line.¹ The Prussians finally retired in good order, and there was no panic. But Daun advanced his lines in defiance, and without attempting any pursuit, asserted the fact of victory.

Frederic lost in this battle over thirteen thousand men,

¹ These were the regiments which were in Poland at the outbreak of the war, and, thus escaping the fate of their comrades of Pirna, early joined the Austrian army.

of whom seven thousand were prisoners, besides forty-five field-pieces and twenty-two flags. The flower of the Prussian infantry perished in the desperate fighting about Kretschor; and a pathetic story describes the king as sitting on a fallen tree when all was over, and mourning like Augustus over his lost legions. But not even the figures of blood, harrowing as they are, tell the whole story of the disaster. The entire campaign was ruined. Frederic himself hurried over to Prague only to give orders for raising the blockade, and for an immediate retreat toward the frontier. The blow to his prestige seemed incalculable. Eight successful battles, nearly all fought against superior numbers, had spread abroad a general belief in the invincibility of the Prussian troops, except under conditions which had not yet appeared;¹ and this useful superstition was now forever shattered. The Prussian officers began to discuss the generalship of their king. The reckless acceptance of battle where Daun had invited it was criticised in whispers; all disaffected elements now found a rallying-point; prince Henry insinuated that his brother had fled to Prague in order to get his own person out of danger;² and ugly stories were circulated, though they were not published until long afterwards, about the king's own mismanagement of his army in the face of the enemy. As Frederic's first defeat, the battle of Kollin had an interest quite beyond its real military significance, though this, of course, was great. The literature upon it is copious, controversial, disfigured by personal jealousy, and freely tinctured with scandal. It has been critically

¹ Count Broglie wrote from Vienna, between the battles of Prague and Kollin, of the superiority "que l'habileté du roi de Prusse et ses succès lui donnent sur les troupes impériales, et sur tous leurs généraux." Stühr, i. 253 n.

² In a letter to his sister, the princess Amelia, which, according to Arneth, v. 198, fell into Austrian hands. Henckel, *Mil. Nachlass*, I. ii. 235, 236, gives a striking picture of the king's reappearance in the camp at Prague.

examined by a Prussian historical scholar, lately deceased. His conclusions are wholly in favor of the accuracy of Frederic's account of the battle as given in his published works; and the general bias of the national writers in favor of their great king ought not to prejudice the reader against an essay which bears such marks of careful study. But I am not as certain that he has completely made out his case.¹

The exultation in Vienna over the victory of Kollin took little account of the odds by which it had been won. It was enough that the formidable Prussians had suffered defeat, that Prague had been relieved, that the invasion had been turned back; and the whole population, led by the empress-queen herself, gave way to a delirium of joy. Maria Theresa sent Daun an autograph letter of thanks, gave his soldiers a month's extra pay, and founded in honor of the event the order which bears her name. In the mean time the victorious marshal proceeded to Prague, where his troops wel-

Daun and
prince
Charles.

¹ Max Duncker, "Die Schlacht bei Kollin," in his volume *Aus der Zeit Friedrichs des Grossen und Friedrich Wilhelm III.*, elsewhere cited. The controversy turns principally upon the question of the responsibility for the error in deployment. Frederic charged it to Maurice in his final account of the battle, *Œuvres*, iv. 128, 129, though not in his letters at the time; but other works like that of Berenhorst, of Retzow, and of the Prussian General Staff make the king guilty. Carlyle's statement of the evidence on both sides is fair. Napoleon's censure is almost unqualified, but the authors of the Staff history, i. 304, justly observe that what often seems to be Frederic's rashness in attacking superior numbers was profound policy, since he was thus able to choose his own place for fighting, and to bring his whole army against part of the enemy. Frederic wrote in July or August a vindication of his policy under the title "*Raisons de ma conduite militaire*," which is printed in the *Œuvres*, vol. xxvii. part III. pp. 269-277, and largely reproduced in the royal history. I find in a letter of Frederic to Podewils and Finckenstein, 11 July, 1757, the curious charge that they were in part responsible for the defeat at Kollin, because their urgent appeals for troops to be sent to Hanover and Hesse led him to give battle prematurely!

comed their less fortunate comrades to freedom. But over these rejoicings the death of Browne cast a brief shade of gloom, which it is believed was made more intense for Daun by pathetic warnings addressed to him by the dying soldier about the ingratitude of the court of Austria. And nearly at the same time he learned that the command of the united armies was again conferred upon the prince of Lorraine. This time the protests were stronger and more numerous than before; the ministers and the allied courts joined in them; but the emperor persisted and the empress yielded.¹

At Paris the delight over Daun's victory was scarcely less than at Vienna. The news from Kollin effaced the bad impression left by the news from ^{Bernis and Stainville.} Prague, silenced the opposition for a time, and restored the ascendancy of the war party. A certain popularity was also given to recent changes in the foreign department which lifted Bernis another step upwards. It had been planned after the return of D'Estrées that the abbé should go to Vienna as French ambassador, a part for which he had undoubted qualifications. But a later arrangement gave the place to the young count Stainville, better known as the duke of Choiseul. The new ambassador was a native of Lorraine, but had already seen service in French diplomacy; he had the support of the Pompadour, and nominally was a friend of Bernis. But the abbé was not easy under the rise of the new favorite. He records in his memoirs that he disliked the appointment, and only acquiesced because he could offer no opposition which would not be ascribed to jealousy.² By a curious turn of affairs, too, which Bernis in

¹ Arneth, v. 202.

² *Mémoires de Bernis*, i. 382, 383. The abbé adds that he heard at the time that Stainville said, speaking of his (B.'s) strength with madame de Pompadour, "Oh ! pour cela il ne m'embarrasse pas, je le perdrais auprès d'elle quand je voudrais," — a prophetic remark, if true.

later years charged to hostile intrigues, he himself was made minister of foreign affairs before Stainville departed, and had the honor of drawing up his instructions. He took the oath of office on the twenty-ninth of June. The number of the Gazette that announced his appointment contained also the news of the Austrian victory at Kollin, a coincidence which the abbé regarded as a happy omen.¹

While the French court was following with anxious interest the course of affairs in Bohemia, its own army had not been idle. Marshal d'Estrées took the command on the twenty-second of April. Münster, Friesland, and the other western possessions of Frederic fell successively into his hands; and when the duke of Cumberland rejected the renewed offers of neutrality for Hanover, the marshal moved directly upon the allied army. But on his approach the duke at once abandoned the line of the Ems, and took up a new position at Minden, behind the Weser. Hesse-Cassel was thus uncovered to the enemy, and the aged landgrave fled for personal safety to the free city of Hamburg. Then the French plans were further unfolded.

Soon after the battle of Prague, when good news was doubly prized, the empress-queen learned that France had consented, in view of the critical situation, to furnish a second army for direct service against the king of Prussia. The rendezvous was Strasburg, where the troops at once began to assemble. In assigning the prince of Soubise to the chief command, or rather in providing an army for him to command, Louis fulfilled a promise early made to madame de Pompadour, and thus got credit for generosity to an

¹ *Mémoires*, i. 386-388. His naïve explanation of Choiseul's interest in his appointment is that he (Choiseul) was unwilling to risk his diplomatic reputation under so weak a minister as Rouillé. The letter of the empress-queen to Louis announcing the victory is given by Luynes, vi. 88.

Retreat of
Cumber-
land.

Army of
the Em-
pire.

ally when he was simply loyal to an intriguing mistress. After some discussion this army was sent to join the German levies now forming into the army of the Empire. But these levies came in slowly, and were made up of the very dregs of the population. All the best German troops were in the pay of France or Austria, and were attached to the main armies; so that until the arrival of Soubise with the French, and of Loudon with three thousand Austrians, the "army of execution" was little more than a mob of vagabonds, turned loose from the prisons and workhouses, ill clothed, ill fed, and ill armed, the sport of satire and caricature. Its rendezvous was the vicinity of Fürth, and its numbers gradually reached about thirty-four thousand.¹ Soubise brought twenty-four thousand more. The junction was effected late in August near the city of Erfurt; but Soubise submitted unwillingly to the authority of the prince of Saxe-Hildburghausen, whom the emperor had assigned to the command in chief, and frequent disputes between the two generals lamed the energy of their operations.

After the retreat of the duke of Cumberland behind the Weser there ensued a considerable delay on the part of the French. Marshal d'Estrées was a brave and experienced soldier, who owed his place to nobody's favor; but he was excessively cautious, and complained bitterly of the want of harmony and subordination among his officers. Repeated and peremptory orders from Paris, and intimations that his place was in danger,² finally got him once more in motion, and on the fifteenth of July he crossed the Weser unopposed near Hörter. Was Hanover to be given up

Battle of
Hasten-
beck,
26 July,
1757.

¹ Brodrück, *Quellenstücke und Studien über den Feldzug der Reichs-armee von 1757*, Leipsic, 1858, p. 43. This total includes 8,000 Austrians.

² See Stühr, i. 117, 118. In fact his successor was already chosen in the person of the duke of Richelieu.

without a fight? Frederic feared so now, for he ordered the Prussian battalions, which, since they evacuated Wesel, had formed part of the allied army, to leave it and report at Magdeburg.¹ But the duke finally checked his retreat, and, taking up a strong position east of the fortress of Hameln, awaited the trial of arms. On the twenty-sixth the armies met in the battle of Hastenbeck, so called from a village near the centre of Cumberland's line. As the French had seventy thousand men with seventy heavy guns, while the other side was only half as strong, the issue hardly seemed doubtful; but the fight was badly conducted on both sides, and as its fortunes changed each commander in turn gave the word to retreat, so that the curious spectacle was offered of two armies running away from each other before the battle was over. But the duke had the start in the race, and D'Estrées, finally yielding to his officers, returned to occupy the field as victor. Cumberland retreated hurriedly down the Weser, over the Aller, and then toward the lower Elbe, where he eventually established his headquarters at Stade. Hanover now stood open to the French, and not only Hanover but also Halle, Magdeburg, and the richest portions of Prussia. Just at this time D'Estrées was relieved of his command.

The day after this battle, though of course before the news of it arrived, Mitchell announced to Frederic that the English government was willing to grant him a liberal pecuniary support. This was in answer to the king's own intimation made through two channels just a month earlier;² but while grateful for the offer, he now hesitated to accept it, and assured Mitchell that to do so might only burden his ally with expensive and unnecessary engagements. "I was pleased

¹ See his letter, 12 July, 1757, to Cumberland.

² Mitchell's report of an audience, 28 June, 1757, *Polit. Corresp.*, xv. 194; Frederic to Michell, 8 July, 1757.

but not surprised with the noble dignity of this answer," wrote the sympathetic envoy, "for I have seen the king of Prussia great in prosperity, but greater still in adversity."¹ These words refer, doubtless, to a new disappointment under which Frederic was just then suffering. We have seen that immediately after the battle of Kollin, while Maurice led the wreck of the beaten army to Nimburg on the Elbe, Frederic collected the troops left on the east of Prague, and hastened in the same direction. The following day Keith set out with his own command for Budin. Frederic was greatly depressed by the ruin of his plans; but as the enemy gave him no respite, he manfully girded up his loins for fresh efforts. He proposed to hold the line of the Elbe, if possible, and thus maintain himself in Bohemia. His forces were reorganized into two armies of nearly thirty thousand each. With the first of these, which he commanded in person, Frederic undertook to hold the gates to Saxony, his headquarters being at Leitmeritz; while the other near Lissa and Nimburg, under his brother the prince of Prussia,² had the more difficult task of guarding the crossings of the river and the roads to Silesia and the Lausitz. In case of doubt he was enjoined to take the advice of his generals, among whom were Winterfeldt, Schmettau, and Bevern. But the enemy's movements, though bold and menacing, were wrapped in mystery; the prince was unequal to the strain upon his nerves; he was perplexed by a multitude of counsellors as well as by Frederic's brief, impatient, not to say contradictory orders; and as his supplies were also running short, he abandoned the Elbe on the last day of June, and fell back to Jung-Bunzlau, later to Neuschloss, and finally to Leipa. Daun and prince Charles now had an open road. They crossed the river near Brandeis on the first of July, and

¹ Mitchell to Holderness, 28 July, 1757. *Polit. Corresp.*, xv. 279.

² August William, heir presumptive.

leaving enough troops in front of Frederic to mask their real purpose, marched directly to Niemess, on the high-road to the Lausitz. It was still in the power of the prince to head them off, or at least to try a battle, by crossing from Leipä to Gabel. But while he neglected to decide, and wrote feebly for orders, the enemy themselves seized Gabel, where there was only a small Prussian force, and thus gained control of the most direct route to Zittau, a rich and flourishing town of the Lausitz, now filled with military stores of every kind. The prince marched to its relief by the nearest road now left open to him. But he came up on one side only in time to see the Austrians lay the city in ashes with hot shot fired from the impregnable position which they had taken on the other side.¹

Frederic's rage was terrible. A series of letters, steadily rising in the scale of violence, finally culminated in a reply, full of the most cruel reproaches, to the prince's report that he had lost control of the road to Zittau. "You know not what you wish or what you are doing," wrote the king. "Command a harem of women, if you like; but so long as I live, I will never again give you the command over ten men. When I am dead you can commit all the follies you wish, but during my life you will not have another chance to ruin the state."² After the loss of Zittau the prince fell back to Löbau and thence to Bautzen, while the army of the king, now left without support, gave up Bohemia and

*Fate of the
prince of
Prussia.*

¹ On this unfortunate affair it is to be observed : 1, That according to the letters printed in vol. xv. of the *Polit. Corresp.*, Frederic approved the prince's march to Neuschloss and did not distinctly condemn the further retreat to Leipä ; 2, that this last movement is believed to have been made on the advice of Winterfeldt, who was the special representative of Frederic's views and methods ; and, 3, that it was hopeless, or nearly so, for the prince to attempt to face 60,000 or 70,000 Austrians, with his own small force.

² Frederic to the prince of Prussia, 19 July, 1757.

retired upon Dresden. Frederic in person joined the prince with a small reënforcement, and partly redressed the balance of affairs. Without his presence he feared the retreat would not stop short of Berlin itself.¹ But his anger was such that he refused to see his brother, and replied coldly to his letter of excuse.² The poor prince threw up his command; repaired to Dresden; wrote other letters, which were either not answered or were answered harshly; wandered aimlessly about for a time; and died the following year from a broken heart.³ Frederic received the news with decent emotion. He protested that he had always loved his brother, whose greatest fault was a quick temper, and whose many errors were due to bad advisers; but in this affliction as in all others reason and philosophy, he urged, were sure consolations.⁴ The value of philosophy as a solace in grief was felt not less strongly by Frederic in this month of July, 1757, as causes of grief accumulated so fast. On the retreat from Kollin he learned of the danger to his province of Saxony from the French and the imperialists. Then came the news of the death of his mother, the queen dowager Sophia Dorothea, on the twenty-eighth of June, under which his strong nature broke completely down;

¹ Frederic to Keith, 27 July, 1757.

² *Polit. Corresp.*, xv. 280, 281.

³ Retzow, i. 156 et seq., gives the contemporary opinion and gossip, laying stress of course upon everything unfavorable to Frederic, and with him should be consulted Henckel von Donnersmarck in the *Mil. Nachlass*, vol. I. ii.; he also belonged to the opposition, but his diary of events at Frederic's headquarters during this period is strikingly confirmed by the *Politische Correspondenz*.

⁴ Frederic to prince Henry, 25 June, 1758. By the death of August William his oldest son, who afterwards ascended the throne as Frederic William II., then a lad of fourteen years, became heir presumptive. The "bad adviser" who caused the loss of Zittau was not Winterfeldt, but — general Charles Schmettau, a brother of the soldier diplomatist of the second Silesian war. See Frederic to the prince of Prussia, 15 July, 1757.

and he wrote almost daily letters to Wilhelmina about the overwhelming nature of his loss.

In general the correspondence of Frederic and Wilhelmina was a frank exchange of love and confidence. But just at this time it had a strong seasoning of politics. In her zeal for her brother's cause the princess of Bayreuth now took up and became rather deeply involved in secret intrigues for peace between France and Prussia, and the release of the latter from one of the most formidable of her enemies. There were a number of agents in this business, and its branches shoot out in many directions. It is probable, indeed, that Frederic had no very strong hopes of success.¹ The scheme was set on foot a week after the disaster of Kollin, when he was in a state of some depression. He had just written that it would probably be necessary to fall back upon Saxony and Silesia, and that as soon as the French advanced upon Magdeburg, the end would come.² At the same time a letter to Wilhelmina urged her to make use of her connections with France for conveying to that court his earnest wish for peace.³ Wilhelmina employed the services of the chevalier Folard, who was the French agent at several of the smaller German courts, her own among the number, and who had shown some interest in such a work. But the overtures which he transmitted to Paris were at once revealed by Bernis to Stahremberg, and this part of the plot came to an early end.⁴ In French diplomacy there was still, however, a power be-

¹ This appears from Frederic to Podewils, 11 July, 1757. Cf. same to Wilhelmina, 7 July.

² To prince Maurice, 25 June, 1757.

³ *Polit. Corresp.*, xv. 187. She was to make the perfectly baseless insinuation that the Austrians had offered him terms, that is, were willing to betray France and their other allies. A later letter, 28 June, 1757, which is printed also in the *Œuvres de Frédéric*, xxvii. part I. p. 293, is in the same sense.

⁴ Schaefer, i. 411, 412; Arneth, v. 271.

Secret
efforts for
peace.

tween the ministers and the king. Through a certain count de Mirabeau, lord chamberlain of the court of Bayreuth, Frederic tried once more to gain the Pompadour; offered her as much as five hundred thousand thalers for her support, and in the end proposed even to give her the sovereignty over Neuchâtel, with its revenues for life.¹ Count Mirabeau seems to have effected nothing. A still more ambitious negotiation was undertaken at the instance of the count of Neuwied, a small German prince friendly to Frederic, or at least not unwilling to earn his gratitude; and secret emissaries were dispatched by Frederic to him and by him to France. To his own agent, colonel Balby, Frederic laid down four points, the acceptance of which was to be the unalterable condition of further negotiations: no cession of territory, an armistice for time to consult his allies, the inclusion of the German adherents of Prussia in the peace, and the renewal of the old alliance between the two powers.² But even this enterprise led to nothing. Austrian hussars captured some of the secret dispatches; the agent of the count of Neuwied, one Barbutt, was thrown into the Bastille; and Balby's mission ended in failure. No better success attended the direct overtures which Frederic later made to marshal Richelieu, the successor of D'Estrées. In a letter full of personal flattery the king invited Richelieu to add to his military laurels the glory of bringing about peace between two states which were natural allies; but the court of Versailles replied coldly that it could enter on no negotiations except in concert with its allies.³ One of those most disappointed or most disgusted at the result was Voltaire, who from his distant retreat watched the

¹ *Polit. Corresp.*, xv. 218, 377.

² *Polit. Corresp.*, xv. 300. The date is 14 August, 1757.

³ The full history of these transactions would fill a volume. The chief authorities are the *Polit. Corresp.*, vol. xv., the memoirs of Bernis, Arneth, Stuhr, and Schaefer.

course of the intrigue with a sympathetic eye, and in many letters urged Frederic even to yield territory for the sake of peace. A mere king, he once wrote, might well shrink from such a sacrifice, but a philosopher can dispense with lands.¹

It was not until the middle of October that the French reply was transmitted from Richelieu's headquarters, and in the interval much had occurred. The four months which followed the battle of Kollin were months of almost uninterrupted disaster for the Prussian cause.

The Russian operations had been delayed by the lateness of the season and other causes; and notwithstanding urgent appeals from Vienna, it was midsummer before the army of Elizabeth, over one hundred and twenty-five thousand strong, crossed the frontier of Preussen. An imperial manifesto gave as the reason for the movement the invasion by Frederic of the territory of allies of Russia. The general-in-chief, count Stephen Apraxin, who had been selected for the command nearly a year before, was a friend of Bestuschef; and Williams only voiced the general opinion when he described him as timid, indolent, corrupt, and treacherous.² But these qualities, which ought to have made him acceptable to the English party at St. Petersburg, made him highly distasteful at Vienna and Paris. Through the secret correspondence of Louis XV., a plan was therefore set on foot to substitute the prince of Conti, who, having lost the throne of Poland by the introduction of the new system, and the command of the army of the Rhine through the opposition of the Pompadour, next took up the possibility of a royal settle-

¹ Voltaire to Frederic, October, 1757. A fair résumé of his efforts for peace up to the time of the letter to Richelieu is given in Frederic to Finckenstein, 21 September, 1757, *Polit. Corresp.*, xv. 362 et seq.

² See his reports apud Raumer, *Beiträge*, ii. 400, 401; also Arneth, v. 53, and Bernis, *Mémoires*, ii. 12.

The Rus-
sians in
Preussen.

ment in Courland, a military career at the head of a Russian army, and even a marriage with Elizabeth herself. The empress seemed at one time to acquiesce in at least the second part of the programme. Douglas and Woronzof espoused it warmly; and although they were feebly supported by the new French ambassador, the Marquis de l'Hôpital, an honest gentleman of the old school, unaccustomed and averse to deep intrigue, the chevalier d'Eon was sent to Paris in the interest of the scheme. But as a recent coldness had set in between Louis and Conti, the former hesitated to give his direct approval, and the whole project fell to the ground.¹ The grand chancellor once more prevailed over the feeble will of Elizabeth, and Apraxin kept a command in which he fully justified both the confidence of his friends and the suspicions of his enemies. It appears to be clear, however, that the general had an army which in respect to discipline and equipment was far behind the standard of the age; that he was hampered by the inadequate or contradictory orders which he received from St. Petersburg; and that at every step he acted on the advice of a council of war, as the military law of Russia required.² But it is also obvious that the general of an army can largely influence the opinion of his subordinates, and that the force which Apraxin led into Preussen was formidable by its numbers alone.

To oppose him Lehwaldt had less than thirty thousand men.³ He himself was over seventy years of age,

¹ This intrigue is developed with much detail by M. Vandal, *Louis XV. et Elisabeth de Russie*, pp. 297-310.

² See *Der Siebenjährige Krieg*, by the Russian colonel Masslowski, translated by A. von Drygolski, I. Theil, Berlin, 1888, which with more specific references I shall often cite. The fate of Poland is suggested by the names of these two men, author and translator, one now in the Russian, the other in the Prussian army.

³ Twenty-eight thousand, according to the G. S., i. 328. There were, besides, a few militia, hastily collected and used mainly in the garrison.

and, though a brave soldier, wanted the audacity of the younger officers trained under Frederic's own eye.

*Battle of
Gross-
Jägersdorf.*

But the king was unable to send him troops, and declined to give him instructions, except the general one to accept the first chance for battle that was not absolutely hopeless, and to use his own judgment without any councils of war.¹ Thus left to his own resources the old marshal showed himself worthy of his master's confidence. Retiring no farther than the line of the Pregel, he took position first at Insterburg, then near Wehlau, and awaited the approach of the enemy. The Russians advanced leisurely, and after sending out a detachment to capture the fortress of Memel, crossed the Pregel with their reunited forces on the twenty-eighth of August, and two days later faced the Prussian army from the vicinity of Gross-Jägersdorf. Lehwaldt at once gave battle. At first he gained some advantage against the enemy's left, but the Russian infantry fought stubbornly and overwhelming numbers decided the day. Lehwaldt lost nearly five thousand men killed and wounded and twenty-eight field guns.² He retired in good order to his former camp, and was not pursued; but the outlook for Preussen was desperate. A Russian fleet was reported on the way to the Baltic for an attack on Königsberg, while the English ships promised to Frederic for the defence of his coasts still failed to appear.

It was next in order for the Swedes to move against the province allotted to them in the general plan of operations. Pomerania was even more defenceless than Preussen, for except a few battalions all the regular troops had long since been drawn to other points; so that the northern invaders, collecting

*The
Swedes in
Pomerania.*

¹ Frederic to Lehwaldt, 11, 17 July, 1757.

² Lehwaldt's report of the battle and Frederic's comforting answer are in the *Polit. Corresp.*, xv. 331-333. For the details of the action from the Russian side, see Masslowski, I. 222 et seq.

twenty thousand men about Stralsund, crossed the river Peene unopposed on the twelfth of September. A few days later the fortified town of Peenemünde fell into their hands. The Swedish envoy at Regensburg justified this attack upon a friendly power by alleging the obligations of his government under the treaty of Westphalia; but notwithstanding the convenience of that well-known formula, it is not unfair to presume that another motive was the desire to recover the portion of Pomerania which had been ceded to Prussia in 1720. This was to be Sweden's share of the common spoils, as long held out in negotiations which finally led to a new treaty with France and Austria.¹ But just at this crisis temporary relief came to Frederic in an unexpected way.

A few days after the battle of Gross-Jägersdorf Europe was amazed to learn that Apraxin, instead of following up his victory, had turned his back ^{Retreat of Apraxin.} on Preussen and retired behind the Niemen.² Treachery was at once suspected, and with it was coupled the name of Bestuschef. Later these suspicions took the shape of formal charges. But official evidence shows clearly that a council of officers called by the commanding general unanimously approved the movement, and that the necessities of the commissariat, usually described as a mere pretext on the part of Apraxin, were felt by the entire staff to be a complete and imperative reason.³

¹ 22 September, 1757. See Schoell, iii. 37. The territorial stipulations were in secret articles.

² "Sans que jusqu'à présent on en puisse pénétrer la cause." Frederic to Wilhelmina, 24 September, 1757. Cf. same to Lehwaldt, 29 September.

³ Masslowski, I. 244-249, and appendix. See, also, p. 301, the extract from Solowief's Russian history, where the author inquires whether it is not probable that in the council of war there would have been at least one honest voice raised against the retreat, if the reasons for it had not been good. That is indeed not history, but it deserves attention. M. Vandal, *Louis XV. et Elisabeth*, p. 311 et seq.,

The general's own fate was melancholy. When Austria complained of the feeble conduct of her ally, Bestuschef promptly abandoned Apraxin, who was arraigned before a court-martial, and died in the course of the proceedings. Lehwaldt was now enabled to lead a considerable part of his troops into Pomerania.

The next disaster struck Frederic nearer home. After he had sent the prince of Prussia to the rear in disgrace, restored the confidence of the Silesian army by his personal visit, and vainly offered battle to the superior force of prince Charles, he returned himself with a few troops to Saxony, leaving the duke of Bevern in command in the Lausitz. Bevern's duty was to oppose the designs of the Austrians, and Winterfeldt was left to assist him. But no very good feeling reigned between the two. Winterfeldt's imperious temper made him personally unpopular, and a general like the duke of Bevern, to whom the powerful favorite was assigned as a nominal subordinate, yet really half independent and in direct confidential relations with the king, chafed under such an irksome connection, and was embarrassed in his military conduct. Affairs proceeded, therefore, not much better than under the former unlucky commander. Although the dissensions between Daun and prince Charles in the rival army were hardly less acute, and also hindered energetic measures, Bevern early became alarmed about his supplies, and fell back to Görlitz, leaving Winterfeldt's corps on the other side of the Neisse, near Moys. This corps the Austrians under Nadasdy attacked on the seventh of September. When this action began Winterfeldt was absent in consultation with Bevern, but at the sound of firing he sprang into his

Battle of
Moys, and
death of
Winter-
feldt.

suggests that Apraxin also feared an uprising in his rear by the Poles, who had suffered nearly as much as the Prussians from the exactions of his troops, and whose anger count Broglie systematically encouraged under the general tenor of his secret instructions.

saddle and hurried across the river, only to find his troops flying before overwhelming numbers. For a short time he succeeded in rallying them, but in the crisis of the battle he fell mortally wounded; the enemy pressed their advantage, and this part of the position was lost. The left wing, however, where Zieten commanded, was not dislodged, and the next day the Austrians themselves retired. The battle cost the Prussians two thousand men, but its great significance was the loss of Winterfeldt. Frederic himself, who only heard of it a week later, mentions it with the defeats of Kollin, Gross-Jägersdorf, and Hastenbeck, as an event which affected the whole prospects of the war.¹ In the subsequent re-cremations, too, the friends of the lost general ascribed the issue of the day to Bevern's failure to give adequate support.²

The affair at Moys had both immediate and remote consequences alike disastrous to Prussia; but the latter alone connect themselves at once with the course of events. By occupying Bautzen, after Bevern's retreat to Görlitz, the Austrians interrupted his communication with Frederic. This alone was not a very serious event, for Frederic had foreseen it when he departed for Thuringia, and had left the duke considerable freedom of action.³ But three days after the battle of Moys Bevern abandoned even Görlitz, and fell back over the Bober to Bunzlau. This movement uncovered the road to Berlin, an error of which the enemy were

The Austrians in Berlin.

¹ Frederic to Wilhelmina, 17 September, 1759. For the Austrian account see *Heldengeschichte*, iv. 620 et seq.

² But even Varnhagen, *Ausgewählte Schriften*, xii. 124, makes admissions which possibly expose Winterfeldt to the charge of heedlessness before and recklessness after the attack. The G. S. history, i. 390, condemns Winterfeldt and exculpates Bevern. Frederic himself, *Œuvres*, iv. 140, 141, is neutral, but praises Winterfeldt highly.

³ Frederic to Bevern, 6 September, 1757.

quick to take advantage. General Hadik at once set out with a small force for the Prussian capital. The garrison was inadequate to its defence, and after a brief resistance at one of the gates, left the city to its fate. Hadik demanded a contribution of six hundred thousand thalers from the magistracy. But when less than two hundred thousand had been paid he heard of the approach of prince Maurice from Torgau, whereupon he packed his booty and departed as suddenly as he had come. A Prussian historian justly observes that the raid might have been made far more effective if more troops had been detailed for it.¹ But the moral effect was considerable, and the affair caused great exultation at Vienna.

It was finally an aggravation of Frederic's trials that while his own affairs were going so badly those of his only ally were conducted with positive disgrace. The duke of Richelieu succeeded marshal d'Estrées soon after the battle of Hastenbeck, and it was confidently promised, especially by the duke himself, that more vigor would now be infused into the French operations. His first display of vigor was made in plundering the region which the victory of Hastenbeck, and the retreat of Cumberland, had left exposed to his rapacity. The city and electorate of Hanover suffered terribly from his exactions. The duke of Brunswick hastened to open negotiations with the invader, and learned what harsh terms could be written in the insolence of triumph.² Meantime the French troops, follow-

¹ Schaefer, i. 442, 443. Arneth, v. 238, intimates that the force was somewhat smaller than Hadik had expected. But prince Charles was evidently unwilling to reduce his relative strength of two to one as against Bevern.

² The French were to remain in possession of the cities of Brunswick and Wolfenbüttel; the duke promised to recall his troops from Stade, and after dispatching his contingent to the imperial army, to disarm and disband the rest. Schaefer, i. 386, 387. The treaty was signed at Vienna, 20 September, 1757.

ing up their advantage, though none too promptly, and entering the territory of Bremen and Verden, which, though nominally belonging to Hanover, enjoyed a sort of guaranty from Denmark, finally got the allied army blockaded in Stade. The duke of Cumberland was in despair. Not deficient in personal courage or military talent, he wanted moral firmness in great crises; and as regent of Hanover he had a political responsibility which he was ill fitted to bear. He applied, therefore, to the king of Denmark for diplomatic aid, which Frederic V. was not at all reluctant to afford. But Richelieu was not less anxious to reach an agreement, which would enable him to claim the honor of a practical victory, and then to go quietly into camp for the winter. Accordingly he, too, through Ogier, the French resident at Copenhagen, invoked the good offices of the Danish king. His mediation, solicited as it was by both sides, brought about early in September the famous convention of Closter-Zeven. By its provisions an armistice was adopted between the contending parties; the duke of Cumberland was to dismiss his auxiliaries, over a third of his entire forces; the rest were to retire behind the Elbe, leaving only a garrison in Stade; prisoners were to be mutually released; and the French were to remain in possession of the conquered territory.¹ After this singular transaction Richelieu proposed to take winter quarters at once in Hanover, where alone, he argued, subsistence and safety were equally easy to find. But the peremptory orders of his government required him to push on toward the Elbe, in order to invest Magdeburg and reach out a

¹ Schoell, iii. 49. The convention was signed on the eighth of September at the monastery of Zeven, whence its name. Supplementary articles adopted a few days later modified, or explained, the terms somewhat in favor of Cumberland; it was declared, e. g., that the Hanoverian troops were not prisoners of war. *Ibid.*, p. 50. Cf. Stühr, i. 126 et seq.

hand to Soubise.¹ This order was finally obeyed, and in the last days of September forty thousand French, with the marshal himself, occupied the city and district of Halberstadt. The king of Prussia thus saw himself deserted by his only ally, while the hostile army which that ally had set free calmly marched into one of his richest counties, plundered the inhabitants, and threatened the important fortress of Magdeburg.

With the small force, less than thirty thousand men, left for operations against the French and imperialists Frederic set out from Dresden on the last day of August. In the assignment of general officers the duke of Bevern received Zieten as well as Winterfeldt, while prince Henry, Ferdinand of Brunswick, Maurice, Keith, and Seydlitz accompanied the king. Seydlitz was a dashing horseman, who, like Zieten, had come to the front in the course of Frederic's measures for improving the mounted arm of the service. He was a soldier by nature as well as by training. His smart dress, saucy bearing, and dashing courage filled the popular ideal of a captain of horse. But Seydlitz was also a commander of very solid ability; prompt, full of resources, judicious; facing responsibility as he faced danger; and passionately devoted to his king. In this campaign he laid the basis of a reputation which steadily grew during the whole course of the war.

The early weeks of the campaign were not indeed favorable to a soldier full of ambition like Seydlitz, or to a ruler oppressed by a great problem like Frederic, for they were chiefly marked by the efforts of the Prussians to force, and the efforts of the enemy to evade, an open engagement. Except one or two unimportant raids, the

¹ Stühr, i. 133. Quite in accordance, therefore, with the Vienna plan, which was to neutralize Hanover in order that the whole French force might coöperate against Frederic. As if the Austrians, Russians, and Swedes were not enough !

"army of execution" had done nothing for the redemption of Saxony. Hildburghausen and Soubise were in constant strife; and as they were never ready for battle at the same time, the campaign wanted on their part nearly every military virtue. When Frederic advanced they retired. If he fell back they followed him cautiously, showing fight only when their fifty thousand had a safe position against the attack of half that number. On the thirtieth of September Frederic reached Erfurt, but only a part of his army accompanied him to this point. Prince Maurice had been left with several thousand men to guard the line of the Saale, and Ferdinand had been detailed toward Halberstadt with another force to watch the movements of Richelieu. This left Frederic only some twelve thousand men; and it seemed highly improbable that the enemy would long stand idle before such an insignificant force, or would fail to attack it if it should advance beyond the reach of its necessary supports. But it was not enough merely to hold the imperialists in check. Though they could wait, Frederic, with Swedes and Austrians invading his dominions from other sides, could not; he needed decisive battles, and if battles could not be found here, they must be sought elsewhere. The retrograde movement which he now began was thus not a retreat before the enemy. He fell back leisurely, spending one week at Buttelstädt and another at Buttstädt, uncertain whether to expect a trial of arms with Hildburghausen or with the Austrians in the Lausitz,¹ when the reports, greatly exaggerated, of the enemy's advance upon Berlin decided for the moment his plans. Pushing Maurice on in advance, and leaving only a small force under Keith at Leipsic, he hastened by forced marches toward what seemed the point of greatest danger. He hoped at least to intercept the enemy on their retreat. But the march upon Berlin proved to be

¹ Frederic to Maurice, 29 September, 1757.

only the petty raid of Hadik; the alarm soon subsided; and Frederic, who had advanced with his instalment of troops beyond the Elbe, had to consider what next he would do. Should he march against the Austrians, who were now in Silesia, or turn again in search of the imperialists, who had entered Saxony? After some hesitation he chose the latter.

There may have been political as well as military reasons for this choice. In logical sequence to the
The Em-
pire and
its army. fulminations previously aimed at Frederic, yet after considerable delay, the aulic council finally ordered, and on the twenty-second of August the emperor signed, a formal summons to the king of Prussia as margrave of Brandenburg to appear and show cause why he should not be put under the ban of the Empire.¹ But the summons had not yet been served on the guilty man, and the more scrupulous jurists doubted whether service might not be necessary to legalize the subsequent steps. It was finally decided that all forms would be satisfied by serving the papers upon Plottho, the envoy of Prussia at the diet. The attempt was accordingly made on the fourteenth of October; but Plottho replied by flinging the unlucky notary out of the door, and his papers after him, to the great delight of the wits of Germany.² The affair had, however, its serious side. Great as was Frederic's contempt for the forms of imperial discipline, he was not indifferent to public opinion; and he knew that a good victory over the "army of execution" would cover the aulic council with derision, and serve his cause better in Germany than all of Plottho's cogent deductions. True to its tactics that army had again advanced when Fred-

¹ Citatio ad videndum et audiendum.

² See Plottho's report of the incident in *Heldengeschichte*, iv. 745-749. Henckel, *Mil. Nachlass*, I. ii., mentions reports from Regensburg to the effect that a cell had been prepared at Innsbruck, to which the royal prisoner was to be consigned!

eric fell back; true also to the orders of Soubise, which directed him to engage the king's attention without risking a battle while the Austrians carried out their plans in Silesia, but if he should turn against them, to take possession of Saxony.¹ Now, therefore, the imperialists marched upon Leipsic, and summoned Keith to surrender. But Keith did nothing of the sort. He made the best possible arrangements for defence, threatened to burn the suburbs if the enemy advanced, and reported the situation to Frederic.²

In the midst of these perplexities Frederic found some relief in the attitude of England and Hanover. His theory of the allied army had been that it would hold the French in check, or in other words stand between the French and his own possessions in the region of the Elbe. This theory was rudely shaken by the battle of Hastenbeck; it seemed to be completely shattered by the convention of Closter-Zeven. That treaty practically disarmed his allies, separated their army into its original elements, and gave Richelieu a free passage through Hanover toward Prussia. But Richelieu and Cumberland were only the agents in a transaction which neither of the principals fully approved. Bernis states that Richelieu in his official correspondence had previously thrown out hints of his purpose, and that by the king's order he wrote a letter expressly forbidding any steps of the kind; but soon afterwards news of the convention arrived, whereupon he advised Louis to ratify it if England did the same.³ The well-known desire of Austria for the recognition of Hanoverian neutrality, and reports of secret overtures lately received by her from London, may have had some influence on the decision of the French court.⁴ But it seems that France insisted on certain amendments

Rupture of
the con-
vention of
Closter-
Zeven.

¹ Bernis, *Mémoires*, ii. 31.

² Retzow, i. 200.

³ *Mémoires*, ii. 18-20, 25,

⁴ See Stühr, i. 127.

to the treaty as a further condition of acceptance. The points, four in number, which she demanded were the extension of the armistice to cover the duration of the war; its application to all the Hanoverians; no troops to be sent by England into the duchies of Bremen and Verden; and an engagement that Cumberland's army should not serve against the allies of France.¹ But these propositions, even as softened by the mediator, were not acceptable to England. Even the original convention caused a general outburst of indignation, in which George the Second openly took part. He roundly denounced the folly of his son; relieved him at once from the command; and covered him with personal reproaches.² But this alone would not undo the work of Closter-Zeven. Even though it were to be regarded as something more than a mere military agreement between commanders in the field, even if it were partly political in its nature, the full powers given to Cumberland raised awkward questions alike for the king and for his ministers; and for a time George seemed helpless. In a letter to Frederic he mournfully confessed that his hands were tied so far as Hanover was concerned.³ But the treaty was still unratified, the opposition to it grew stronger every day, and the conduct of the French themselves soon furnished a reason or a pretext for revoking it. Their propositions of amendment, and certain movements of their troops, were said to be a breach of the engagement on their part, and equivalent, therefore, to a release of England. This decision once reached, the government took its next steps with satisfactory vigor. Orders were sent to the head-

¹ Flassan, vi. 104, 105. Cf. Huschberg-Wuttke, p. 346 et seq.

² The duke insisted with much dignity that he had written orders for everything he had done, and it seems to have been the current opinion in England that he told the truth. See H. Walpole, *Memoirs of George II.*, iii. 61.

³ 20 September, 1757. *Polit. Corresp.*, xv. 424.

quarters at Stade to hold the Hanoverians together, to recall the auxiliaries, and to prepare for an early renewal of hostilities. Michell reported in the most encouraging tone about the new spirit that reigned at London.¹ Even the long-delayed formal request for the assignment of Ferdinand of Brunswick to the command of the allied army was now prepared, and an officer was sent to lay it before Frederic.

This new energy was due to William Pitt. After his rude dismissal in the spring all attempts to form ^{William Pitt} a stable government had failed and public affairs seemed worse than ever.² In despair the king finally called again on the leader whom he hated but the nation loved; and Pitt nobly consenting to act with the duke of Newcastle, negotiations led to the completion of a new cabinet, which kissed hands on the twenty-ninth of June, a month before the battle of Hastenbeck. Newcastle received the treasury with the control of the patronage; Pitt and Holderness were secretaries of state; lord Anson had the admiralty, while Fox was put off with the paymastership of the forces. But the real power in the government was Pitt. His imperious will asserted itself over all of his colleagues; the entire conduct of everything except the finances fell practically into his hands; and under his inspiration England roused herself to those

¹ *Polit. Corresp.*, xv. 425, 426, 455, etc. The details above given belong, loosely speaking, to the month of October. Frederic seems to have heard as early as the 16th of that month that the convention would not be ratified. *Ibid.*, p. 427. Richelieu suspected it, and the landgrave of Hesse-Cassel received formal notice of it, about the same time. Huschberg-Wuttke, pp. 364, 365.

² Contemporary opinion is well reflected in a letter of the 26th of July, 1757, by the Danish statesman Bernstorff, who writes of "cette flé, que nous avons vue si florissante et si respectée, mais qui aujourd'hui semble courir à sa décadence." Vedel, *Correspondance de Bernstorff*, i. 186. Even Pitt was at one time inclined to purchase the aid of Spain by the restoration of Gibraltar.

brilliant achievements which still form one of the most splendid chapters in her annals. But with regard to the war in Germany Pitt changed his views slowly. He was on record against the Anglo-Prussian convention of Westminster, against the subsidy treaties, against the whole Hanoverian policy of George the Second. When the duke of Cumberland, his old enemy, returned to England Pitt magnanimously defended him against the royal vengeance. He refused at first any considerable increase of the allowance for the allied army.¹ But he gradually came to take the king's view, that the war was really an English war, and that Hanover was this time an innocent sufferer from England's quarrel. As soon as this conviction took root in his mind a new theory of national policy sprang up. It was now an easy step to the more complete view that to defeat France anywhere was to weaken her everywhere, or, as Pitt tersely put it, that America could be conquered in Germany. Then he made ready to renew the struggle in Hanover, offered Frederic four million thalers a year from the English treasury, and tore up the convention of Closter-Zeven.²

¹ See George Grenville to Pitt, 14 August, 1757, in Chatham's Correspondence, i. 243 et seq., and Schaefer, i. 373.

² On the thirtieth of August Frederic intimated that he would have to accept English money, and in a report of 23 September, 1757, Michell announced that the sum named above would be granted "si votre majesté [i. e., Frederic] voulait et pouvait se maintenir dans la poursuite de la guerre, et ne pas faire la paix sans le concours et la participation de l'Angleterre." *Polit. Corresp.*, xv. 315, 425 n. The alleged breach of Cumberland's treaty by the French was also suggested by Frederic as something which gave England a right to repudiate it. Frederic to George II., 16 October, 1757. But Schaefer, i. 476, makes it clear that the English cabinet had already reached its decision when Frederic's suggestions were received. There was widely published at this time a letter, accepted by later historians, e. g., Flassan, vi. 102, 103, as genuine, wherein Frederic sharply censured George II. for the convention of Closter-Zeven. But it was an ingenious forgery. See *Polit. Corresp.*, xv. 432, 433.

From the depths of despair into which England had been plunged by the disasters in Germany, by the failure of the expedition against Rochefort, by the fiasco before Louisburg, by the riots over the militia bill, and by the misfortunes of her ally, the king of Prussia, she gradually rose to a new sense of confidence and resolution under the example of this strong, hopeful, self-reliant man.

What now were the feelings of the duke of Richelieu as he saw the edifice so carefully erected falling down before his eyes? Simply those of a cynical man of pleasure, who when baffled in the pursuit of one form of diversion turns languidly to another. He was not wholly worthless as a soldier. He shared with marshal Saxe the honors of Fontenoy; he delivered Genoa from the Austrians in 1748; at Minorca he showed real talent, and the capture of Port Mahon was perhaps the most brilliant achievement of the French arms during the entire war. But these were brief displays of energy and ability. For the laborious sacrifices of a general in command during a long campaign he wanted the power and even the taste; he preferred the triumphs of love in the boudoir, or of intrigue in the cabinet. It was an agreeable thing to be at the head of a large army, but it was not an agreeable thing to spend months away from France, in bad weather, and among a strange people. How, then, could ennui be escaped? Clearly, by making easy terms with the duke of Cumberland, collecting plenty of money for importunate creditors, sending the army into winter quarters, and then hurrying over to Paris for the dissipation of the gay season. Such had been the duke of Richelieu all his long life hitherto; such he was in the year of our Lord 1757. He despised Bernis, of course, not, however, because he was weak, but because he was, or had become serious. Madame de Pompadour had turned against him; yet while Bernis

was finding in this estrangement the real explanation of Richelieu's unwarlike negotiations,¹ the marshal himself cheerfully took up fresh intrigues, as they offered themselves to him. Frederic's appeal to him to act as agent in bringing about peace was not unwelcome. Even after these overtures had failed, he consented to a special convention with Ferdinand of Brunswick, acting in the name of Frederic, by the terms of which the supplies to be levied in the district of Halberstadt were regulated strictly, and the inhabitants secured against some of the evils of a hostile occupation.² The agreement was, indeed, rejected by the French court, and further negotiations led to nothing. But he remained for nearly six weeks in a state of practical inaction, which has always been regarded as suspicious, and which Frederic seems to hint was the effect of bribery.³ Richelieu himself insisted that his army was in no condition to fight, and this seems indeed to have been the case. In any event, the marshal simply detached ten thousand men under the duke of Broglie to reinforce Soubise, made no attempt on Magdeburg, toward which Ferdinand had retired, and calmly watched the course of events about him. Political and military negotiations were the chief contributions made by this accomplished trifler to the autumn campaign in Thuringia.

The leisure of Richelieu was Frederic's opportunity, and Keith's note of warning was promptly answered. Ferdinand and Maurice were at once summoned, the one from Halle, the other from Berlin; and the concentration of all available troops upon

The combined army makes a stand.

¹ Bernis, *Mémoires*, i. 404, 405.

² 17 October, 1757. Cf. Stühr, i. 139 et seq.

³ "Il n'est pas douteux que les sommes qui passèrent entre les mains du maréchal ne ralentirent dans la suite considérablement son ardeur militaire." *Œuvres de Frédéric*, iv. 145. But this may refer only to the contributions levied on the country.

Leipsic was ordered.¹ For the city itself Frederic had little fear. He knew that an army which had for its special mission the rescue of the native land of the dauphiness would be unlikely to risk even for military advantage the smallest Saxon village; but the sudden and unexpected boldness of the enemy gave him reason to hope that he could now by a single battle rid himself of them forever.² Yet he was nearly disappointed. On the first news of his return Soubise lost heart, and opportune orders from Paris gave him an excuse for seeking winter quarters behind the Saale; while Hildburghausen was too weak to give battle without the French, and was himself much impressed by Frederic's presence at Leipsic.³ Again, therefore, the Prussians took the offensive. On the third of November, after smart skirmishes with the enemy's rear-guard, and some delay caused by the destruction of bridges, they crossed the Saale in three columns at Weissenfels, Merseburg, and Halle, and bivouacked for the night at Braunsdorf, only four or five miles from the high ground in front of the village of Mùcheln, where the hostile camp-fires burned. The next morning early they moved nearer, with a view to battle. But during the night the combined army had shifted its position toward Branderode, on which its right rested; its flanks were protected by nature, its front by rude breastworks; and even Frederic's temerity shrank from an assault. He fell back, therefore, upon the village of Rossbach, with his right toward Bedra. But this movement was taken in the other army for a sign of weakness; the drums were

¹ Frederic to Ferdinand and Maurice, 23 October, 1757.

² Frederic to Keith, 23 October, 1757. The honest compiler of the *Heldengeschichte* suggests, therefore, iv. 715, that Hadik's raid may have been a real blessing to the Prussians, since it led the "army of execution" into a position whence it could not escape without a fight.

³ Paulmy to Soubise, 23 October, 1757, apud Stühr, i. 357. Cf. Arneth, v. 247; Luynes, xvi. 304.

beaten furiously in triumph; and there was a general cry for action. Even Soubise was now obliged to yield. He had received letters from Stainville which described in strong colors the impatience of the imperial court, and his own officers in a council of war were eager for battle.¹ It was decided, therefore, to fight the following day, and according to a plan submitted by Hildburghausen.

This plan proposed a march by the right, and then a flank attack from or through the level ground at Reichertswerben, on the extreme left of Frederic's army. But owing to the renewed dissensions of the generals it was eleven o'clock before they got in motion;² and Soubise would have been untrue to himself, or indeed to facts, if he had not pointed out that the flank was exposed during the movement to a sudden attack from a daring and vigilant foe. This time, however, Frederic was in a measure taken by surprise. About two o'clock, while he was at table in the manor house at Rossbach, a body of the enemy's horse, detailed under count St. Germain to watch the Prussian camp while the rest of the army executed its movement by the flank, appeared in sight near Almdorf; and it was at first taken to be only the rear-guard employed to cover a general retreat. The sinuous course of the main army, which was also visible in the distance, seemed to confirm this theory. But a closer examination soon made plain to Frederic the secret of the enemy's manœuvre. Then his action was prompt. He resolved to shift his own ground by a swift march by the left, and thus not only thwart the enemy's

¹ Bernis, *Mémoires*, ii. 31; Bernis to Stainville, 14 November, 1757; Arneth, v. 248.

² Hildburghausen says it was even one o'clock before the French started. See his report in Brodrück, *Feldzug der Reichsarmee von 1757*, p. 302, and, pp. 344, 345, Brodrück's collation of the many conflicting statements about the hour of day. They range from eight A. M. to two P. M.

design upon his flank, but also gain a position from which he could choose his own place for battle. At the word of command the tents were struck, the men seized their arms, the troopers sprang into their saddles, the whole force fell into line, and with Seydlitz in advance the march began. The two armies were now moving on converging lines. The enemy had the earlier start, but their course was the arc of a circle, while the Prussians marched by the chord and were partly concealed by hills. Two of these hills, or rather knolls, were important tactical points. The one called Pölzen was the more distant, and thither Seydlitz led his eager horsemen; the field guns were hurried up the other, the so-called Janus Hill; and the infantry ranged itself behind and between, ready for its opportunity. Prussian energy and Prussian tactics thus gained all the advantage of position. The combined army, full of confidence and careless of precaution, hurried onward in pursuit, as it supposed, of a retreating foe. But when the watchful scouts gave the proper signal, the Prussian cavalry suddenly rose over the crest of one hill, the artillery was uncovered on the other, and the issue of arms was joined.

The battle was begun by Seydlitz, who commanded the entire cavalry, and to whom after Frederic is due the chief credit for the day. About three o'clock he led the hussars forming his first line down the slopes of the Pölzen Hill against the right flank of the enemy, which contained their best regiments of horse, Austrian as well as French. The shock was terrible, but the enemy had the advantage of numbers and weight, and Seydlitz made repeated charges before the hostile line began to waver.¹ Then he called down the dragoons of the second line. They, too, fell impetuously upon the reeling column; the disorder passed into a panic; and when the artillery opened fire this part of the enemy's line fled wildly from

¹ Hildburghausen says four charges.

the scene. Seydlitz pursued them a short distance, then called a halt and gave his gallant men a rest. The infantry now took up the battle, and the Prussians again forced the fighting. They advanced from the Janus Hill through Reichertswerben toward the enemy's right wing. But here everything was in confusion.¹ Suddenly arrested on its march the combined army was not deployed for battle; the frantic efforts of Soubise and Hildburghausen to bring up artillery and cavalry only added to the disorder; the regiments of foot were entangled with one another; while toward this chaotic mass the Prussians under prince Henry marched in perfect order, and with the firm bearing of masters. All accounts agree that the first battalions approached to within forty or fifty paces of the enemy before they opened fire. But the fight here was short. Though several French regiments tried to make a stand, they soon quailed before the fatal precision of the Prussian volleys, and, being unsupported, followed their demoralized comrades. In the wildest disorder the entire "army of execution," — that army which the emperor had summoned as a sort of sheriff's posse to enforce judgment against the margrave of Brandenburg, and which the French called the "Dauphiness" because it was to punish the audacious invader of the land which had the honor of giving birth to the wife of the heir apparent of France, — in the wildest confusion, and after only a show of fighting, this army of fifty thousand men retreated before the determined attack of half as many Prussians.² The retreat became, too, a veritable race for

¹ The combined army marched in three columns, composed of the first and second lines of battle and the reserve, but for some unknown reason the reserve was placed between the two lines.

² Bernis in his *Mémoires*, ii. 39, makes Frederic say after the battle to a French officer taken prisoner that he had supposed himself confronted only by the imperial levies, not by the French also. The story wants probability as well as corroboration. But if any such remark was made, it was probably inspired only by a deli-

safety. The fugitives threw away their guns, their knapsacks, everything which could impede their flight; regimental organization was lost; and at the proper moment Seydlitz with his cavalry gave the coup de grace. According to Hildburghausen, the approach of night, which checked the Prussian pursuit, alone saved the army from complete destruction.¹

The tactical features of the battle of Rossbach, and the trial which it afforded between numbers on the one side and generalship united with discipline on the other, made the victory the most brilliant, with the possible exception of Sohr, that Frederic had yet won. But it was also a popular victory, and for a time affected the national aspects of the war. The plain cate courtesy, or by a deeper design, not by an instinct of veracity. Brodrück, p. 346, gives a careful estimate of the numbers actually engaged, according to which Hildburghausen had 36,684 and Frederic 20,570.

Effects of
the Prussian
victory.

¹ Brodrück, p. 303. The Prussian losses are given at 165 officers and men killed, and 376 wounded, among the latter prince Henry and Seydlitz. The other side lost twice as many killed, some 2,000 wounded, as well as many prisoners and deserters. G. S., i. 371. The *Polit. Corresp.* has some previously unpublished accounts of the battle. One, vol. xv. pp. 8-10, is from Eichel, but from reports brought to Merseburg, for the secretary was not an eye-witness; the others are from Frederic himself in the form of brief letters to his various correspondents. The "Relation," pp. 26-29, seems to be only the original draft of what is published by Lloyd and others as the official Prussian version of the battle. Stühr gives in his *Forschungen*, i. 366 et seq., extracts from the reports of Soubise and other French officers, not only upon the engagement itself, but also upon the movements of the combined army both before and after the engagement. They make a sad story of discord and incapacity. See also Huseberg-Wuttke, pp. 300, 306, 307, and Brodrück, *passim*. Specially interesting in Brodrück's excellent work are the extracts from the letters of Mollinger, secretary of prince George of Darmstadt, a general in the combined army. The prince formerly served under Frederic, and Mollinger remained a staunch Prussian sympathizer, as his piquant reports abundantly show. Henckel's *Nachlass*, I. ii., reprints the various official "relations" of the battle.

people of Germany were not very keen politicians, and were unable to weigh with much nicety the real issues involved. Perhaps they failed to reflect that part of the defeated army were their own countrymen; that Frederic's own troops were not of unmixed blood; and that less than a score of years before he himself had welcomed the French into Germany. But they knew that the French were aliens, and felt them to be invaders. They recognized in Rossbach the victory of a German prince over a race of proud and insolent foreigners; and the accounts are perhaps not greatly exaggerated which describe how the event was celebrated in town and village throughout the Fatherland, and how the populace hooted the fine gentlemen of Versailles as they fled along the roads to France.¹ In Paris, too, the effects of the victory were significant. It was universally felt to be a grave blow to the military prestige of France, an inexcusable blow, a blow directly chargeable to the wretched system of directing the most important interests according to the whims of a bad woman; and in sharp-edged sarcasms which were passed about in drawing-rooms the public anger took its revenge upon madame de Pompadour, and the unlucky object of her favor, the prince of Soubise. Madame, it was said, could make a farmer general, but not a general. Soubise's house in the city was described as offered for rent because the owner was going to a military school, and a street song represented him walking up and down Europe, lantern in hand, looking for his lost army.² Bernis, who also came in for his share of the public resentment, was alarmed and bewildered. With all his devotion to the reigning mistress and her favorites, he had as a timid man a strong instinct of self-preservation, and he now became warmly anxious for peace. It was not indeed the conduct of French di-

¹ Cf. Schaefer, i. 463 et seq.; Huschberg-Wuttke, p. 301 n.

² See Barbier's *Journal*, ed. 1866, vi. 595, 602.

plomacy, but the conduct of the French arms, that discouraged him. His letters are full of complaints about the generals, the staff, the war office; despairing of any improvement here, he began to sound the court of Vienna on the subject of overtures to the enemy; and though not yet willing to make peace without the Austrians, he was quite willing to make peace with them.¹ But as yet Bernis's place was secure, and Soubise, for his part, was soon able to show the baton of a marshal of France as evidence of the undiminished influence of the Pompadour. Frederic said neatly, contrasting his fate with that of D'Estrées, that the French promoted one general for losing, and disgraced another general for winning a battle.²

In England the news of Rossbach was received, of course, with delight. But in one sense the victory had an unfortunate effect. Relieving Frederic, as it seemed to do, from one set of enemies, and giving him freedom of action in part of the field, what was more natural than that it should also suggest to the English and Hanoverian ministers a diminished sense of their own duty to support him, and an increased sense of their right to expect his aid in their own cause? In an interview with the king on the ninth of November, Mitchell, who had his standing orders on the subject, urged him to turn his victorious army against Richelieu, and drive him out of Hanover, whither he had since returned. Frederic rejected the invitation with much warmth, though he promised to lend the aid of part of the army of Lehwaldt in Pomerania as soon as it

The Hanoverian army gets a new commander.

¹ *Mémoires*, ii. 43 et seq.

² *Œuvres*, iv. 155, 156. A similar *mot* is attributed by Luynes, xvi. 300, to Richelieu, who had been an original applicant for the command which he finally received. It is to the effect that he was refused the command because he had taken Port Mahon, and D'Estrées was removed from the command because he had won the battle of Hastenbeck.

could be spared from the operations against the Swedes.¹ But Mitchell knew the situation better, or faced it more frankly, than his government. While losing no opportunity to press Frederic for aid in Hanover, he refused to exaggerate the consequences of the victory of Rossbach, insisted on the still precarious situation of the king of Prussia, and even incurred the displeasure of his court by the urgency of his appeals for greater energy in support of the common cause.² Pitt was still preoccupied with other plans, and had not yet mastered the German problem. But one important transaction was completed in these days. Immediately after the battle of Rossbach the Hanoverian general Schulenburg waited upon Frederic with the formal request for the assignment of prince Ferdinand of Brunswick to the command of the allied army. Mitchell was called in to assist at the audience. It was agreed that the prince should be only loaned for the service; that he should retain his rank, pay, and character as a Prussian officer; and that England should simply support his table and camp appointments during the war.³ After cordial interviews and discussions with Frederic, the new commander set out for Stade, where he arrived by way of Hamburg on the twenty-third of November.

Prince Ferdinand was a brother of the reigning duke of Brunswick, and had not completed his thirty-seventh year when he received this important command. Forced like so many younger sons of princely families to seek a career for himself, he joined the Prussian army in 1740; rose upward by gradual steps, and in 1757 had the title of lieutenant-general. His career had been honorable, but not brilliant. The

Ferdinand
of Brun-
swick.

¹ Mitchell's report, 11 November, 1757. *Polit. Corresp.*, xvi. 15.

² See Raumer, *Beiträge*, ii. 446, 447, for Holdernessee's sharp letter of 21 December, 1757.

³ *Polit. Corresp.*, xvi. 15-17.

service of Frederic contained many officers of higher rank and greater name, — officers who, if military reputation alone had decided, would have had better claims to the appointment.¹ The birth and connections of Ferdinand mainly determined his selection. But it was in his favor that if he had as yet shown no unusual brilliancy, he had also shown no devouring ambition; that he had kept clear of the feuds and intrigues of the camp; that his rectitude of character was known to all men; and that moderation of temper, love of justice, and unvarying tact were parts of his natural endowment. These were great qualifications for the command of an army which had in its diverse elements and its internal dissensions enemies nearly as formidable as those who confronted it in the open field. But in the long and weary campaigns which ensued the prince displayed also the qualities of a consummate general. The scope of the present work will not require, or even permit me to describe his operations with the same particularity as those of Frederic; but any history of the Seven Years' War is imperfect which does not leave on its readers the conviction that Ferdinand of Brunswick was one of the finest characters, whether as a soldier or as a man, which that bloody struggle produced.²

While Frederic was thus sending one of his leading generals out upon an arduous mission, he himself was also preparing, not for rest and repose after his victorious battle, but for a new campaign in a distant part of his dominions, and on the very edge of winter. Mitchell describes this fact as the reason given by the king for

¹ Neither in form nor in fact was Ferdinand designated by Frederic in response to a request for *some* Prussian general to command the allied army, as the early histories state.

² Bernis wrote later of this appointment: "Ce ne fut, comme disait Louis XIV. de M. de Vendôme, qu'un homme de plus, et cet homme valut une armée." *Mémoires*, ii. 28.

not pursuing Richelieu into Hanover. "He answered," writes the envoy, "that he must immediately go into Silesia to endeavor to save Schweidnitz;" and later in the conversation Frederic is reported as saying that if he should undertake to follow the French marshal, the Austrians would "get a settlement in Silesia."¹ The case was indeed urgent. It was far more urgent than Frederic supposed; but even as he understood it, prompt and energetic action was needed.

After the engagement at Moys, and the retreat of Bevern upon Bunzlau, prince Charles and Daun The war in Silesia. agreed that their principal efforts ought now to be directed against Silesia. Fifteen thousand men were left behind in the Lausitz under general Marschall. Even without these the Austrians greatly outnumbered the forces of Bevern, and prince Charles seems to have been repeatedly advised that the true way to reconquer Silesia was to destroy the opposing Prussian army.² But though the most earnest appeals and the most emphatic warnings came from his own brother, the emperor, this time as on every previous occasion the prince only half did his duty. With constant complaints about the weather, the roads, the supplies, and the transportation, he marched slowly by way of Lauban, Löwenberg, and Goldberg toward Liegnitz. The object was to turn Bevern's line of retreat by getting between him and Breslau. In both armies the opinions of the officers about the wisdom of giving battle seem to have been divided; but the Prussian general had so weakened his forces by sending reinforcements to the garrisons of several of the fortified towns that when the enemy confronted him, on the twenty-sixth of September, near Liegnitz, he thought best to decline the challenge. To reach Breslau now he had to adopt a feint. Falling back ostensibly upon

¹ Mitchell's audience, 9 November, 1757, loc. cit.

² Arneth, v. 230, 231.

Glogau, below the capital, he suddenly changed his course toward Steinau, crossed the Oder, and marched swiftly up the stream on the west side to his destination. Then he recrossed through the city to the left bank of the river. The Austrians were completely out-maneuvred. When prince Charles came up two days later, on the third of October, he found the duke and his army defiantly camped outside the walls of the city, throwing up earthworks, fitting the surrounding hamlets into a scheme of defence, and taking every precaution against attack. In this crisis, with his great advantage of numbers, what was the policy of prince Charles?

He held councils of war, and he wrote to Vienna for instructions. Neither formality was required. But he timidly shrank from responsibility, and as he had dispatched a force under Nadasdy for the siege of Schweidnitz, the question was submitted to the council of war, and to Maria Theresa herself, whether it was better to give battle to Bevern at once, or to await the result of Nadasdy's enterprise. Incredible as it may seem, the consultations and correspondence over this puzzle covered a good part of the month of October, the practical result being that the plan favored by a majority of the Austrian officers, to watch Bevern without attacking him, while the movement against Schweidnitz was taking its course, received the assent of the empress-queen.¹ Hence nearly two months elapsed before the rival armies in Silesia actually came to blows. The fortress of Schweidnitz had an important strategical bearing

¹ The chief authority is of course Arneth, who gives, v. 232 et seq., a most humiliating picture of the indecision which reigned in the Austrian camp, and of the efforts of Maria Theresa to reconcile a friendly consideration for her brother-in-law with the due execution of her own well-defined plans. With Arneth and his contributions from official sources should be compared what is given by Stühr, i. 266 et seq., especially the reports of Montazet, a French officer with the Austrian army.

on the pass which led through the mountains into Bohemia by way of Trautenau, and the works had been rebuilt with great care during the years of peace. But the stout resistance which the place ought to have offered was apparently not made. The investment conducted by thirty thousand men was completed on the nineteenth of October, and the siege operations were pushed with great vigor under the direction of skilful French engineers. In the night of the eleventh of November part of the outer works were carried by storm. The next day the garrison capitulated. The Austrians took nearly six thousand prisoners, one hundred and eighty guns, large stores of powder and shells, and over twenty thousand thalers in specie.¹

A week before the fall of Schweidnitz, Frederic set out for its relief. He had followed up the victory of the fifth of November with his usual energy, and driven the demoralized foe safely beyond the Unstrut; but the critical state of affairs in Silesia forbade any further pursuit. Calling his troops together he turned his face toward the next point of danger. "This is indeed," he wrote, "a year of toil for me."² The plan which he adopted made an admirable use of his feeble resources. Prince Henry with a small force was left to maintain, or rather to represent, the Prussian occupation of Saxony, to enforce the assessments and the conscription; while Keith with a few thousand men made a bold diversion into Bohemia, which carried terror to the very walls of Prague, and compelled, as was intended, the recall of the Austrian forces left

Frederic's
march to
Silesia.

¹ G. S., i. 410; Arneth, v. 252. It is always stated, and so far as I am aware has not been denied, that the Austrians obtained a plan of the works through the baseness of Louis XV., to whom Frederic had sent it as a compliment, and of course in confidence, some years before.

² To Keith, 7 November, 1757.

under Marschall in the Lausitz. Frederic had thus an unobstructed route to Silesia. With some fourteen thousand men he took up his line of march by way of Leipzig, Torgau, and the Lausitz, hoping to reach Schweidnitz by the twenty-eighth of November.¹ But fortune, which had smiled upon him at Rossbach, was now again unkind. At Königsbrück, on the Elbe, where he gave the army a day's rest, he learned of the fall of Schweidnitz. It fell to Bevern himself to report this disastrous event, and the report was taken as a confession on his own part of a failure of duty. The general freedom of action left to him at the outset of his campaign was afterwards seasoned by frequent injunctions to beware of timid counsels, to act boldly and energetically, and to give or accept battle whenever fair opportunity offered. As time proceeded, and affairs grew worse, Frederic's orders became more imperative. But the duke seemed unequal to his task. The skill and courage with which he had led his army across Silesia faded away after he took up his position before Breslau. During the siege of Schweidnitz the enemy's forces were divided; after its fall they would at once reunite, and in overwhelming numbers. Bevern knew this, and let the opportunity pass. He now decided to attack, and then decided not to attack; held councils of war, which discovered much hesitation on the part of his leading officers, and confused his own judgments; and thus drifted at the mercy of events until the Prussians in Schweidnitz hauled down their colors, and marched off as prisoners of war. The crisis which Frederic had tried to avert, both by his exhortations to Bevern and by his own rapid march, had thus arrived. It is not surprising that he wrote with great bitterness to the duke, reproaching him for his failure to give battle to the enemy, holding him responsible for the loss of

¹ Frederic to Bevern, 10 November, 1757. Cf. Schaefer, i. 509. He had reckoned that the place could hold out six weeks.

Schweidnitz, and commanding him in the most peremptory tones to attack prince Charles at once. Otherwise the king's own corps would be imperilled, with prince Charles separating it from Bevern, while Marschall and Nadasdy threatened it from other sides.¹

The Austrians, however, were not disposed to go in search of Frederic; their object was rather to defeat Bevern, capture Breslau, and then complete the conquest of Silesia. Directly, therefore, on the fall of Schweidnitz, Nadasdy joined prince Charles with the bulk of his forces. The Austrians then numbered eighty thousand; the Prussians, only thirty thousand.² With this advantage in strength prince Charles felt encouraged to attack Bevern, and won for the first time in his life a complete victory. The Prussians fought with great courage and tenacity. On the left Zieten repulsed Nadasdy in brilliant style, and the general conduct of the defence seems to have been good. But numbers and weight in the end prevailed; the Austrians carried position after position; and when night fell Bevern gave up the field, and hastily retired to the other side of the Oder.³ In the course of the night the victors occupied the deserted camp. Two days later, on the twenty-fourth of November, the duke himself, while making a reconnoissance in the early morning, in company of a single orderly, fell into the hands of the enemy's pickets, and was carried off to Vienna as a prisoner of war. It was at once suspected and widely believed that he had planned the result in order to escape Frederic's vengeance.⁴ General Kyau as senior in rank took the

Battle of
Breslau,
22 November,
1757.

¹ Frederic to Bevern, 18 November, 1757.

² G. S., i. 414.

³ Arneth, v. 255, makes the Prussian loss 9,000, the Austrian 6,000, in killed, wounded, and prisoners.

⁴ Frederic wrote in after years, *Œuvres*, iv. 160, that Bevern "se laissa prendre," a form of words which though usually taken to imply a belief in his guilt by no means compels such an interpreta-

command. But he was old and irresolute, and in spite of Frederic's orders to hold the city at any cost, he hastily took the road for Glogau with the ruins of the army. The next day general Lestwitz, who remained with a few battalions in Breslau,¹ signed articles of capitulation almost before a shot had been fired. The Austrians occupied the city in triumph; great numbers of deserters joined them; and everybody felt that Silesia was lost to the king of Prussia,—everybody, perhaps, except the king of Prussia himself. The crisis was the most trying that he had yet encountered, for he had not only to bear the shock of a great reverse, but to bear it also after a few hours of exultation which followed the false reports of a complete Prussian victory.² But Frederic's voice was one of unbroken resolution. To prince Henry he wrote,³ "All these misfortunes have not broken my spirit; I shall go straight ahead, according to the course already marked out." Lestwitz and Kyau were ordered under arrest, and the command of the fugitive army was given to Zieten.

On the twenty-eighth of November Frederic reached Parchwitz, and there awaited the arrival of Zieten. It has been suggested that the retreat from Breslau was really a wise measure, since

Union
of the
Prussian
forces.

tion. Bevern himself was released after a short time by Maria Theresa, whose kinsman he was; but on his return Frederic sent him into a sort of exile as commandant of Stettin, and he was only slowly restored to favor. Lloyd, i. 273 n., says he was undeniably one of the greatest generals of the time, and other authorities concur in this opinion.

¹ The General Staff, vol. i. p. 428, says this was by Frederic's orders. On the contrary, the king had expressly ordered Bevern himself to remain there. *Polit. Corresp.*, xvi. 54, 55.

² See Frederic's correspondence from Naumburg, 24 November, 1757, and Eichel to Finckenstein, same date. How these reports got into circulation is unknown, but they were widely believed. They placed the Austrian losses as high as 24,000.

³ 30 November, 1757.

it saved the larger part of Bevern's army, and made possible its junction with the king. The march up the Oder gave time also to restore discipline, pick up fugitives, dispose of the wounded, and compute the numbers that remained; on the second of December the whole force crossed the river near Glogau, and joined the army of Frederic. The lists called for a total of thirty-nine thousand.¹ The next day was taken for rest, which Zieten's broken and dispirited regiments greatly needed. Frederic visited them in their rude quarters, talked with the men, rallied their courage by words of cheer, and promised them a chance to wipe out the disgrace of Breslau. In the course of the day, too, he assembled the leading officers, and made them an energetic speech, which, in many versions and with much exaggeration or confusion of details, has been handed down in the histories. In substance he told them that he proposed to march directly against an enemy who outnumbered him two to one, and was posted in a place of great natural strength. Such a course was so contrary to all the rules of war that he would excuse, without ill-will, any officer who felt reluctant to follow. But when this suggestion was received, as had doubtless been expected, with loud and unanimous protests, the king expressed his satisfaction; took them as an augury of success, and, changing his tone, announced that any regiment which wavered in front of the foe would lose its colors, be disgraced before the army, and be sent to the interior for garrison service. The conclusion was an assurance that they would soon beat the Austrians, or never meet again. The fancy of an enthusiastic reader might easily enlarge the picture, and represent the officers drawing their swords at the close of this spirited harangue, waving

¹ Frederic to prince Henry, 1 December, 1757. But the actual strength was not over 33,000.

them above their heads in old Germanic style, and swear-
ing to die for king and fatherland.¹

Early the next morning the army set out on its desperate errand. It was in one respect more desperate than Frederic supposed, for the Austrians had nearly three times instead of twice as many men as he; but they lost part of their advantage of position in the course of the day by their own action. After the defeat of Bevern and the capture of Breslau they rested a few days on their laurels, and allowed Kyau to march away unopposed. Their camp was formed along the high ground behind the stream called the Schweidnitz Water, with their right resting on the city, and all the conditions favoring a successful resistance by eighty thousand men to any attempt by thirty thousand. But it was feared by the Austrian generals that if they kept this position the Prussians might reach undisturbed a point from which, with their swift tactics, they could threaten both Breslau and Liegnitz, and thus compel them to divide their own forces before the battle. This consideration led them to decide on a movement toward the enemy.² After the most complete preparations the

Movements
of the
Austrians.

¹ Tempelhof, i. 323, gives the substance of the address, while Retzow, i. 240-242, pretends to give the king's exact language, though from memory. Of course the words were not "taken down," as Carlyle, v. 186, says, and not even Retzow claims that they were. From an exhaustive critical study of the matter which R. Kaser publishes in the *Forschungen zur Brandenburgischen und Preussischen Geschichte*, i. 605 et seq., it appears certain that there was no speech to the army, but only to the officers; that this speech was delivered at Parchwitz on the 3d of December and not on the following day; and that the passages given above are all that can be ascribed to it with certainty. Frederic's own subsequent account is sufficiently cynical. "On tâcha de distraire les idées tristes" . . . he says, "par la gaieté; le vin fut même une ressource pour ranimer les esprits abattus." *Œuvres*, iv. 161.

² See the Austrian version in Lloyd-Tempelhof, i. 311. But why did they not make this movement several days before, inquires the

army broke camp on the fourth, crossed the Schweidnitz Water, and pushed on in the direction of Neumarkt and Parchwitz, but had not proceeded far when it was learned that the Prussian vanguard had already reached Neumarkt. This cleared the situation at once. Prince Charles called a halt, sent the baggage trains back to the other side of the stream, and formed for action. Though the new position was not as strong as the one just abandoned, and had the disadvantage of water in the rear, even Arneth admits that it was well chosen.¹ The army was deployed between the village of Nippern, on which the extreme right leaned, and the village of Sagschütz, four miles distant; while in right angle to this point an auxiliary flank, or what is called in tactics a *crochet* to the rear,² was thrown back to a pond in front of Gohlau. The formation was in two lines, with cavalry on the flanks and also, for some unexplained purpose, between the lines. Artillery was posted to command the roads and other approaches. On the right general Lucchesi had command, while part of the left wing and the *crochet* was formed by the separate corps of Nadasdy. The Austrian line has been criticised as too long and thin. At his end, too, Nadasdy made the mistake of putting the contingents of Bavaria and Würtemberg, which were disaffected, in the first line instead of the second, as had been arranged, — a mistake for which he was afterwards severely blamed by prince Charles in his report.³

Long before sunrise the next morning, the fifth of

critical Lloyd, and thus prevent the junction of the Prussian forces ?
Ibid., p. 317.

¹ Arneth, v. 263.

² Also called the order *en potence*. The two lines thus converging into an angle form what is called an offensive wedge. But Jomini seems to doubt its value.

³ Arneth, v. 263.

December, just one month after Rossbach, the Prussians were put in motion. They were arranged according to the order of battle adopted the day before, and marched in four parallel columns, the right counting as the first. This was made up of the cavalry of the right wing of both lines; the second column had the infantry of the right; the third, the infantry of the left; and the fourth, the cavalry of the left; while the artillery followed in the rear, and the whole was preceded by a vanguard of ten battalions. At the village of Borne the vanguard struck and routed a force of Saxon cavalry. Borne was nearly opposite the centre of the Austrian position; and as daylight now dawned, Frederic was able from a hill near by to get a fair view of the whole of the enemy's lines. He was familiar with the ground as the scene of frequent manœuvres and reviews. Hence a short survey convinced him that as the Austrian right was sheltered by swamps and woods, the left, which was more vulnerable, must be the object of his tactics. Some accounts state that the king made feigned movements toward the enemy's right, and even that his original plan was to give battle on that side. These are not supported by the evidence.¹ But Lucchesi seems to have believed in the reality of danger, for he sent urgent appeals for reënforcements, which after some delay were granted, and Daun accompanied them.² Thus the Austrians strengthened one of their wings while Frederic was swiftly moving against the other. A short distance beyond Borne the Prussian army changed its course and order of march to suit the plan; the four columns of the first line wheeled successively to the right, forming a single long thin column; those of the second

Advance
of the
Prussians.

¹ Kutzen, *Friedrich der Grosse und sein Heer in den Tagen der Schlacht bei Leuthen*, Breslau, 1851, p. 69.

² According to Arneth, v. 264, these even included some cavalry from the extreme left. See also Cogniazo, ii. 425, 426.

line wheeled in the same way and at the same time, forming a second column parallel to the first; and these two columns of march were, of course, the two lines of battle. In each case cavalry led and cavalry brought up the rear, while the foot of the two wings, the right first, filled up the interval. To the left and near the front the vanguard had its position. The line of march was obliquely toward the enemy's left, and the attack was to be en échelon, a system of tactics which Frederic here showed in its greatest perfection, and with which his name is inseparably connected.

The general object of the oblique order of attack is to turn an enemy's flank. This appears in Frederic's battles of Hohenfriedberg and Prague; while at Rossbach the combined army, attempting the same tactics, enabled him to show how an energetic general could thwart them by changing his own front. But a more special aim of this movement is to give a smaller army a chance to overcome the disadvantage of numbers by massing a superior force upon one extremity of the enemy's line. This also was not new in Frederic's time. Epaminondas had tried it successfully two thousand years before, and it was elementary in the art of war. The method is to attack an enemy's flank with one wing, while the other is kept out of the range of fire and held in a position from which it can supply reinforcements when needed, and also act as a check upon the disengaged part of the hostile army. This describes the general tactics of Frederic at Kollin. But it is evident that the success of such a manœuvre depends on several conditions, as, for example, the secrecy of the preliminary movements, the exact discipline of the troops, the distance to which the refused wing is thrown back, the method of deploying the attacking wing, and, usually, the neglect of the enemy to adopt suitable measures against it. At Kollin nearly all of these

Oblique attack en échelon.

conditions were absent, and the attempt ended in disaster. But in the battle which now ensued they were all present. A low range of hills and the morning fog hid the army of Frederic as it marched from Borne to the point of attack; and without making any earnest effort to learn the truth, the Austrian generals suffered the plan to develop itself undisturbed. The faultless accuracy with which the troops executed their orders won the admiration even of their own officers, who knew what Prussian discipline meant.¹ The refused wing was not left, as at Kollin, to be vexed and demoralized by the enemy's fire. And the attack itself was arranged on a plan which combined the highest degree of effectiveness with an almost mathematical precision. This is known as the order en échelon. The attacking column resembles a huge flight of stairs, which is formed by throwing each of the battalions a certain distance behind yet parallel to the line of its predecessor; between the openings thus made cavalry and artillery can easily pass when needed; while a simple movement forward of the various sections can at any time close the gaps, and form an unbroken line. The parallel marching of the sections gives the direction of the entire body, and the fighting fronts appear as each faces to the enemy and advances into action. By this combination the attacking line steadily pushes itself around the enemy's flank, its real strength is concealed, and the various parts of which it is composed enter under fire only as fast as they are needed. Modern firearms, with their long range and great precision, have made this order of battle difficult or impossible. But its use by Frederic gives it a right to be described, if only as one of the achievements of human genius.

The plan of battle gave prince Maurice command of the right or active wing, with Zieten in charge of the cavalry, while generals Retzow and Driesen stood in the

¹ Tempelhof, an eye-witness, i. 327.

same relation at the opposite side of the line. On reaching the higher ground between Lobetintz and Kortschütz the army deployed for action. The vanguard was chosen to open the fight; but as six battalions had been shifted to a point beyond the cavalry of the right flank — an unusual arrangement which the end soon justified — only three battalions remained, under general Wedell, for this honorable duty. About noon the engagement began. A battery of guns placed in advance of the infantry of the right wing opened fire, and at the same time Wedell moved upon the Austrian angle near Sagschütz. The assault was in small force, but it was vigorous and effective; the twelve-pounders — called affectionately by the troops the “Brummers” — kept up a fierce cannonade; the infantry of the right came punctually into action; the “wedge” began to waver; and when Nadasdy from the extreme left essayed a counter charge upon the Prussian cavalry, his men were surprised and repulsed by the well-directed fire of the six battalions. Behind Gohlau the brave Hungarian leader tried to form his shattered corps for another stand. But now Zieten was upon him with the cavalry, which the nature of the ground had embarrassed during the early part of the fight; and the fresh vigor of its onset completed this part of the work. Nadasdy’s corps was literally swept from the field, and gave neither friend nor foe any further concern. In the mean time the rest of the Austrian infantry formed a new and tolerably compact line of battle, nearly at right angles to the first, with Leuthen at the centre. A few battalions flung themselves into the village itself and behind the stout walls of the cemetery, where occurred perhaps the sharpest fighting of the day. Frederic hurried up his own remaining foot, which deployed opposite the new line of the enemy. The twelve-pounders dashed into shorter range, and reopened their fire. Inch by inch, and only

Battle of
Leuthen,
5 Decem-
ber, 1757.

after the most desperate and bloody hand-to-hand combats, were the enemy forced out of their natural defences, and beyond the village. All along the line the battle was stubborn; at one moment it was highly critical for the Prussians. Seeing a favorable chance, Lucchesi galloped up with the cavalry of the right directly toward Frederic's left, hoping to turn his flank by this sudden move. But general Driesen, who up to this time had stood in reserve behind Radaxendorf, caught him in the act, and by a swift movement anticipated his tactics. Ten squadrons of dragoons fell upon his flank and rear; the rest of Driesen's horse attacked directly in front, and with such momentum that Lucchesi's entire cavalry was thrown back upon the foot, which it swept away in its own panic. Lucchesi himself was killed. The Austrians made only one more attempt to rally. Tempelhof's plan shows their third and last line drawn from the village of Lissa on the left to Frobeltwitz on the right; but they were now only dense masses of demoralized troops, on which the "Brummers" directed their fire with murderous effect,¹ while their front was so short that Frederic easily turned their right flank, cutting off whole battalions as prisoners, and finally deciding about five o'clock the issue of the day. The defeated army retired behind the Schweidnitz Water. Frederic with a few volunteers pursued them to the very edge of the stream, and hurried them over by parting volleys. Fired by this example, the rest of the weary troops followed after the king, and as they tramped along in the gathering darkness struck up as by inspiration the grand old hymn, "Nun danket alle Gott," in which even the wounded among whom they picked their way bravely joined, until they reached their comrades, when, as the last tones died

¹ Marainville, a French officer with the Austrian army, praises especially the conduct of the Prussian artillery. See Stühr, i. 388, 389.

away, they lay down to their well-earned rest under the cold December sky.¹

Such was the battle of Leuthen, the most famous of all that Frederic fought.² Jomini compares it to Sohr, which it undoubtedly resembles in many respects, especially in the proportion of numbers engaged; and Napoleon pronounced it a masterpiece in the history of war. About the details of the engagement a historian may justly be diffident. But the leading facts are clear, and the result tells its own story. With thirty thousand men Frederic gave battle to eighty thousand, and during four hours' hard fighting drove them out of position after position, until his own superb generalship and the disciplined valor of his troops won a complete, indeed an overwhelming victory. The figures of the relative losses would be almost incredible, were they not supported by so many authorities on either side. The victors lost something over six thousand men in killed, wounded, and missing. But the Austrian total foots up more than twenty thousand, half of whom were prisoners taken on the field; besides this, they lost over one hundred guns, fifty-one flags, and four thousand wagons. Seventeen generals were killed or wounded, and many regiments were left without officers enough to hold the men in the ranks. The letters of prince Charles describe graphically the terrible night of shame, anguish, and anxiety which his beaten and demoralized army passed.³ So critical was the situation felt to be that the prince, Daun, and other general officers were astir as early as four o'clock the next morning, when they hurried the

¹ Retzow, i. 252, 253, has perhaps the best account of this picturesque incident.

² Most famous, I mean, as a military achievement. Rossbach, and one or two others, made perhaps more noise in the world, but not for purely military reasons.

³ Arneth, v. 265 and note 397.

Retreat
of the
Austrians.

remnants of their great army over the Lohe; after which they restored some degree of discipline, and formed a temporary order of battle. In the afternoon the entire force, except the large garrison left in Breslau, took the road for Schweidnitz. But as an attempt to winter in Silesia was held to be too hazardous, the retreat actually continued until safe quarters were finally reached in Bohemia. The final muster rolls showed the presence of only something over thirty thousand men, and but a small part even of these were fit for active duty.¹

Frederic was, of course, not the general to rest even on the laurels of such a victory as Leuthen. Zieten was promptly sent in pursuit of the retreating foe; and by hanging on their flanks, and charging tardy battalions, he cut off many prisoners, and increased the general demoralization. Meantime the king himself at once invested Breslau. The Austrian commander, general Sprecher, was esteemed a man of resolution, and his first measures pointed to a desperate resistance; he even issued an order threatening with death any person who spoke of surrender. But on the twentieth of December, after the cannonade had made a slight breach in the not very formidable walls by which the city was surrounded, he yielded the place. The

Recapture
of Breslau.

¹ This campaign ended the military career of prince Charles of Lorraine. Even Maria Theresa, and his own brother, the emperor, now abandoned him, and he returned to his government in the Netherlands, where he lived until his death in 1780. Frederic esteemed him rather highly, and in the very year, almost the very hour, of his death, expressed the opinion that he was a soldier of real merit, who failed not so much on account of his own defects, as on account of the faults of a system. See Carlyle, vi. 505. But for readers here the most important fact is that in his fall prince Charles carried with him a much abler soldier than himself in the person of Nadasy. Held responsible in the reports from the field, and notwithstanding a record of exceptional brilliancy, for the disaster at Leuthen, Nadasy threw up his command, and retired to his estates in Hungary, where in inaction he passed the rest of his life.

entire garrison, seventeen thousand strong, including a dozen general officers, became prisoners of war.¹ Liegnitz held out a week longer, and as the result of their brave defence the garrison were allowed to depart with military honors.² In all Silesia only Schweidnitz now remained in Austrian hands.

In Hanover, and all that part of Germany which formed the French sphere of operations, the presence, the firm hand, and the prompt energy of Ferdinand of Brunswick were felt at once.

Richelieu
and the
French
after
Rossbach.

After the battle of Rossbach the two parts of the combined army lost all cohesion and went asunder. The frightened imperialists took the roads to the south into Franconia. Soubise and the French fled westward, and hardly paused to collect themselves until they reached the limits of Hesse-Cassel, where they were practically incorporated with the main army, or at least were brought under the authority of Richelieu. At the same time the latter evacuated Halberstadt, and retired into Brunswick and Hanover. This movement had ultimately in view, subject to such changes as were made necessary by the unexpected defeat of Soubise, an imposing scheme formed by the French court soon after the convention of Closter-Zeven. As the duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin was an important, or a convenient factor in the programme, a treaty was negotiated with him by which he agreed to open certain of his fortified towns to the French for garrisons and magazines.³ The contingents of Hesse and Brunswick, whose return from Stade was part of the plan, were to be organized into a Protestant legion in the

¹ The articles of capitulation and a full list of the prisoners are given in *Heldengeschichte*, iv. 961 et seq.

² *Ibid.*, p. 1017 et seq. G. S., i. 455, computes the total losses of the Austrians for the month of December at 42,000.

³ Signed 1 December, 1757. The articles are given by Schaefer, i. 597-600. It seems doubtful whether it was ever formally ratified.

service of France; and after these details were arranged, it was proposed to stretch out Richelieu's line until his extreme left joined the Swedes. The Prussian provinces of Saxony, Brandenburg, and Pomerania would be completely enveloped from the west and north. It would then only be necessary, so the French plan assumed, to make a concerted advance along the whole line, drawing the circle, or half-circle, steadily tighter and tighter, until a good part of Prussia should be strangled in its folds, as the boa constrictor crushes its prey. The advance of Richelieu into Halberstadt was part of this original plan. But the delay in the execution of the convention of Closter-Zeven, the defeat of Soubise, and the rumors from Stade, made it necessary for the marshal to assure his rear against the allied army. From Brunswick, therefore, he addressed on the ninth of November a peremptory demand for explanations to general Zastrow, who had been left in command by Cumberland. The answer, dated five days later, was a sufficiently clear indication that hostilities would soon be reopened; but a subsequent communication from Zastrow, twenty-first of November, left no longer any doubt on the subject.¹

The formal rupture of the convention of Closter-Zeven, though long expected and long delayed, now made a complete change in the situation. The old landgrave of Hesse cut short his negotiations with Richelieu, and renewed his adhesion to the allied cause. The Hanoverian ministers accepted the new turn of events. Charles duke of Brunswick alone bowed before the French power, and in accordance with his special

Initial
work of
Ferdinand.

¹ This correspondence is printed in a pamphlet issued by the French in defence of their conduct. The title is, *Das Betragen Sr. Allerchristl. Majestät des Königs in Frankreich entgegengestellt dem Betragen des Königs in England*, etc. Strasburg, 1758. The English, or Anglo-Hanoverian pamphlet is reproduced in *Heldengeschichte*, iv. 756 et seq. The date is Stade, 26 November, 1757.

treaty recalled his troops from Stade.¹ But Ferdinand had sent forward orders forbidding their departure as in violation of their engagement to England; and when they attempted to leave, the Hessians and Hanoverians surrounded and detained them. Two Brunswick generals were placed under arrest, and the fugitives were escorted back to the camp, where they promised submission to the new general-in-chief. Such was the situation when Ferdinand reached Stade in person. On his way he had picked up the young hereditary prince of Brunswick, his nephew, and, notwithstanding the paternal commands, taken him to headquarters.² In doing this, and in detaining the Brunswick troops, Ferdinand assumed, as he well knew, a grave responsibility. But the crisis was urgent, and there was no time for weighing risks. As soon as he had got control of the situation, which a judicious mixture of firmness and moderation soon brought about, he gave due notice of his purpose,³ took the offensive, and advanced directly upon the enemy. The French marshal, surprised by the turn of affairs, and in nervous dread of imaginary Prussians coming up from the other side,⁴ fell back with little or no resistance behind the Aller. Beyond this stream Ferdinand did not feel strong enough to press the issue. It was now the middle of December, and notwithstanding Frederic's earnest appeals the prince put his troops into winter quarters, pressing meanwhile the siege of Harburg, which fell on the thirtieth of December. The French camped between the Aller and the Leine, except the corps of Soubise, which

¹ Ante, p. 114.

² Charles William Ferdinand, afterwards reigning duke of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel, and commander of the Austro-Prussian forces against France in 1792. The correspondence exchanged between the three is given by Stühr, i. 350-354.

³ Ferdinand to Richelieu, 28 November, 1757.

⁴ See Stühr, i. 238-241.

remained in Hesse. The duke of Mecklenburg was thus left to his own resources. Nothing could be baser than this desertion by France of a prince who had been led by her solemn pledges into schemes that would make him, if left unassisted, the certain object of Frederic's vengeance.

In the course of December the armies all ceased active operations. Keith returned from his expedition to Bohemia, and joined prince Henry in Saxony. Lehwaldt's arrival in Pomerania broke the winter repose of the Swedes, who had retired to the line of the Peene; and by energetic tactics he soon recovered all the Prussian territory still in their hands, except the island of Rügen, the fort at the mouth of the Peene, and the fortified city of Stralsund. But the Prussians drew a close line of blockade about the enemy's positions before they went into quarters for the winter. Frederic took up his own headquarters at Br̄slau, while in northern Bohemia the Austrians had time to reflect on the vicissitudes of war.



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